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ABSTRACT
The thesis focusses on the question of the coherence of the
notion of a "criterion" which has enjoyed considerable currency in
the contemporary Philosophy of Language and Mind. The text is
divided into three parts, each of which deals with a particular
aspect of the notion of a criterion, or of theories of criteria.
Part One consists of Chapters 1, 2 and 3 and explores the question
of the origins of the notion and of theories concerning it.
Wittgenstein's later work is widely recognized as the notion's point
of origin and for that reason I examine Wittgenstein's use of the
term "criterion" and the philosophy of language which is the proper
context of the notion as employed by that author. I then present my
own account of the significance of the notion to Wittgenstein, and
the role of the notion in his later thought. Part Two consists of
Chapters 4 and 5 which examine the place of the notion in the
contemporary Philosophy of Language and offer a critical account of
much recent work in that field. Finally, in Part Three, I
concentrate on the question of the coherence of the notion. The
sixth Chapter deals mainly with epistemological issues of relevance
but also involves some formal work together with some discussion
of the ramifications of the notion, correctly understood, in the
Philosophy of Mind. Chapter Seven suggests a formal, logical
framework in which criterial reasoning patterns can be usefully
mapped and also attempts to demonstrate an inherent flexibilty of
format which might allow for contrastive comparisons with other
modes of reasoning.
The following thesis consists wholly of my own work and thoughts on
the subjects discussed therein.
Paul Tomassi
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The concept of a criterion makes its full philosophical debut
in the works of Wittgenstein in the early pages (24-25) of the Blue
Book [1933-34]. Nowhere else is the concept given such overt,
sustained and self-conscious consideration though it appears in a
wide variety of later contexts. In fact the term first occurs in a
number of passages (III 23, XVII 181, 186, XX 206, 215) in the
Philosophical Remarks [1929-30], which would place its exact origin
some four years earlier. As the primary focus of contemporary
debate, however, the Blue Book passage remains very much its
beginning. For that reason I sacrifice exact textual chronology in
order to attain an ubersicht of commentary.
I COMMENTARY
Baker and Hacker, who for many years championed a criteriological
interpretation of the later Wittgenstein, originally shared a
particular opinion of these passages. Baker [1974, p.159] referred
to "the ambiguity of 'criteria' in the Blue Book" which resulted
from "the notorious passage which introduces criteria" and concluded
that "the term must be judged ambiguous in the Blue Book".
Similarily, Hacker [1972, p.285] spoke of "inconsistencies in the
Blue Book's use of the term and maintained that "this notorious
passage (81. B p.24-25) is misleading". At that time both authors
agreed that with the exception of the offending introduction there
did exist a clear and univocal later use with which the introduction
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could not sit comfortably. If this account is impartial exegesis and
therefore valid commentary, then, as Nietzsche [1973, p. 131] has
asserted: "the disinterested act is an interesting and interested
act" .
In the most recent of Hacker's commentaries, the revised
edition of "Insight and Illusion" [1985], that attitude is
significantly moderated. In this case a textual 'ambiguity' is
noted, though the point is relegated to a footnote [p.316]. The
ambiguity in question concerns whether or not descriptions of the
satisfaction of P's criterial circumstances actually entail that P
is true. The problem arises because, to Hacker, the two examples of
criteria which Wittgenstein presents in the Blue Book p.24-25 each
seem to suggest a different answer to that question. This is clearly
the cause of the original claim. That is, at least one of the examples
in the introductory passages was felt to portray descriptions of the
satisfaction of P's criterial circumstances as entailing P while in
many later uses descriptions of the satisfaction of criteria for P
appeared to fall short of entailing that P.
While I have no hermenuetic axe to grind as regards defeasibility,
it does seem to me that if it is not immediately obvious that the
relation was specifically intended not to be entailing it is equally
not obvious that it was intented purely as one of entailment. In fact
I shall argue both that Wittgenstein did not distinguish between criteria,
or between criteria and symptoms, in terms of the notion of
entailment and that these passages present a mish-mash of ideas not
all of which were later taken up by Wittgenstein. What is patently
obvious is that explicit concern and discussion of defeasibility and
criterial relations does not feature in any of the passages in
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question and that is consistently the case as regards later uses. I
return to the issue of consistency below in section V.
In sharp commentorial contrast to this type of interpretative line
John Cook [1969, p.134-5] has proposed an alternative exegesis of
these passages whereby Wittgenstein is considered to have exposed
the concept of a criterion which he had just introduced as being "a
piece of confusion" and ultimately "a bogus notion". For Cook the
whole exercise forms perhaps the earliest example of what was later
to be termed Wittgenstein's attack on essentialism. Apparently then,
Wittgenstein introduced the term only to explode it as a myth, a
conceptual confusion. Cook [1969] presupposes that reasoning
criterially is on a philosophical par with Socratic Dialectic.
According to Cook [1969], in identifying the criterion for an
expression we not only discover the real meaning of that expression
but identify the single form, the "common element", which every
proper case of application manifests. Certainly, such classically
rationalist epistemology and its metaphysically essentialist
underpinnings are anathema to the spirit of Wittgenstein's later
work. No doubt he would have wholeheartedly opposed it, that is, if
he had characterized the concept of a criterion as Cook has alleged.
During his account of the matter Cook [op. cit] does acknowledge
that: "the argument is not made explicit in the Blue Book although
the conclusion is stated on page 25". This is explained by the fact
that the Blue Book was originally a supplement to a series of
lectures and therefore was intended only for those attending the
lectures which accompanied it. Against this interpretation I argue
that while 8aker and Hacker were visibly too extreme in attributing
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a full-blown criterial theory to Wittgenstein, Cook goes too far in
the opposite direction if, as appears to be the case, he is allowing
no positive use of the term at all.
II EXEGESIS
Over pages 24-25 of the Blue Book Wittgenstein deploys the terms
"criteria"/"criterion" nine times in total. It may prove valuable to
examine each of these occurrences and their contexts so as to
reconstruct the basic framework of Wittgenstein's argument here.
Firstly, a criterion for an expression is identified as an aspect
of that expression's grammar, sense or meaning and to explain one's
criterion for an assertion containing that expression is considered
tantamount to giving an explanation of the meaning of that
expression:
"..to explain my criterion for another person's having
toothache is to give a grammatical explanation about the
word 'toothache' and in this sense, an explanation
concerning the meaning of the word 'toothache'."
(BIB.p.24)
Secondly, criteria are alleged to function as means of identification
which co-ordinate experience and utterance. Criteria are construed as
phenomena which are themselves coincident with other phenomena and are
described as being in some sense conventional, I discuss below just in what
sense that is so.
"Suppose that by observation I found that in certain cases
whenever these first criteria told me a person had toothache,
a red patch appeared on the person's cheek. Supposing I now
said to someone "I see A has toothache, he's got a red patch
on his cheek." He may ask me "How do you know A has toothache
when you see a red patch?" I should then point out that certain
phenomena had always coincided with the appearance of the red
patch. Now one may go on and ask: "How do you know he has got
toothache when he holds his cheek?" The answer to this might be,
I say HE has toothache when he holds his cheek because I hold
my cheek when I have toothache." But what if we went on asking..
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You will be at a loss to answer ..and find that here we strike
rock bottom, that is we have come down to conventions."
(BIB.p.24)
The third use introduces "criteria" as a term to be contrasted with the
term "symptom":
"Let us introduce two antithetical terms in order to avoid
certain elementary confusions: To the question "How do
you know that so-and-so is the case ?', we sometimes
answer by giving 'criteria' and sometimes by giving
'symptoms'."
The introduction of new terminology is in keeping with the promise
on page 23 that not only will we examine particular uses so as to
'clear the matter up" but:
"We shall also try to construct new notations, in order to
break the spell of those we are accustomed to."
The fourth and fifth uses occur in a passage where it is made
clear that medical science, in the sense of the community of doctors
and medical scientists, is that authority which decides on the
defining criterion for the term 'angina' and that the criterion
contrasts with 'symptoms':
"If medical science calls angina an inflammation caused
by a particular bacillus, and we ask in a particular
case 'why do you say this man has got angina?' then
the answer 'I have found the bacillus so-and-so in
his blood' gives us the criterion, or what we may call
the defining criterion of angina. If on the other hand
the answer was, 'his throat was inflamed', this might
give us a symptom of angina."
The sixth use occurs when Wittgenstein explains a 'symptom' as a
phenomenon which is coincident with the presence of a criterion, and
reiterates and emphasises the fact that the defining criterion will
itself be a phenomenon:
"I call a 'symptom' a phenomenon of which experience has
taught us that it coincided, in some way or another with
the phenomenon which is our defining criterion. Then to
say 'A man has angina if this bacillus is found in him'
is a tautology or it is a loose way of stating the
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definition of 'angina'. But to say, 'A man has angina
whenever he has an inflamed throat' is to make an
hypothesis."
The seventh and eighth uses point up the fundamental
interchangeability of criteria and symptoms and emphasise the fact
that although we can decide to give a word a use on the basis of
criteria selecting a criterion from a given set of phenomena may be
wholly arbitrary or ad hoc.
"In practice if you were asked which phenomenon is the
defining criterion and which is a symptom you would in
most cases be unable to answer this question except by
making an arbitrary decision ad hoc. It may be practical
to define a word by taking one phenomenon as the
defining criterion but we shall easily be persuaded
to define the word by means of what, according to
our first use was a symptom."
(BIB.p.25)
It is tempting to describe the process of deciding on a
criterion as essentially a matter of convention, particularity in
the case of angina. If we did so describe the second example we
might then argue that both examples of criteria are identical in
presenting criteria as conventional. But there are at least two
senses of "convention" at work here. Firstly, Wittgenstein speaks of
'coming down to conventions' and secondly, we could describe doctors as
deciding 'by convention' on a criterion for angina. The two uses, and
therefore the two examples, are distinguished at least in so far as
there is a degree of choice in the latter case which is absent from the
former. It is not obvious that we are as free to choose which behavioural
phenomena are criterial for toothache as doctors might be as regards
defining angina. Again, the interchangeability feature seems much less
readily applicable to the case of toothache. However, in both cases,
once use is criterially fixed we no longer have any choice. Of
course, we could speak differently but there is a clear sense in
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which that would change the language we use, dependent upon the degree
of difference involved. Therefore, both cases have the property of
use-fixing in common and in this respect are identical. I return to
the same point below, in a number of contexts.
The ninth use indicates and emphasises that doctors as
practitioners of medical language-games may successfully and
correctly use words in the complete absence of any such
criteria/symptom distinction. Again the basic interchangeability
of symptom and criterion is re-iterated:
"Doctors will use names of diseases without ever
deciding which phenomena are to be taken as criteria
and which as symptoms; and this need not be a
deplorable lack of clarity. For remember that in
general we don't use language according to strict
rules-it hasn't been taught to us by means of
strict rules either. We in our discussions on the
other hand constantly compare language with a
calculus proceeding according to strict rules.
This is a very one-sided way of looking at
language."
(BIB p.25)
In these final remarks it is made abundantly clear that in a certain
sense criteria are irrelevant to correct use in this case and are by
no means essential or necessarily pre-requisite. The ordinary
business of language can readily proceed in the complete absence
of criterial distinctions. At the heart of the very introduction of
the terminology in question then is a claim which is antithetical to
any suggestion that a theory of meaning was ever couched, explicitly
or implicitly, in those terms. For here criteria just are not
coextensive with meaningfulness. Criteria are not essential to
meaning. Yet, to construe a notion as inessential, even frequently
irrelevant, is plainly not equivalent to exposing that notion as
illusory, bogus or inherently confused. This alone will not suffice
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to establish the validity of Cook's interpretation.
Following Cook [1969] I now cite what was alleged by that author to
be the conclusion to Wittgenstein's implicit argument:
"we are unable clearly to circumscribe the concepts
we use not because we don't know their real definition
but because there is no real definition to them."
(Bl.B, p.25)
It is of vital importance to valid exegesis to examine the context
of this remark. In fact it occurs in the third paragraph of p.25 which
I have already quoted, above p.7- As noted that paragraph begins:
"This is a very one sided way of looking at language"
(BIB p.25)
But there is a definite continuation of sense, an enjambement,
between the second and third paragraphs on page 25, as the initial
of "This" makes obvious.
The opening "This" of the third paragraph transparently refers
to the point immediately preceding, namely, that to demand that
linguistic rules be calculus-like in their rigour and precision is
an unrealistic and one-sided way of thinking about language. That
claim arose when Wittgenstein emphasised the lack of necessity for
criteria in every case and held correct use in the absence of any
criteria/symptom distinction to be a linguistic commonplace. There
Wittgenstein referred to a certain philosophical attitude which
considered the lack of these distinctions as a lack of conceptual
clarity. The point to which Cook refers may well be a rejoinder to
that, rather Fregean, attitude and may well reinforce the point
noted that many concepts do not have and need not have any explicit
defining criteria. But that still does not show that no concept could
have a criterion. It is just fallacious to infer from the fact that
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many words do not have criteria to the conclusion that none could.
As I read him Wittgenstein has just outlined what criteria for
toothache or angina might be. What he is complaining about is surely
that attitude which holds language to be a calculus and therefore
demands precise distinctions in every instance. If anything, it is this
attitude which is held to be inherently confused; not the concept of
a criterion. Notably, Cook [1969] supplies his own reference for the
"this" in question namely, "common element", even although that phrase
appears nowhere on either page. As Russell has asserted in another
context "this may appear odd but that is not my fault".
Why one wonders, if Cook [1969] were correct, should Wittgenstein
continue to invoke the term in later pages of the very text in which it
is allegedly exploded? Undoubtedly, in the Blue 8ook Wittgenstein did
think that as a matter of fact we possessed criteria for certain
expressions. The concept is clearly used rather than mentioned.
Comparison between different sets of criteria is frequently invited
as in:
"{Here it will be useful if you consider the different
criteria for what we call 'the identity of these objects'.
(Bl.B p.55)
Again, describing the metaphysician's discontent with ordinary
grammar Wittgenstein outlines the possibility of identifying
cheating by means of criteria. Criteria are described as ways of
finding out and are said to have a role in the meaning of these
particular psychological concepts:
"The man who says 'only my pain is real' doesn't mean to say
that he has found out by the common criteria, which give our
words their common meanings, that the others who said they had
pains were cheating. But what he rebels against is the use of
this expression in connection with these criteria"
(Bl.B p.57)
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Further, why should Wittgenstein ever extend his usage of a 'bogus
notion' beyond the Blue Book to later works ? If it were the case
that the concept was destroyed in the Blue Book we should not expect
any use of it, for example, in the Brown Book. The fact remains that
nine uses are made of "criteria"/"criterion" in part one of the
Brown Book. In each case one could fairly substitute, salva
veritate, on that term with 'means of identification' or, more
simply, 'way of telling'. For example:
"A criterion for what they mean would be the occasions
on which the word we are inclined to translate as 'highest'
is used, the role we might say which we observe this word
to play in the life of the tribe."
(BB, p.94)
"All I can say is: If the fact that they only say "He can.
.." if he has done ...is your criterion for the same meaning,
then the two expressions have the same meaning."
(BB, p.104)
Equally, criteria are twice described as 'defining', as the criteria
in the Blue Book were:
"When on the other hand we talk of the state of a stick in
46 observe that to this state there does not correspond a
particular sense experience which lasts while the state lasts.
Instead of that the defining criterion for something being in
this state consists in certain tests."
(BB, p.101)
"As the defining criterion of "the chief picking men suitable
for this action" I will not take what he says but only the
other features of the situation"
(BB, p.104)
Interestingly, the notion features in rhetorical questions where the
reader is clearly intended to conclude that what we do not have in the
case in question is a criterion:
"'But doesn't B in this case lack the criterion by which he
can recognize the material ? "
(88, p.86)
"should we regard his personal experience as the criterion
distinguishing between reading and not reading?"
(8Q, p.122)
In each case the context makes clear that Wittgenstein is trying to
show the reader the poverty of private mental states as public standards,
as criteria. The reader would not be warranted in inferring from the fact
that this or that is not, or could not, be a criterion to the conclusion
that therefore nothing could be a criterion. Nor is it valid to argue from
something's being a bogus criterion to the concept of criterion as itself
a bogus one.
In part two of the Brown Book the term occurs four times during the
discussion of 'seeing what is common': criteria for understanding are
mentioned (p.132), as are criteria for 'seeing that" (p.135). A
criterion for identifying two meanings of a word is suggested and
behaviour is explicitly held to be criterial (p.138). Nowhere in this
discussion of "seeing what is common' are criteria ever identified as
commmon elements, as essences or as 'what is in common'. Beyond that
discussion, criteria as ways of identifying sincerity are mentioned
(p.140) and the final use in the penultimate paragraph of the text
asserts:
"If I speak of communicating a feeling to someone else,
mustn't I in order to understand what I say know what I
shall call the criterion of having succeeded in
communicating?"
(BB, p.185)
Again, Typescript 229, published as Volume 1 of the "Remarks On
The Philosophy of Psychology", contains eleven uses of the terms
"criteria"/"criterion" (137 (2), 245, 302, 444, 530, 645, 649,
684, 698, 702). This typescript was dictated in Autumn 1947 and is a
selection of remarks from a collection of manuscripts [M.S. books
130-138] which also formed the basis of Part II of the
Investigations. According to the volume's editors G.E.M. Anscombe
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and G.H. Von Wright:
"What Wittgenstein wrote in M.S. books 130-8 may with
some justification be described as preparatory studies
for Part II of the Investigations."
(preface)
Criteria feature in a number of different contexts in this text, as,
for example, ways of telling whether someone can play chess:
"if he now replies that we are interested in what goes on in
him after all, namely: in whether he can play chess-then we
could contradict him by reminding him of the criteria which
would prove his capacity to us."
(302)
Criteria are also presented as ways of telling whether a child has
understood:
"..it is important that he ordinarily gives an answer when he
has put up his hand; and that is the criterion for his
understanding putting up one's hand"
( 245 )
Wittgenstein's first use in this text states that:
"I can't give criteria which put the presence of the sensation
beyond doubt: that is to say there are no such criteria"
(137)
Of course, the fact that descriptions of the satisfaction of criteria
do not entail the truth of assertions of the presence of the sensation does
not itself entail that there are no criteria but the testimony that this
remark provides cannot sit comfortably with the view that Wittgenstein
thought of criteria purely as entailing, or as identical with sensation.
I discuss this matter in more detail below. [Chapter 2, also Chapter 6].
There is a further degree of terminological similarity to the use of
the term in the 81ue Book in the last use in Typescript 229 (702) which
mentions a "logical criterion". Further, in Typescript 232 [Sept/Oct 1984],
published as Volume 2 of the "Remarks On The Philosophy of Psychology",
criteria feature several times during discussions of aspect-perception. In
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remark 42 Wittgenstein raises the question of whether there are criteria for
perceiving changing aspects of a figure:
"if the child hit upon different ways of reproducing it
[the figure] pictorially would that be our criterion for
the change of aspect ?"
In remark 43 Wittgenstein goes on to suggest that seeing might be a
state but asks if this is so..
"..how do I know that a person is in such a state..what
are the logical characteristics of such a state ?"
The same thought is followed through in remark 44:
"For to say that one recognizes the state as a state
whenever one is in it is nonsense. By what does one
recognize it? (The criterion of identity)"
The criterion of identity mentioned in remark 44 would presumably
be a logical characteristic of the state of seeing, as requested in
remark 43. Such a criterion (if possible at all) would then also
provide an answer to the question "how do I know.." in remark 43;
in short a criterion would provide a way of telling. Remark 44
makes clear however that a criterion must be public and that, on
pain of absurdity, no private phenomenon could function as a public
criterion. In another remark on recognition in Typescript 229 (530)
Wittgenstein makes the point that if all we have is a private
experience of recognition without any public criterion for correct
recognition then it may not make sense to speak of recognition here
at all. Wittgenstein's use of "criterion" in remark 44, Typescript
232, has some of the tone of the Brown Book's rhetorical requests
for criteria. The futlity of any attempt to find a private
criterion for public language might well explain the echo here of
those earlier rhetorical uses.
The last use in the present typescript occurs in remark 506 which
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concerns seeing aspects in geometry:
"..there are simply different criteria for seeing."
Nothing in any of the remarks composing the preparatory studies for
Part I or Part II of the Investigations provides any evidence that
Wittgenstein thought of the notion of a criterion as a bogus one.
What clearly does emerge is a continuous thread of use of the term
in the sense of, say, way of telling.
Finally, it must be asked why Cook himself continues to appeal to
the concept of a criterion in his later article "The Metaphysics of
Wittgenstein's On Certainty" [1985] if Wittgenstein had genuinely exposed
the concept as confused. In that essay Cook [1985] readily relies upon the
concept when, for example, he asserts: "..let us return to our criterion for
picking out hinge-propositions" (p.90). Again on the question of the nature
of hinge-propositions, Cook [1985] asks: "by what criterion does he
[Wittgenstein] identify them?" (p.87). Lastly, Cook [1985] wonders of
Wittgenstein had he: "ever worked out clearly in his own mind anything as
definitive as a criterion?" (p.88).
Some explanation of why Cook does use the term "criterion" in that
later article might be given on the basis of an argument in his earlier
article "Human Beings" [1969], p.135:
"..if the idea of a 'defining criterion' is a bogus notion,
then in considering the details of particular cases we are
not considering merely 'symptoms'. These details can show us
something about the grammar of the words...it is useful in
philosophy to ask ourselves what..would enable us to recognize
(would justify us in saying) that someone was expecting a
visitor..it might be that the man was pacing up and down the
room,..looking at his watch..talking about how good it will be
to see his old friend again..if we were asked how we knew that
this person expected a visitor, these are the sorts of things
we would mention. The relevant point then, is that there is not
some one thing, the same in all cases, that justifies our use
of the word 'expecting', and if anything has the right to be
called a criterion it is...such details of particular cases.
Presumably then, it is this second use of "criterion" as the
details of particular cases which Cook [1985] continues to employ.
Having said that, the final use I have quoted from Cook's [1985]
article does concern "definitive" criteria and thus the explanation
may not completely legitimate Cook's later use. However, in the passages
quoted from "Human Beings" Cook's approach comes much closer to that of
Baker [1974] and Hacker [1972] than his claim to have detected
Wittgenstein's demolition of the concept in the Blue Book might lead us
to expect.
In fact, it is the idea of a DEFINING CRITERION which Cook finds
exploded in the Blue Book and not criteria of detail. Now, it is very
plausible to distinguish between descriptions of the satisfaction
of criteria which warrant a defeasible assertion of P and descriptions
of defining characteristics of P which entail that P. Surely, one might
then argue, if the characteristics are strictly definitional then
they are not properly criterial. This is precisely Cook's [1969]
move. I have no quarrel whatsoever with this distinction, which seems
to me well-founded, or with the argument just as it stands, but the
question remains as to whether Wittgenstein ever made such a distinction
or presented such an argument. I have already shown how implausible it is
to interpret the introductory passages as consisting of a refutation of
the notion of a criterion as a defining characteristic understood in Cook's
[1969] terms. The real basis for Cook's [1969] distinction centres on
Wittgenstein's description of the criteria for angina, the second example,
as "defining" while in the first example the criteria for toothache are not
so described. In fact, what Wittgenstein says is that:
"'I have found the bacillus so-and-so in his blood' gives us




But it is wholly imprudent to identify a new use on that basis
alone. By parity of reasoning we must then recognise a further distinct
use when Wittgenstein talks of the "logical criterion" [RPP Vol 1, (702)
Zettel, (466) (477)]. Again, we are presumably dealing with a further use
or two when Wittgenstein talks of the "real criterion" or the "genuine
criterion" [PR, above p.1, para.1].
That is to say, in the introductory passages two examples of criteria
are given. In each case Wittgenstein draws a distinction between criteria
and "coincident phenomena" (ie. symptoms) and in each case the first use
of the former term is simply "criteria" or "criterion". In the second
case Wittgenstein does speak of "..the defining criterion of angina"
but it must be incautious to interpret Wittgenstein's use of "defining
criterion" as marking a new use in Cook's [1969] sense as equivalent to
strictly definitional characteristics, if only because the latter is
itself a highly technical term. The only formal term in the Blue Book
passages, "tautology", is used very loosely in a non-technical sense.
Similarily, I argue, "defining" is used in a loose sense and does
not substantiate Cook's [1969] distinction. Unfortunately for Cook [1969],
Wittgenstein does not explicitly condemn either example and appears
to fail to make Cook's distinction at all. Therefore, it must follow that
Wittgenstein just did not make the distinction which many commentators
would have liked him to make and instead continued to use the concept of a
criterion in a looser, more complex way which, for Wittgenstein, could
legitimately include both the case of toothache and the more scientific case
of angina. Certainly, the defeasible use has been perceived as the most
interesting, and perhaps the most philosophically momentous, and that may
well be so, but as regards WITTGENSTEIN'S use of the term criterion, as
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regards what that concept meant to that author, let the use teach us the
meaning.
Ill SOCIOLOGY.
I should say that I am aware of David Bloor's treatment of these
passages in his: " Wittgenstein: A Social Theory Of Knowledge" [1983].
For the most part Bloor's [1983] account is faithfully explanatory. A
criterion here is "an identifiable cue whose presence justifies the use of
a word or classification" (p.41). This may be true but it might also be
misleading. Because criteria justify use it might be thought that criterionless
uses are therefore unjustified, incorrect etc. 8ut that is just what
Wittgenstein denies. Criteria are not presented as that in virtue of which we
are justified in using words. We use words with no criteria without
'deplorable lack of clarity'. The point is: in general, to use words
correctly we need no justification.
In this I think Bloor's [1983] account may be misleading but in another
point it must be mistaken. Bloor [1983] argues:
"the empirical study of criteria would just be the empirical
study of how words are given sense."
(p.46)
But if we can use words perfectly meaningfully and THEN establish
defining criteria how can the criteria give the sense ? And in those
cases where it is left open, where no criteria are defined, are we
talking senselessly ? Clearly not. In discussing this point with me
David Bloor defended himself from this criticism by distinguishing
the viewpoint of the language-user from that of the spectator. This,
I think, is fundamentally correct and is exemplified in the type of
example with which 81oor [ 1983] is concerned (p.41- 42). The
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standpoint of the social scientist, the anthropologist, is that of
the spectator. The user's words are given sense, for the spectator,
via the publicly manifest criterial relations. In that sense in
which 'institution' is a sociological synonym of the philosopher's
"logic", criteria are part of the social institution of language. In
the original case, if the spectator's study is a study of how words
are given sense then it is a study only of how words are given sense
for him. If this is so I do not think the original context makes it
obvious. And, in any case, it does not exclude the point that for
the language-user criteria just are not always necessary.
Finally, to ascertain whether there are criteria for a given word
is to investigate the grammar of that word; not just to examine the
phenomena empirically. It is a grammatical investigation not a
purely empirical one. Therefore it is a philosophical rather than
sociological investigation. If I know the relation between pain and
pain behaviour is it something which I have observed ? It must be at
least that. But that is so if the relation is symptomatic. We learn
criteria when we learn a language. To know of the connection
empirically is not enough to know that the relation is criterial.
Only an understanding of the grammar of a word, its use and role
will tell us what the criteria for it are. Why this should be a
matter exclusively for sociology and not for the Philosophy of
Language I do not think Bloor [1983] makes clear enough.
IV
What then is the significance
what of the nature and status of a
USE.
of these introductory remarks ? And
criterion for Wittgenstein rather
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than his commentators ?
Wittgenstein's point in the remarks which introduce the concept
of a criterion is, I argue, reminiscent of the famous point made by
Bishop Berkeley [1980] against John Locke's [1975] doctrine of
abstract ideas. As against the existence and conceivability of such
ideas as potential mental images or icons Berkeley [1980] maintained
that the generality in question, which Locke [1975] as semantic
denotationalist saw as essential to explaining the generality
inherent in language, did not consist in the nature of the ideas
themselves but in their function or use. In practice, Berkeley
[1980] argued, the abstract idea amounted to no more than a particular
idea serving to illustrate certain general, common properties. Much as
the geometer's particular line is used to illuminate the properties
common to all lines. Here what is abstract about an idea consists not in
its nature but in its use. Similarity, what is criterial about a
criterion consists not in the nature of the phenomenon itself but
rather in the use which a human community makes of it. What we use
as a criterion is for us criterial. Ontologically, those phenomena
which are used as criteria are ultimately actually empirically
observable. But so are symptoms. It is the status of criteria in the
institutional logic of language that gives them their special
character and status. I have noted from the Blue Book that a symptom
can become a criterion, that criteria can be established by
convention and that criteria can change according to human purpose
and practical convenience. Hence, I argue, Wittgenstein does
recognize the existence of criteria and the legitimacy of such a
concept but not in the sense of an essence or as strictly
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definitional characteristics or indeed of anything which transcends
human purpose and convenience. In the passages in question
Wittgenstein is drawing attention to linguistic practices and is
neither imposing upon nor deposing from any part of that practice.
What is offered here is a descriptive picture of a fragment of
language. If this is to be construed as a theory then it is a
'philosophical thesis' as delineated and commended in the
Investigations and is as innocuous and unobjectionable as is there
implied.
Simply and ordinarily, a criterion will be a useful and practical
means of identification, of decision, which functions as a mode of
everyday explanation. This characterization would seem very much in
harmony with the widely acknowledged anthropocentric tone of much of
Wittgenstein's later work. An equally simple account of criterion in
the mouth of Wittgenstein is given by Colin McGinn [1984] as
equivalent in sense to 'way of telling" but the suggested definition
occurs in a footnote (p.124) and, unfortunately, no account of the
Blue Book is given. Although I do not attribute my own account to
that author there is no obvious incongruity between these views.
Both will be found to fare equally and transparently well, I think,
if the test of contextual intersubstitutivity is taken. The precise
choice of words allows a degree of freedom but this, I firmly
believe, is as much as Wittgenstein ever meant by "criterion".
V CONSISTENCY.
Having examined the use of 'criterion' in the Blue and Brown
Books it is now possible to consider in a more detailed way the
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source of Baker [1974] and Hacker's [1972] earlier claim that the
Blue Book usage is in fact inconsistent.
Baker [1974] and Hacker's [1972] discomfort with the tone of the
introductory passages in particular is comprehensible only in the
light of their professed interest, at the time of writing, in
developing a criterial semantics and their anxiety that descriptions
of the satisfaction of criteria for P are represented here, in one
case at least, as entailing that P. If descriptions of the
satisfaction of criteria for P did entail that P then the criterial
assertion could not be a defeasible one. To lose this would be to lose
the most interesting and controversial feature of modern criterial
theories. Taken together with the implication noted earlier that
meaning and criteria clearly are not co-extensive in these passages
a very dim picture emerges for any criterial semantics.
But criterial semantics is hardly Wittgenstein's concern here
or in later works. Nowhere in the Blue Book does he assert or discuss
defeasibility in his use of the term but neither does he elsewhere.
The upshot is not that Wittgenstein had a very poor criterial semantics
,as Carl Wellman [1981] has recently argued, but that he was never
concerned to produce one and simply used the terms, "criteria"/
"criterion", in the innocuous sense I have outlined as, in McGinn's
words, ways of telling. Hacker [1987] now recognizes this fact and
refuses to take on board the idea of a Neo-Constructivist Theory of
Meaning based on criteria:
"It was a mistake to present Wittgenstein's remarks about
criteria as the foundations of a novel semantic theory,
for he would have viewed the whole enterprise of constructing
philosophical theories of meaning as yet another house of
cards to be demolished not fostered."
(p.viii)
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Despite this, some anxiety about consistency remains:
"In some of Wittgenstein's mathematical examples it is at any
rate not obvious that what he calls a criterion falls short of
entailment..Similar considerations apply to the angina example."
(p.316)
The extent of the revision in Hacker's [1987] revised edition is
considerable, as is the degree of improvement in the essay on criteria
therein. A brief account of the new conception will make clear why the
the claim to inconsistency remains; albeit relegated to a footnote.
In the final chapter of the revised text Hacker [1987] attempts to
find a middle path between two accounts of criteria. Firstly, Hacker
[1987] rejects McDowell's [1982] criteria which exemplify pain
directly, such that no "logical space" mediates between the criteria
and the pain. Hacker [1987] contends that this denies any inferential
structure to the relation and is a costly equivocation as a strong
form of behaviourism is an obvious logical consequence. However this
may well be more Hacker's characterisation of McDowell [1982] than
actually McDowell's [1982] view. For although McDowell [1982] does
assert an identification, in a sense, (a sense more fully discussed
below, Ch.6 ) it is not an identification involving pure behaviour but
rather PAIN-behaviour.
Of course, there is only behaviour, but not colourless bodily
movement, for the description of the behaviour ineradicably involves
mental vocabulary. Therefore, no behaviouristic reduction can be
effected. The real trouble here, which Hacker [1987] does not make
clear, is that instead of having to make a case for criterial
support ever adding up to truth the problem becomes that of
explaining how, on the basis of criteria, we can ever be wrong.
On the other hand Hacker [1987] wants to distance himself from
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Shoemaker's [1963] conception of logically necessarily good
evidence. This is perhaps the classic, post Wittgensteinean,
characterisation of criteria which provides the terms of art for
Gregory Lycan's [1974] scholarly synopsis of the field. Hacker's
[1987] worry here is that this might make the distance between the
relata too great. Criterial inference seems to Hacker to become
inference from the physical to the spectral. Again, I argue, the
real difficulty is not made clear. What Hacker [1987] does not
mention is that if pain behaviour is logically necessarily good
evidence for pain then there is no possible world in which it is not
evidence for pain. To make use of these notions is really to commit
oneself to saying something about how they are being used. For
example, the concept of remoteness requires further explanation.
In Hacker's own revised view a criterion for P is best described
as a:
"grammatically determined ground or reason for the truth of P."
(p.315)
For Hacker [1987], descriptions of the satisfaction of P's criteria
never entail P. One may feign pain. Beginner's luck can be mistaken for
genuine ability. It is because criteria are circumstance-dependent,
Hacker [1987] argues, that criterial assertions are essentially
defeasible. These considerations raise deep problems all of which I
examine in detail below [ie. Ch. 5, 6 & 7]. Despite this it is
worth pausing briefly to consider what Hacker means by 'defeasible'.
In the literature this has almost become a technical term in the
explanation of the concept of a criterion and is rarely itself
explained. I wish only to note the complexity of the notion.
Firstly, as regards pretence, although the criterial assertion of
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pain is defeated it is not the case that the criteria for
pain are destroyed. Pretence gets off the ground on the back of pain-
criteria, by exploiting rather than destroying those criteria.
Again, there may be good intuitive grounds for a distinction between
defeating evidence and overriding evidence. For certain purposes
there may be no need to emphasise this complexity but this need not
necessarily be so in every context.
The general point which Hacker is making here is the logical one
that the criterial relation is Non-Monotonic. That is, it is such
that when more information is conjoined to the premisses,the
conclusion may no longer be warranted. For example, on witnessing
pain behaviour one judges that this is a case of pain. If one then
discovers that this is in fact a case, say, of acting, or of grief
one is no longer entitled to infer to pain.
Finally, Hacker notes that neither what is to count as a criterion
nor what is to count as a defeater can be completely described in
advance of particular contexts. We can only teach by reference to
paradigms and thereby enable deviations from the norm to be
recognised. Again this is a logical consequence of the circumstance-
dependance noted earlier. These points in particular are discussed
below in more detail but for present purposes this much is all that
is required. That is, it can be clearly seen that it is of the
essence of the account of criteria which Hacker [1987] attributes to
Wittgenstein that criterial assertions be defeasible assertions.
Hacker is very clear about this in both editions of "Insight and
Illusion"; much clearer in fact than Wittgenstein himself. It is
this essential feature, I argue, which Hacker feels is threatened by
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the example of angina in the Blue Book.
In the introductory remarks to which I have referred discussion
centres on two examples, namely, that of toothache and that of
angina. In each case Wittgenstein speaks of criteria in connection
with the meaning of the term. Many commentators (ie. Albritton [1970],
Baker [1974], Hacker [1972]) have held that there is an important
difference between the two cases. That difference, as I have noted,
concerns the issue of whether or not a description of the
satisfaction of criteria for P actually entails P. The criteria
themselves, of course, entail nothing for the trivial reason that they
are non-linguistic. The other side of the same coin is of course whether
or not an assertion based on criteria is defeasible. If the assertion
is defeasible it follows that it should be quite possible for the
criteria to be satisfied without that for which they are criterial
being in fact the case. If the description of the satisfaction of
P's criteria logically entails that P this is just what is not
possible. The problem, and the root of the inconsistency allegation,
lies in the fact that while clutching one's cheek and having a red
patch upon it is consistent with not having toothache at all a
description of'the presence of a bacillus whose presence has been
taken to define angina seems to imply that one has angina. From this
premise it has been inferred that Wittgenstein is inconsistent about
criteria (ie. Baker [1974], Hacker [1972]) or, more charitably, that
he has at least two distinct and incompatible notions of a criterion
(ie. Albritton [1970]).
But the matter is not quite as simple as this. Firstly,
it is not immediately obvious to me that the angina case is one of
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entailment. It surely makes perfect sense to say that it may be
that the bacillus is taken to be defining and yet there might be
empirical pressure to alter our present definitions, say, some
people who have the bacillus do not have angina or again that there
are cases of angina in which the bacillus is not present. If this
were the case doctors would clearly revise the original definition.
From a contemporary standpoint it can be argued that the empirical
pressure is to change definitions but also that defining
characteristics cannot be criteria on pain of sacrificing the
defeasible nature of criterial assertion. Hence authors such as Cook
[1969] might conclude that the angina case is not a criterial one.
As I have noted Wittgenstein does not explicitly discuss this point.
But that need not imply that his use is inconsistent. That would be
so only if the term "defining criterion" is used in the precise
technical sense of defining characteristics. I have already warned
against such an interpretation. It is by no means clear that
Wittgenstein's discussion is this precise or technical and it does
not help simply to assume that it is.
Even if it can be taken for granted that the second case is
entailing while the first is not it remains invalid, I argue, to
infer that Wittgenstein's concept of a criterion must be
inconsistent. Both recognising that a defining characteristic
obtains and recognising the satisfaction of criteria for P motivate
assertions that P. Both are "ways of telling', 'cues for use', means
of identification. What has come to be defined as a criterion is
'non-inductive evidence' (ie. Lycan [1974]) which grounds defeasible
assertions. But if the second case is entailing then 'criterion' in
Wittgenstein's later work may mark either type of case. If we are
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being presented with two different ways of telling, means of
identification or cues for use it remains the case that both are
ways of telling. The notion may just be complex enough to allow
different things to count as ways of telling, as criteria. The
degree of precision required of a way of telling would, for
Wittgenstein, be wholly purpose-and context-dependant. It is no
surprise then that the exact character of the method involved will
alter according to just those factors as appropriate. The insistence
of some commmentators on there being an inconsistency arises, I
argue, when they are looking for a Theory, an essence. If, focussing
on one case, we take it to be essentially criterial, as contemporary
orthodoxy precisely does, then any deviation from that case will
look inconsistent with it. This is exactly what Baker [1974] and Hacker
[19723 have done. Having good reason to prefer a defeasible model that
is what they extracted. The rest is condemned as inconsistent. It is a
platitude to warn against foisting a frame on any of Wittgenstein's
work. If we are to see what was meant let us look for the use; the
range of the remarks. It is no part of the investigation that it
will culminate in a Theory. Examining Wittgenstein's use of
"language-game" will no more tell us the essence of a language game
than examining his use of "criterion" will illumine his Theory of
Criteria.
Anxiety about the strength of the relation as presented in the
Blue 8ook is common to a number of the most influential commmentators
and is again evident in R. Albritton's [1970] article on criteria
which may miscast the relation. Here Albritton [1970] outlines two uses
of the term criterion in Wittgenstein's later writings. Firstly,
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Albritton's Wittgenstein asserts that:
"the criterion is a logically necessary as well as a logically
sufficient condition of its [ie. that for which the criterion
provides support] being so.."
(p.235)
Secondly, the stronger claim is made that:
"..to be a criterion of X is just to be what is called X"
(p.241 )
In both accounts then Albritton [1970] asserts a much stronger
relation than Hacker [1972] might have wished for. Clearly, a description
of the satisfaction of P's criterial circumstances simply entails that P
on this model. But is this what Wittgenstein had in mind here ? It is
illuminating to apply some of Wittgenstein's own methodology here
and to focus attention upon the philosophical grammar, the form of
language in which Albritton's [1970] account is couched. In both
accounts Albritton [1970] plays a very formal, technical game employing
the language of entailment and of necessity and sufficiency which could
not be more stylistically distant from Wittgenstein's own mode of
expression. In fact, in the central text which Albritton acknowledges
(81.B, p.24-25) the terms 'entail','necessity' and 'sufficiency' do not
occur at all. On this point Albritton [1970] complains that:
"..if 'logically necessary and sufficient condition' and
'entails' are jargon, they have the company in that misery
of the word 'tautology', which Wittgenstein uses in the
passage I have been discussing."
(p.236)
But this does not alter the fact that the whole tone of those
passages is distinctly non-technical and devoid of any of Albritton's
[1970] jargon. Indeed, the term 'tautology' does occur. But that is
the only technical term which occurs and even this is used in a
non-technical sense or, at least, is not obviously used in a technical
sense. Again, I have suggested that phrase 'defining criterion" is
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also used loosely and may not be straightforwardly equivalent to
"defining characteristics". Instead, Wittgenstein explains a
criterion more like a rule for use, as an aspect of the grammar, use
or meaning of the term X which rests, fundamentally, on convention. In
employing the language of formal logic, I argue, Albritton [1970] gives
a misleading picture of what Wittgenstein understood a criterion to be.
I have already noted that defeasibility might be involved in one of the
two introductory examples and cast doubt on the appropriateness of the
language of entailment to the second. The context in which the
introductory discussion of the term emerges is the Blue Book which
proceeds from the question 'What is the meaning of a word ?' The
discussion is embedded in an attempt to describe the ordinary
grammar of language.
In his first "use" Albritton [1970] shows a tendency to logicise
and over-emphasise aspects of Wittgenstein's use of the term and I think
falls prey to just that "talk of language as a symbolism in an exact
calculus" (Bl.B, p.25) of which Wittgenstein warns: "the puzzles
which we try to remove always spring from just this attitude to
language" (Bl.B, p.26). The second of Albritton's [1970] uses which
asser t an identification between a satisfied criterion of X and being X
itself is even more misleading. What it does make clear is one way in
which commentators may have come to the view that Wittgenstein was a
behaviourist. For, if we substitute Albritton's [1970] account in
psychological contexts, his identification might well generate a very
strong form of behaviourism. That is, if the criterial basis for,
say, pain-ascriptions, is held to be exhaustively describable in
purely behavioural vocabulary. Otherwise, of course, no reduction
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would be effected. The refutation of the suggestion that
Wittgenstein was a behaviourist and a full critique of this type of
commentary requires an examination of Wittgenstein's later
philosophy of mind. The following chapter therefore proceeds from a
paradox at the heart of that philosophy of mind to a discussion in
the third chapter of the role of criteria in the Investigations.
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CHAPTER TWO
INTRODUCTION: A PARADOX IN WITTGENSTEIN'S LATER PHILOSOPHY OF MIND
The paradox I draw attention to in the chapter below is not the
one made famous (or infamous) by Saul Kripke in Chapter Two of his
"Wittgenstein on Rules and Private language" [1982]. Kripke's [1982]
"Wittgensteinian Paradox" is a fundamentally sceptical paradox
allegedley upheld in remark 201 of the Philosophical Investigations.
Although there is an apparent retraction in footnote 7 [Ch. 1]:
"That discussion may contain more of Kripke's
argumentation in support of Wittgenstein rather
than exposition of Wittgenstein's own argument.."
(p.6)
the retraction only-concerns Kripke's account of "the dispositional
theory". For Kripke [1982] the pedigree of the sceptical paradox
remains unquestionably "Wittgensteinian":
"I urge the reader to concentrate..on ..the
intuitive force of Wittgenstein's sceptical problem."
But the sceptical problem is not Wittgenstein's. In the second
paragraph of 201, which Kripke [1982] does not cite, Wittgenstein
explicitly says of the sceptical paradox:
"But it can be seen that there is a misunderstanding
here. ."
This description of scepticism in general as the product of
misunderstanding is far more characteristic of the writings of that
philosopher at every stage than is support for any 'sceptical
paradox'. I discuss this issue more fully below [Ch. 3, Section II].
But in any case the fact remains that the paradox is not being
upheld by Wittgenstein in remark 201. The issues raised by Kripke do
however merit closer attention despite being more Kripkensteinian
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than Wittgensteinian and are discussed in Chapter 5 below. I do not
therefore discuss the 'Wittgensteinian Paradox' at this stage but
rather Wittgenstein's paradox which is baldly stated in remark 304
where Wittgenstein asserts of a sensation:
"it is not a something but not a nothing either."
That remark also contains the assurance that the paradox can be
dissolved; a claim which represents an important challenge from the
standpoint of Wittgensteinean interpretation.
I THE LANGUAGE OF SENSATION
At first blush the most notable feature of remark 304 is the
relative scarcity of discussion of this paradox in the literature
as compared to Kripke's paradox [P.I., 201]. This state of affairs
is not in itself disadvantageous to the present inquiry. In fact it
may be of some methodological advantage in permitting more exclusive
concern with the remarks of Wittgenstein rather than his
commentators. The key to the correct interpretation of the first
half of the paradox, I argue, lies in remark 293. There
Wittgenstein is concerned to argue against a particular conception
of the language of sensation which describes the relation between
sensation-terms and the sensations themselves on the model of names
to their bearers and, more specifically, one which construes
reference ie. the naming relation, as fundamental to semantics. On
that view a sensation term is a label on a private object. Only by
owning the object can one have any idea of the meaning of the label.
Further, because the object is private the label can be fixed only
by the object's owner. Hence, label-fixing must be a matter of
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private ostensive definition.
Given Wittgenstein's attitude to Hume, as recorded by Norman
Malcolm in his "Memoir" [1958], he may not have had "A Treatise of
Human Nature" [1985] in mind here. Yet, I think, Hume's doctrine of
impressions and ideas represents the type of position which Wittgenstein
did have in mind. Hume speaks freely of impressions of sensation as
internal objects which cause mirror-like ideas. The idea in turn
ostensively defines a word which acts as the sign of the idea. The
choice of a particular sign is ultimately arbitrary lie. it is not a
"natural" sign). Once established it is, of course, held constant.
Without the idea as internal object we can literally have no idea of
the meaning of the sensation-term. In order to create the idea in
another we generate the impression, repeat the name and thereby
promote, an introspective association; a private ostensive
definition. The doctrine of impressions and ideas provides the
positivistic rationale for Hume's approach to causation. To verify
necessary connection in experience would be to have an impression
which would give rise to an idea and in this way some actual
content would have been given to the expression "necessary
connection". The doctrine of impressions and ideas therefore brings
together Hume's epistemology, semantic theory and philosophical
psychology.
Again, the theory of language and classic empiricist psychology
of John Locke's "Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding" [1975]
exemplifies the type of philosophical thinking which Wittgenstein
wanted to challenge. The first axiom of Locke's theory of language
is that words stand for ideas and therefore sensation terms stand
for ideas of sensation. Commentators such as Jenkins [1983] have
argued that words have a dual role in Locke's philosophy of language,
since they also have a use in referring to objects. In the
psychological case however this will collapse into the single
purpose of referring to ideas of sensation. These ideas reflect the
impressions of sensation which are their causes and in virtue of the
representational principle at work in Locke generally we have a very
clear example of the natural signification between the idea as
meaning and the impression which is its cause.
Wittgenstein's argument in remark 293 of the Investigations
points to the conclusion that if the game is played at all, if our
practice with and use of sensation-language can go on at all, then
the whole story about private objects becomes superfluous. Integral
to the argument is the claim that if we conceive of the situation
as the classic empiricist invites us to then there can be no
guarantee either that the private object will not vary in character
from subject to subject, or that the impression might not be
different in every case. It seems equally conceivable on the
empiricist model that the object might even constantly change in
every case for an individual subject. On that view what we lack is
any criterion for sameness and again any criterion for correctness.
Most importantly, we just have no criteria whatsoever on this model.
As Bernard Gert argues in his "Wittgenstein's Private
Language Arguments" [1986, p.419]:
"some..think that a private language is impossible
because there can be no independant check on my memory.
But Wittgenstein's point goes deeper than that; it is
not that "I have no criteria of correctness" but that
"there are no criteria of correctness". This is the reason
that "whatever is going to seem right to me is right".
Because there is nothing to remember that will tell me
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how the sound is to be used."
Gert's comment is not confined to remark 293 but, as the title
suggests, ranges over the full breadth of "..the private language
arguments" which are taken to include 293. In that context Gert's
point is that there is nothing about the sensation as private
object which yields any clue to the use of the sensation-term.
Again, it is not just that introspection provides a poor criterion,
or that any particular criterion is lacking in that context. It is
rather that no criterion whatsoever has been established. If we hold
these considerations in abeyance, momentarily, and generalize
universally on the naming-theory model, over the domain of the
set of sensation-terms, we arrive at a picture of a linguistic
community who only know and understand the language of sensation by
reference to their own sensations and can never ultimately know when
or whether fellow language-users ever entertain such experiences.
Ultimately, a form of scepticism about other minds is generated for
as Wittgenstein argues: "the box might even be empty." (P.I. 293).
The form of the argument in this remark is characteristic
almost to the point of definition of Wittgensteinean criticism in
being a Reductio Ad Absurdum, and in this instance it is clearly a
sound example of such. Sensation-terms cannot simply be substantives
whose meanings are provided by their bearers precisely because the
independant practice of sensation talk could proceed if such
bearers constantly altered or even disappeared altogether. The
point here is not even that there cannot be any genuine names in
the language of sensation but rather that these names cannot acquire
their role and status in the way in which the refuted view implies.
We can never justifiably jump from the existence of names directly
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to their actual use which must be taught and learned. This I hope
is something like Wittgenstein's reasoning here.
The argument cuts across both the Empiricist psychology of Hume
and Locke and applies equally to Cartesian Rationalism. In general,
to so construe the language of sensation is to condemn the very
sensations to irrelevance. The fundamental error resides in the
misguided application of the grammar of one language-game, physical
-object designation, to a wholly distinct language-game, that of
sensation. Construed in that way the language of sensation
presupposes objects of reference but as no public, physical object
exists private mental objects must be postulated. It is, I believe,
in this sense that sensations are not somethings. That is, however
the contents of consciousness are to be portrayed they must not be
pictured as quasi-substantial objects floating in an ethereal realm
awaiting a Humean nomenclator. As I have argued, postulating such
objects is logically insufficent to account for the linguistic
practices we possess. Neither can the privacy survive the critique.
If it is possible to identify a peculiar feeling in oneself, say,
as might be experienced in a lift due to shifting in one's centre
of gravity, and to give the peculiar feeling a name, then that
possibility itself already involves and presupposes a complex
background of conceptual apparatus: understanding the concept of a
lift, of motion, of sensation, knowledge of what 'naming' is etc.
The price to be paid if that is denied is again that we are left
with no criteria whatsoever. In short, the privacy of the object
can never explain the public use of the language.
These conclusions need not imply that sensation language is
never descriptive. The relation between the sensation-language and
the sensation might perfectly well be held to be genuinely descriptive
but very different things can be subsumed under that heading. A
description of a room and a description of a sensation can both be
legitimately held to be descriptions but they will also be seen to
differ importantly. I can, for example, be wrong about a feature of
the room I describe but it is not clear that I can be wrong about a
description of my own sensation. Could I be wrong about my being in
pain ? Suppose a malignant psychologist creates an environment which
appears to contain a red-hot stove. In fact the stove is cold. My
hand is forced down upon it and I scream out that I am in pain.
Even here it is not clear that I am wrong. It was undoubtedly an
unpleasant sensation, perhaps a Humean sympathetic pain. Again, it
makes clear sense to doubt the accuracy of my description of a room
but does it make sense to be in pain and to doubt or question that
fact ? If there is no room for error and no role for doubt then is
there room for correctness or a role for knowledge ? Such argument
is thematic of the Investigations and is, I argue, directly
responsible for Wittgenstein's remark in 246 that to have said of me
that I know that I am in pain is to have said nothing more than that
I am in pain. The same point is reiterated in On Certainty in remark
504:
"Whether I know something depends on whether the
evidence backs me up or contradicts me. For to say
one knows one has a pain means nothing."
In one sense the claim is a simple one about ordinary usage.
As opposed to ordinary avowals "I'm in pain !", "that hurts !" etc
the claim " I know I'm in pain" is, at the very least, an unusual
one. In fact, it is more likely to be heard in departments of
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philosophy as an utterance from someone in debate rather than pain.
The fact that, with sufficient artfulness, special contexts can be
imagined (such as the philosophical one) which do confer sense upon
the utterance does not refute the simple point about ordinary
contexts. The remark from On Certainty provides a little more
background here however and is indicative of a more general theme
about the absence of contrasts, the absence of a role for evidence,
of any way of coming to know and is intended, I argue, to cast doubt
upon the content of knowledge-claims under such circumstances.
Wittgenstein's point might equally well have been put, I suggest, by
the claim that it is because we can neither know nor not know that
to seriously talk of someone knowing of their own sensations is, in
an important sense, redundant. But the claim in question is not as
revisionary as might be thought. It involves an acknowledgement of
the authority, the special status of the individual, as regards his
own sensations but couples this point with the claim that unless
there are public criteria in terms of which we learn the language of
sensation in the first place then a radical scepticism follows, as
the story about private objects remains logically insufficent to
explain our use of a public language. However, while it is in terms
of criteria that we learn the language of sensation, once that is
learned we do not identify our own sensations by observing that we
satisfy the criteria. This places the authority of the individual
in his own case and the first person/third person assymetry against
the backdrop of a logically primary common public language. The
private is therefore dependant upon the public in a sense which
reverses the logical priorities of traditional Cartesian
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epistemology. Despite this, Wittgenstein nonetheless seems to allow
that while doubt has a role in the third person case it has no role
in the first person case. In that he might well agree with Descartes
except in so far as he takes the dupitable to be logically and
epistemologically prior to the indupitable. But if doubt is to be
excluded from the first person case because it has no role then so,
Wittgenstein seems to suggest, must its counterpart knowledge. I
critically assess and discuss these points in more detail in
Chapters 6 and 7 below but this, I argue, explains Wittgenstein's
prohibition against knowledge-claims in first person cases.
As a final point against the type of view considered in remark
293 it may be argued that the inner-sense cognitivism which Modern
Philosophy inherits, ultimately, from Descartes and which is clearly
illustrated in classic British Empiricism misconstrues the nature of
personal experience. For there is no cognition of being in pain via
inner sense; there is just the state of being in pain. That state
already involves the awareness; pain is itself a form of awareness.
To postulate a second order awareness from inner-sense is to run
the risk of a third order, awareness of that awareness and so on.
The implication of my account of Wittgenstein is that it is in the
first instance on the basis of criteria determining the meanings of
sensation terms that we learn to discriminate between, classify,
name and describe our awareness.
While I would not want to argue that all our sensations are
invariably conscious sensations (it seems clear to me that many of
them are not) I would want to argue that it is always possible that
a sensation be conscious. That is, I do not want to rule out my
automatically and unconsciously brushing an insect off my hand when
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reading, for example, though I would want to say that that sensation
could be a conscious one. Therefore, I would want to argue that a
sensation which was not possibly consciously manifestible is no
sensation at all. To be in pain but to be unaware of the pain might
be a poor description of being anaesthetised but it would not be a
description of being in pain. D. Dennett [1981] has recently argued
that such a state of being in pain but lacking any awareness of the
pain could describe the result of performing a lobotomy on a
subject. Norman Malcolm has held this claim to be a bizarre one.
If I subtract the felt character of the pain from the pain can I be
confident that what I have left over is still pain ? Malcolm's doubt
is a reasonable one supported further by the fact that neither
Dennett nor those who authorize or perform such horrendous
operations can possibly know that the result of it is truly
described as has been claimed, pain without the awareness; if,
indeed, any sense can be made of the description at all. The
operation is performed in the last resort to modify a subject's
behavioural reactions. It may be a more pessimistic view that
the subject still experiences horrendous pain and distress
although he is no longer physically able to express it but it is
not one which Dennett, or logic alone, can simply rule out. That
is to say, while I would want to allow that there must be some
outward manifestation, in principle at least, it remains possible
that the effect of the lobotomy is on a par with a paralysing
poison, a sophisticated, restraining rope.
Neither, I argue, will the original description be truly
applicable to animals. Certainly, cats lack conceptual thought and
the ability to express pain linguistically. The fact that the cat
cannot say: "I know I'm in pain", if that is taken as a marker of
conceptual thought, will not lessen for a moment the excruciatingly
painful character of the sensations it feels in a laboratory
experiment, or in having a leg or tail broken by a motorist. Any
lack of awareness here is due not to the sentient animal but to
those human beings who are too insensitive to recognize the
suffering, or to allow it to count. Finally, of those human beings
who cannot feel pain we do not say that they are in pain but do not
know that they are for it is just the being in pain which they lack.
They simply do not have the sensation, the awareness. As Geach
[1967] argues, what we are aware of is the pain not the cognition.
The analogy to sense suggests the possibility of error. But I think
serious doubt has already been cast upon that suggestion.
In concluding my treatment of the first half of the paradox it
might be felt that the case against epistemic and semantic privacy
is not fully prosecuted just on the basis of the argument in remark
293. To this I concede that a fuller appreciation of the suasiveness
of Wittgenstein's critique of meaning as mental process requires a
much wider survey of his remarks and it is to this that I now turn.
II Experience And Meaning
Remark 293 is instructive in a fundamentally negativistic sense.
It considers and refutes one answer to the question: what is it for
a word to mean ? At best, it illuminates what sensations are not by
pointing out one meaning model which cannot be properly applied to
the language of sensation. The Reductio Ad Absurdum is a very
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characteristic form of Wittgensteinean criticism and as a mode of
instruction has its purpose. In order to clarify the later
philosophy of mind so as to refute the behaviourist allegation
I continue to refer to it after absorbing the question above into
the inquiry as to what it is for a person to understand a word,
much as Wittgenstein himself does in the Blue Book. I examine the
next move to meaning as use and the question as to what it is to use,
to follow a rule, in Chapter 5 below. At this stage I want to discuss
the idea of a 'private language argument". This will bring sharply
into focus possible answers to the question as to what it is for
someone to understand a word. The range and critical power of
Wittgenstein's remarks on that subject will refute any allegation
that the targets of those remarks are unsophisticated.
The critical target of remark 293 is the basically Augustinean
position which asserts that language is essentially a matter of the
composition of names and explains meaning in terms of that naming
-relation. Concern with such positions is thematic of the
Investigations. Augustine, and the dream theory outlined by Socrates
in Plato's Theaetetus, are explicitly quoted; and the Atomistic
views of Russell on the logically proper name, for example, are
examined at some length. The first 120 remarks constitute strong
evidence for this interpretation. But with 693 remarks in part one
alone whether that view can be extended as an explanatory device of
value throughout remains an open question. By indicating where and
how more sophisticated positions are rebutted I argue against that
view. What follows cannot be a wholly comprehensive exegesis but
should be sufficient to establish the point.
The account of sensation-language which I considered in remark
293 identifies the sense of a sensation-term with the sensation as
quasi-substantial object and therefore makes meaning a property
first and foremost of the individual rather than the community. One
might try to preserve this latter feature, this privacy of meaning,
and improve upon the plausibility of the account of the meaning of
sensation-terms by identifying the sense of a sensation-term not
with the object which it allegedly names but with the idea which,
for example, the empiricists took to be caused by the experience of
the object. On such a view sense will still be private and for the
individual will consist in, let us say, mental representations;
construed very broadly. These turbulences in the stream of
consciousness could be construed as inscrutable to other language-
users and in this way privacy of sense could be ensured. In order
to guarantee the possibility, indeed the empirical reality, of
communication a coincidence or convergence of aspects of sense
might be postulated as a bridging-mechanism from private sense to
public meaning.
This position is clearly more sophisticated than its predecessor
and yet Wittgenstein does deploy a range of arguments against just
such a view. The first of these draws attention to grammatical
differences between understanding and mental processes of any kind
and is an important wedge-driving preliminary to a sustained
critique. At p. 59 Wittgenstein indicates that clear cases of mental
processes differ categorially from those of understanding both in
terms of intensity-aspects and the nature of their temporality.
Understanding, Wittgenstein argues, is not a process term but is
more akin to an ability or disposition. It is a technique
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exemplified in behaviour rather than a psychologically continuous
experience. The point is not that understanding completely lacks
experiential content but rather that as mastery of a technique it
involves more than that.
A second group of arguments offers further support for the
claim that what comes before the mind cannot constitute a sufficient
condition of meaning or understanding (139, 141, 151-2 ). Here it is
emphasised that understanding the meaning of a word must include a
working knowledge of the roles played by it in the network of
appropriate contexts and indicates the inadequacy of mental
processes to the task. Sense could not consist in an image, feeling
or formula for possession of that will not of itself teach the
application of the word; it will tell nothing about what to do next
with the word. Even if a given picture of, say, a cube suggests a
use, ie. its applicability to cubes, the individual is still free
to employ a method of projection under which that image applies to
triangular prisms. A line sketch of an old man walking up a hill
with a stick is just as validly a line sketch of an old man sliding
backwards down a hill. The point being that any compulsion from an
image to a specific word-use is psychological and not logical. We
possess two distinct sets of criteria: one for representations, the
other for their application. The picture need not even be imaginary.
For if the use is known the picture's task could as be as well
fulfilled by a public drawing or physical model. Again, although the
same image occurs on two occasions of use neither the word nor the
meaning of the word need be identical in both.
A third argument-group contests the claim that any mental process
constitutes a necessary condition of understanding (151-2, 329-30).
For example, a thought-experiment is outlined that involves firstly,
both saying and meaning a word and secondly, simply privately
meaning it. The point is that there is nothing left of the meaning
of the sentence once we subtract the use of the sentence. The
experiment is designed to make clear that it is just not true that
mental processes invariably accompany verbal expressions: meaning is
not a process and, a fortiori, no process invariably accompanies
meaning. Again, Wittgenstein is denying the existence of a second-
order, semantic language existing only in the mental realm. That is
again his point at p.18e when he asks:
"Can I say "bububu" and mean 'if it doesn't
rain I shall go for a walk'?"
The same conclusion is endorsed in remark 329:
"language is the vehicle of thought."
This much classification of Wittgenstein's remarks is available
in Mcginn [1984] though I do not wish to blame that author for the
account presented here. While I follow Mcginn in not laying claim to
a comprehensive classification, I argue that it must be broadened at
least as far as a fourth category. This fourth group of arguments is
best approached from a question already raised by remark 293: how
do sensations or mental processes ever become associated with words
either as the referents of names or as the senses of expressions ?
It might be claimed that by some reflective mental act of
deliberative linking a sensation is named or a process associated
with an expression. But is this even possible ? Can the terms
'named', 'defined', 'associated' be understood at all in a context
where the necessary backdrop to those practices is wholly absent ?
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If, for instance, the mental act is supposed to be one of definition
then unless it determines future application it cannot be made sense
of as definition. But this is just what the mental act cannot do.
Again, following Gert [1986], it is not that "I have no criteria of
correctness" but that "there are no criteria of correctness". There
is no external court of appeal for correctness of use and:
"Whatever is going to seem right is right.."
(P.I. 258)
Whatever the act amounts to it cannot amount to definition.
Worse still, similar consequences will arise for "naming' and
"association". In order to explain the use of any of these terms we
must presuppose exactly what we seek to explain, namely, an
established use. Again, while an act of this kind might be attempted
and might even be sincerely felt a success it remains possible that
in fact it has not been properly understood, possible that
subsequent actual use will exemplify misunderstanding. Here public
use corrects private opinion for meaning can only be taught by use
in context. It is also reasonable to expect that if sense is a
mental occurence then that occurence should at least be co-extensive
with meaningful utterance. But even if this implausible claim were
actually demonstrable the claim that it is precisely in this that
understanding consists would surely require independant
argumentative support. It is natural to wonder why we need postulate
any coincidence or convergence of sense between language-users as
guarantor of public meaning when rules of use and application are
evidently common anyway. No real content has been given to the
notion of a convergence which looks like a prime candidate for the
application of Occam's razor.
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Meaning cannot therefore be identified with mental processes
but despite this, as Lewis [1980] notes, in Part II of the
Philosophical Investigations [ie. p.175, p.241] Wittgenstein
suggests that the mental accompaniments of utterances have a vital
role in giving life to those utterances, personalizing use and
giving substance to idiolect, to dialect. Although they do not
exhaust meaning because as rules are shared public communication
could continue. There is strong reason to believe that although
language could continue as "basic communication", in Strawson's
terms, linguistic and perceptual capabilities might be seriously
restricted. The breadth and quality of our perceptions would be
reduced by the semantic equivalent of aspect-blindness. To so lack
the mental accompaniments of a language is described by Wittgenstein
in Zettel (183-4) as "meaning-blindness". Characteristically,
the meaning-blind would be unable, for example, to understand
ambiguous words in contexts which were not clearly disambiguated,
would be unable to mean the same word in different senses, to
comprehend secondary senses of terms and therefore would be incapable
of appreciating the sadness of music. The meaning-blind would be a:
"..people without stories, poetry, imagery, songs.."
and therefore, as Lewis [1980] indicates, would be a radically
different group of language-users. The point is that though
communication would be possible for the meaning-blind it could
never amount to more than mere communication. Wittgenstein is
not therefore fairly described as reducing the private, the mental
to the public. Nor, I shall argue in the subsequent section, is he
guilty of reducing the mental to the physical. Personal experience
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is vital to language and meaning even though in the final analysis
communication via public shared meaning, rules of use, underwrites
the existence of language.
My classification is not by any means an exhaustive one.
But it is sufficient to warrant the rejection of the claim that
the Investigations deals only with the obsolete and the untenable.
It is also sufficient to establish a further point or two about
that work.
Many of the remarks which make up the Investigations exemplify
a striking unity of subject matter and this is illustrated clearly a
remark 293. In semantic terms, it argues that the language of
sensation cannot be underpinned by private meaning-bodies as the
bearers of names, while in mentalistic terms, sensations themselves
are no sort of private object, no sort of object at all in fact.
Though this remark and many others are readily described as
philosophical psychology they are as easily subsumed under the
headings of language or meaning. The author himself speaks here
of continually converging upon the same problems from different
perspectives:
"The same or almost the same points were always
being approached from different directions.."
(P.I., preface)
The particularity and apparently disparate character of the
remarks together with their emphasis on specifics of context mask
that feature and can be misleading.
Further, the fact that remark 293 and all the others cited
argue against kinds of private language without every remark being
THE private language argument must endorse the conclusion that none
of them is. Precisely because the critique of privacy of meaning,
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privacy of language, is not ultimately any single argument but is a
thematic concern which runs throughout the Investigations.
Philosophical energies might be more profitably employed identifying
and distinguishing the targets of these remarks rather than awarding
them titles.
Ill BEHAVIOUR AND SENSATION
According to my account of the first half of the paradox
Wittgenstein denied that sensations could be properly understood as
private mental objects but in so doing did not deny any role for
the mental accompaniments of language-use. Neither, I argue, did he
identify or reduce the mental to the physical as regards behaviour
and sensation. However, Rogers Albritton [1970] is by no means alone
in holding just the opposite view, viz., that Wittgenstein left no
room for toothache in toothache language-games, no room for pain in
pain language-games. But this could not be further from the truth.
"it is-we should like to say-not merely the picture of
the behaviour that plays a part in the language game
with the words 'he is in pain ' but also the picture of
the pain..not merely the paradigm of the behaviour but
also that of the pain."
(P.I. , 300)
This remark is qualified by the prescription that we say not
that the picture of pain is involved in the language-game but that
the image of pain is involved. The qualification may seem less than
transparent as it stands and introduces a degree of confusion to the
English version of remark 300 as a whole. There is an alternative
translation of remarks 300-1 however and a lucid unfolding of their
philosophical content in Peter Winch's "Wittgenstein: Picture and
Representation" [1987]. In his paper Winch takes issue with
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Anscombe's rendering of "vorstellung" as "image" which is rightly
held to have "overpoweringly pictorial associations" (p. 76).
Winch's point is that, as "bild" is usually given as "picture", if
"vorstellung" is then given as "image", with overtones of "icon",
then any contrast between the two terms must be lost and with that
loss Wittgenstein's whole point disappears. In place of:
"It is true that in a sense the image of pain enters
the language-game; but not as a picture... An image is
not a picture, but a picture can correspond to it."
Winch [1987] substitutes:
"It is true that in a sense the representation of pain
enters the language-game; but not in the form of a
picture...A representation is not a picture, but a picture
can correspond to it."
The point is then that the way pain is exemplified in a context
is something to which a picture can correspond in that one can form
a picture of the behaviour involved. That same picture of the
behaviour will also correspond equally to acting or to mimicry or
deceit even though what is exemplified, the representation, is
different. Therefore, representation and picture contrast exactly
as thinking of something and picturing the object of the thought
contrast. The point that the representation is not itself pictorial
is also well made. With an old man in a blanket Michelangelo
represented God and the majesty of his love but if a picture
requires some degree of genuine similarity then that representation
is hardly pictorial.
Winch attempts to make sense of Wittgenstein's first claim that
although the representation of pain enters the language-game it does
not do so pictorially; that is, pain is represented in the context
and in behaviour, linguistic and otherwise but not as a picture
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(what would be a picture of pure naked pain ?) In addition Winch
shows how plausible Wittgenstein's second claim is that although a
picture can be taken to correspond to a representation it does not
follow that the representation itsef is pictorial. Earlier in his
discussion Winch alludes to remarks 424-6 of the Investigations
where Wittgenstein distinguishes pictures we freely choose, which
suggest their own application and are readily so applicable, from
those which are not chosen but seem to be presupposed by a way of
talking. Talk about other minds, Winch suggests, belongs to the
latter category. Such talk characteristically involves the actual
inapplicability of the picture suggested and seems to leave us with
only an indirect route; with second best: "while I was talking to
him I did not know what was going on in his head". The mistake,
Winch argues, consists either in focussing only on this picture at
the expense of the particular use it springs from, or, in taking the
way a person's mind is represented as itself literally pictorial.
But to say this much is not yet to deny that such language does
involve pictures; neither is it to eliminate or reduce them.
Wittgenstein, Winch argues, is explicitly non-reductionist and
emphasises that: "The picture is there" (P.I., 424).
In "Wittgenstein: Picture and Representation" Winch offers a
highly plausible alternative translation with an explanatory power
which dwarfs the original. Winch therefore succeeds to an extent in
"Trying to Make Sense" of remarks 300-1 by demonstrating more
clearly the philosophical eating here and, as regards the
alternative translation proposed, that is the proof of the pudding.
Despite this fact, the representation of pain remains pictorial at
least in the sense that it is ultimately a picture of pain-behaviour
which is the means of representation, as it were. But if it is a
picture purely of behaviour which remains then the job of refuting
the crypto-behaviourist interpretation has not yet been done.
However, if in describing the picture of the behaviour we cannot but
use pain-vocabulary, mentalistic vocabulary, then in one sense
(the non-reductionist one) Wittgenstein could not be a behaviourist.
This is not made clear by Winch however. A clearer general account
of this issue is given by John McDowell in his "Criteria,
Defeasibility and Knowledge" [1982] and I discuss the contents of
that paper below in Chapter 6.
That Wittgenstein was not a behaviourist is made clear in, among
others, remark 307. Here Wittgenstein explicitly considers the
behaviourist accusation, accuses himself of holding everything other
than behaviour a fiction and asserts that if he is speaking of a
fiction it is of a grammatical fiction. There is for Wittgenstein
adequate room for pains in pain language-games, and pain is
certainly represented in those games. The proviso consists in the
fact that the grammar of those games be properly understood for
grammar is to inform us both of the nature and the role of
sensations and images. This in no way amounts to a denial of the
existence of mental accompaniments or of a reduction of such to
behaviour but is in typical style a plea for correct understanding.
Whatever grammar is appropriate here it cannot be one of object and
designation. This picture and its ensuing perplexities have been
eliminated. Now however we lack a positive philosophical account of
matters and the temptation is to ask what then is an image and what
a sensation ? But these are precisely the wrong questions. For what
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will you count as an answer beyond what has already been rejected ?
The relevant terms are still employed as substantives and these
interrogatives invite a description of somethings in the sense just
dispensed with. What is proposed instead is a conceptual
investigation via a perspicuous representation of actual word-use.
Characteristically, Wittgenstein argues that the question and his
proposal both ask for a word to be explained but the former leads
us to anticipate the wrong kind of answer.
I have tried to show that in the hands of both the Classic
Empiricist and the Cartesian Rationalist philosophical psychology
has come to grief. But does the Wittgensteinean alternative
presuppose a conception of philosophical psychology which reduces
that discipline to a branch of morphology ? Certainly, the
methodological prescription is to begin from an examination of
the grammatical but the implications of that enquiry need not be
confined to the linguistic; grammatical investigation can have
consequences exceeding austerely morphological interest.
Dummett's 'metaphor thesis', viz., the view that metaphysical
disputes are ultimately linguistic disputes, provides one
example of a way in which the consequences of investigations
into language and meaning might have ontological implications. CM3J
This, I argue, constitutes a valuable rule of methodology even
if the philosophical character of the disputants is not quite as
uniformly dichotomized, invariant and generalizable as Dummett
might suppose.
The privacy embodied in psychological concepts, the
unimpeachability of the subject, is not a function of the type of
object an image or sensation is but is a reflection of the nature
of the linguistic games we play with them. To maintain that only
the subject can know his own sensation is at once to confuse a
grammatical fact with an empirical fact. Ordinarily we frequently
do know when other people are in pain. The point is that while it
makes sense to doubt as regards others it makes no sense to doubt
in my own case. The sceptical restriction on the applicability of
"know" to the first person is itself a reflection of the grammatical
fact that there is no role for doubt in that game. The privacy of
sensation amounts then to saying that this is how the game is played.
Grammar permits a role for doubt in the one case and rules it out in
the other. That is why: "the proposition 'sensations are private' is
comparable to 'one plays patience by oneself'" (P.I., 248).*The
philosophical prejudice of the proposition distorts the reflection of
the grammatical fact that this is how the game is played.
In a sense then the paradox is resolved once the account of
sensations as somethings is rejected. The point is not that
sensations are therefore nothings. Clearly, Wittgenstein is not
denying their existence. Nor is it that sensations are something in
between the two. Rather, the point is that the something/nothing
distinction, the physical-object/designation grammar is not the
grammar which actually governs our use of sensation-language. To
take the inappropriate grammar and impose it where it does not
belong is a philosophical temptation which is responsible for many
difficulties according to Wittgenstein and if anything is denied or
forbidden it is this. Once that temptation is removed the paradox
is removed along with it.
To argue that it is only of what behaves like a human being
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that we say it has sensation is not to argue that it is only in
behaviour that sensation consists. I argue from the evidence above
that Wittgenstein did not identify sensation with behaviour, deny
the former or reduce the former to the latter. Sensations, bound up
with their representations, clearly do have a role. What is denied,
and surely rightly, is a number of erroneous theories of sensation.
IV CRITERIA ANO EMOTION
Analysis and clarification of the concept of emotion is an
aspect of the study of human nature which is well documented in
the literature of both philosophy and psychology. Traditional
thought on this subject has frequently focussed upon forms of what
might appropriately be termed 'feeling-theory' which identifies
emotion with the presence in consciousness of particular felt
qualities, analogous to sensory qualities, which are properly
accessible only via introspection. Descartes [1981], for example,
describes the emotions or passions of the soul as introspective
perceptions, specific states of consciousness; and again in Hume
the passions are described as impressions of reflection. Another
form of feeling-theory has also been upheld by William James in
his "Principles Of Psychology" [1950] where emotions, and indeed
consciousness, are identified with bodily sensations. According to
such viewpoints emotion terms are most naturally construed simply
as names designating feelings which are considered explanatory of
behaviour in specifying its cause as a given inner experience.
This account of emotions is not entirely an unproblematic one.
It can be argued for a variety of reasons, that the language of
emotion is misconceived as a set of names. The Wittgensteinean
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critique of similar views concerning the set of psychological
concepts points up the fact that no term functioning as a name for
a state of consciousness construed as a logically private object
could plausibly be said to have any shared intersubjective meaning
in the context of a public language. But the language of emotion,
for example, is plainly meaningful and this is just a Reductio of
feeling-theory, as I have been arguing above. In addition it is
natural to reflect that there is in fact no set of distinctly
demarcated feelings to which emotion terms could correspond.
Feelings of annoyance, for example, may be wholly indistinguishable
from those of indignation. Similar difficulties may arise at the
level of demarcation of emotional feelings from non-emotional
states. Again, as is familiar from Ryle [ 1949J the notion of
privileged access via introspection might be disputed in this
context in view of the fact that a person can be wrong about his
own emotions, failing, for example, to recognize a jealous state.
The attribution of a naming-function to every emotion term in
ordinary language and discourse would appear to ignore that sense
or use of such terms in which descriptions are given of long-term
dispositions to act, for example, fear of snakes or craving for
oysters.
As is well-known these difficulties and others led authors
such as Ryle [1949] to seek a more adequate account in a
dispositional theory of the emotions. According to such views
emotions are identical with dispositions or tendencies to particular
behaviour patterns and explain actions not as occult causes but by
reference to types of disposition expressed in law-like
propositions. Obvious problems arising from such approaches included
the possibility of being sincerely afraid in the absence of any overt
behavioural manifestations whatsoever. There is a price to be paid
for not trying to cut the middle path, as Wittgenstein did for
sensations, between somethings and nothings; regardless of which
side we take.
With this much background I turn now to the role of criteria in
the context of the emotions. It has been argued against Ryle-type
theorizing that while behavioural dispositions may provide evidence
for statements attributing specific emotions it remains possible,
logically and empirically, for behaviour descriptions to be true
when the attribution of emotion is false; and equally it has been
argued that the converse also holds. The conclusion drawn from this
state of affairs is that the two are independent in terms of truth
and falsity and therefore cannot be semantically equivalent. It only
follows from that fact that Ryle cannot have his identification,
his assertion of logical or metaphysical identity. From the point
of view of criteria no such identification was ever alleged and it
is open to the criterialist to argue that the problematic truth-
value discrepancy is just the condition of defeasibility which he
explicitly recognizes. Of course the onus is on the criterialist to
make sense of this claim and to provide it with philosophical
substantiation. In fact I will defend the claim as it stands but am
here concerned only to argue that if the criterial basis is a sound
one then it is one from which a plausible story about criteria in
the context of emotion logically follows. This context will clearly
make more rigorous demands of criteria in terms of adequacy
conditions. Criteria for assertions of emotion cannot be allowed to
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be exclusively behavioural but must include elements of social
context. Thus while certain behaviour patterns are equally
consistent with, for example, both shame and embarrassment it would
be wholly illegitimate to assert shame in the absence of an object
for the emotion which engenders actual or perceived
reprehensibility. The point is not a new one. It is Errol Bedford's
[1965-57] and the importance of extending the criteria beyond
behaviour narrowly interpreted can be seen by uncovering what is
right, and what is wrong, in that author's account.
Theorists such as Bedford [1965-57] have identified the cause
of an emotion with the object of that emotion and have analysed
emotion as an evaluational response to its object. This must have
some element of truth in it just in so far as evaluation is often
a prominent feature of emotional states and because knowledge of an
agent's evaluational response can* be a good reason to attribute a
certain emotion to that agent. Despite this, evaluation alone cannot
provide a complete analysis for it seems that what makes emotions
emotional, the felt character of the experience, might be wholly
left out of account. In the entry under "Emotion" in the
"Encyclopaedia of Philosophy" William Alston argues that emotions
can be understood as 'bodily perturbations'. These might then be
construed as the effects arising from the evaluation of the object.
But again any account of why cold, rational judgement should cause
such perturbations is just what has been left out. Although there
is often an evaluational aspect to the felt character of an emotion
the former cannot therefore constitute the latter. Therefore, there
can be no plausible identification of emotion and evaluation. But
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this conclusion is entirely consonant with the account of
psychological terms which I have outlined as the later Wittgenstein's
and which I believe to be fundamentally correct. Oespite this state
of affairs, the object, the evaluational response to the object and
the behaviour of the subject do all express the emotion. That the
object is evaluated in a certain way will characterise the nature of
the emotional state. Oifferent evaluations will represent different
emotional states. In this way evaluation of the object provides a
means of identifying (perhaps fallibly) an emotional state in a
subject and readily functions as one criterion, among others, for
emotion.
Although I am not presenting any sort of theory of the emotions
here I hope my remarks show the special relevance both of the object
and the subject's evaluation of it as criteria of some significance




The principal text of the Wittgenstein corpus remains
the Philosophical Investigations. Of all the later texts and
manuscripts under scrutiny among Wittgenstein's commentators it
alone was intended for publication by its author. In examining
Wittgenstein's use of "criterion" in that text I take it as
already established that Wittgenstein did not use that term to give
content to a reductionist form of behaviourism. This leaves two
widely-argued claims as regards criteria in the Investigations.
Firstly, that it constitutes the basis of Wittgenstein's own Neo-
Constructivist Theory of Meaning and secondly, that the notion of a
criterion is the key to Wittgenstein's refutation of scepticism about
other minds. In the section below I examine the former claim. The
section subsequent to that deals with the latter. Finally, in the
third section I consider the use of On Certainty among commentators
who defend a criterion-theoretic interpretation of Wittgenstein's
later philosophy and challenge the validity of any appeal to that
text for those purposes.
I THEORY OF MEANING
At this point I will only discuss the question of whether or
not Wittgenstein advocated a Theory of Meaning in the Philosophical
Investigations. The wider and more interesting question of the
nature and potential value of the Theory of Meaning in contemporary
philosophy of language I will examine in Chapter Four. In the
present context however I raise the question of Wittgenstein's
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attitude to theoretical approaches to the concept of meaning in
order to refute a particular type of interpretation of that authors
remarks.
A very clear example of the type of commentary which I wish
to oppose in the present chapter is contained in Baker and Hacker's
joint Critical Notice of Wittgenstein's "Philosophical Grammar'
in Hind, vol. 85 [1976]. The views expressed therein are no
longer upheld by those authors but are nonetheless exemplary of a
type of commentary which has enjoyed considerable currency. In
their Critical Notice Baker and Hacker [1976] maintain both that:




"The explicit verificationism of the Bemerkungen
was not a temporary aberration., but the first step
in a sustained exploration of forms of constructivist
semantics."
(p.270)
The Philosophical Investigations was felt to represent the
culmination of that exploration in a Neo-Constructivist Theory of
Meaning erected upon a foundational Theory of Criteria. But is this
plausible ? As is well known with respect to the Investigations
Wittgenstein described many things as constitutive of meaning. In
remark 353, for example, it is asserted that appeal to verification-
procedures may enter into an account of meaning:
"asking whether and how a proposition can be verified
is only one way of asking 'how d'you mean' ? the
answer is a contribution to the grammar of the
proposition."
In remark 560 ordinary explanations of meaning are said to be
respectable accounts of meaning:
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"the meaning of a word is what is explained by the
explanation of the meaning
and, famously, on page 220e Wittgenstein advises:
"let the use of words teach you their meaning."
As regards names, in remark 43, Wittgenstein contends that
pointing to a bearer can contribute to an explanation of meaning.
Over pages 214-216 of part II Wittgenstein clearly maintains that
expressive intonation can cause a word to be filled with meaning.
This is a figurative use of the term but it is not a figure which
is arbitrarily chosen, rather it forces itself upon us and:
"the figurative use of a word cannot conflict with
the original one."
Rather than endorsing any single core notion Wittgenstein
appears to outline a number factors which can be involved as
regards meaning and its explanation. Further, In remark 65 it is
contended that there is no one single feature or phenomenon which
unites language. This, I argue, must be consistent with, and reflective
of, the view that there is no single, unifying aspect of use which
can be singled out as the central one in terms of which every other
could be explained. These thoughts echo the characterisation of
"meaning" in the Blue Book as an "odd-job" word to be contrasted
with the idea of a word with a single, precise function in terms of
which it is invariably to be understood. The same sentiment is again
explicit in Remark 64 of On Certainty:
"Compare the meaning of a word with the 'function' of
an official and 'different meanings' with 'different
functions 1 ."
In Remark 560 of the Investigations Wittgenstein asserts:
"if you want to understand a word look for what are
called explanations of meaning."
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It will be a truism to say that as a matter of linguistic fact
explanations do not come in only one form or serve only one kind of
purpose. Explanations will be as diverse in aim and type as the uses
of the utterances they seek to explain. In so far as a Theory of
Meaning strives to locate any one feature essential to semantics,
be it criteria or anything else, there can, for Wittgenstein, never
be a valid Theory of Meaning; for the simple reason that no such
unifying factor exists. On this point, I argue, he is surely right.
Even if it is contended that we call all these "meaningful" and,
therefore, they must have something in common, it remains invalid to
infer that they therefore all are so called in virtue of a
particular feature which every single case shares. That would
require independant demonstration.
It has been argued that despite the variety of factors involved
in giving an account of meaning which are explicitly recognized by
Wittgenstein in the Philosophical Investigations the slogan that
"meaning is use" is, at least potentially, a unifying factor capable
of providing a basis for a central notion in the Theory of Meaning.
Michael Oummett [ie. 1963/73], for example, has taken this suggestion
very seriously. Against that idea however, I would again argue that
there just is no one particular feature or aspect of use which can be
singled out as the central one in terms of which all other aspects
might be explained. Oummett's response here has been to streamline
Wittgenstein's claims, focussing on the essentially public character
of meaning. As regards the logical constants, taken as paradigm
cases, Dummett picks out two aspects of use: justification for
use, the "introduction rules', and secondly, the consequences of
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use, the 'elimination rules'. The condition that the reason for
asserting must harmonize with the consequences of so doing produces
a non-holistic account with revisionist potential. But, plausible as
this sounds, it does not establish that Wittgenstein did in fact
support a Neo-Constructivist Theory based upon a core notion of
criteria. Even if it were the case that the 'meaning as use' slogan
had great unifying power it would remain a good question why use was
to be cashed out, always and only, in terms of criteria; especially
given that many sentences do not have criteria. Of course, the
Oummettian approach would probably take a notion of assertability-
conditions or the like as the core notion here and would classify
criteria as a type of such. Dummett's approach clearly merits
consideration in its own right but I will consider that matter in
the subsequent chapter.
The Neo-Constructivist interpretation is used here only
as an example of the attribution of a THEORY of meaning to the
Wittgenstein of the Investigations. If that particular
interpretation could be shown to be erroneous it would still be
possible to offer some other Theory of Meaning as being
'really' Wittgenstein's. But there is a more general reaon why
that too would be erroneous. That is, I think it can be deduced
from a number of Wittgenstein's remarks that he did not adhere
to any THEORY of Meaning and was in fact opposed not to some
theories but to the theoretical approach. If that can be shown
to be the case it must follow not only that it is a mistake to
attribute a Neo-Constructivist Theory of Meaning to Wittgenstein
but that it is a mistake to attribute to the Wittgenstein of the
Investigations any Theory of Meaning.
- 65 -
I would appeal here to Wittgenstein's conception of the
nature of philosophy. In his "Wittgenstein on the Nature of
Philosophy" [19^.] A. Kenny identifies one of the key features of
Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy during the post-Tractatus
period as emphasising a contrast between the descriptive and the
theoretical. Description ought to be illuminating and
representative. The theoretical approach is explanatory and
hypothetical. The sole purpose of philosophy resides in description
facilitating release from the grip of linguistic bewitchment.
Language, through its grammatical categories almost suggests
theoretical approaches; through noun and adjective to substance and
property, for example. Not only are there metaphors but sets or
structures of metaphors pertaining to concepts like time, for
example, which suggest forward direction: the arrow of time, the
flow of the river of time etc. In one sense it is of the nature of
metaphor to mislead. As a device which explicitly identifies that
which is never actually identical it involves identifying one thing
with something else which, ultimately, it is not. But Philosophy,
for the Wittgenstein of the Investigations, is intended to
constitute a means of resisting just such temptations and
suggestions by elucidating, and expanding our view of patterns of
use, by description. It is, by definition, non-theoretical and non-
hypothetical.
This distinction between the descriptive and the theoretical
might be thought to connect with a similar concern in empirical
theory. In that context the distinction between the purely
descriptive and the theoretical is often denied. 8ut both in the
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present context and where empirical theories are obtainable it is
a mistake, I argue, to deny the distinction. To suggest that all
language is theoretical is surely to deny the possibility of mere
description. Contemporary philosophers of science frequently motivate
the rejection of the empiricist conception of a foundational empirical
basis by appeal to the theory-laden nature of all language. But the
fact that phenomenalistic language, the language of experience, is
parasitic upon physical-object language is what entails that the
empiricist in his foundationalism has got his logical priorities
wrong. It is by no means a logical consequence of that fact that when
we ask for description we are always asking for, or getting, a theory.
According to Wittgenstein attempts at explanation ought to be
replaced with lucid description. This is disconsonant with the very
possibility of Theory of Meaning as traditionally conceived. These
sentiments are very clearly expressed in remark 109, again in
remarks 125-6 and in remark 127: "the work of the philosopher
consists in assembling reminders for a particular purpose." In these
remarks Wittgenstein wholly recasts the purpose of philosophy which
becomes therapeutic; a way of dissolving perplexities by actual
case-studies in language whose upshot will be reports so
unobjectionable as to end debate. Contra Kenny's claim this is
hardly 'in the same methodological spirit as that of Descartes'.
These descriptive pictures of the actual workings of language
which remain of philosophical theory will be no Theory of Meaning
but will retain a point or purpose and a "light" of their own.
They will enable the theorist to comprehend the various roles of
"meaning". But it is surely valid to infer from these remarks,
which apply quite generally to Philosophy, that it is plainly
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inconsistent to describe the author of these remarks as someone
who, in actual fact, subscribes to an account of meaning which
identifies one, single feature, the criterion, as the definitive
core notion of that theory. It remains an independent question
however, to what extent any systematic, but purely descriptive,
classification fixing on some, perhaps observable, aspect of use,
internal to a language, or to certain language-games, could be
compatible with Wittgenstein's thought. But it does at least
seems clear that a grand unified theoretical story specifying
content from the outside and perhaps with predictive power
must be wholly incompatible with Wittgenstein's later thought.
Again, questions as to the nature and value of theories of
meaning must retain an importance beyond the interpretation of
Wittgenstein's later philosophy but I consider those questions
in detail in the next chapter.
Interestingly, it might still be possible to talk here
about 'theory'; though not in the currently orthodox sense.
Etymologically, the particular conception of the nature of
theory I have in mind does remain faithful to the original
Greek usage of the term 'theoria', the root of our own term,
which relates to the verb "to see' and to elucidating and
clarifying; notions which survive, even on the Wittgensteinean
conception.
It is important to qualify my position here and hopefully
to clarify it. I do acknowledge that Wittgenstein used the term
"criterion" in the Investigations but cannot accept that this
amounts to a full-blown theory of any kind. In particular, I cannot
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accept that it amounts to a Theory of Meaning. To look for anything
in the Investigations remotely similar to those criterial theories
surveyed by Lycan [1974] must be to search for chimeras; at best it
will result in an exercise in misdescription. Wittgenstein did
introduce the term into philosophical discourse and is undoubtedly
responsible for the currency which the term enjoys but I do not accept
that more was intended by it than its introduction in pages 24-25 of
the Blue Book makes explicit. Wittgenstein's role in the matter of
contemporary debate may well be one of origination and inspiration
but that does not justify the claim that he held anything like a
contemporary theory. It is either this inspirational role which,
through esteem, ends up exaggerated to the extent of attributing
to that author a "criterial semantics", or the attempt to exact a
misplaced legitimation by authority. Greater weight might be given
to Wittgenstein's own hope, expressed in the preface, that his
work not spare others the troubleof thinking but inspire them
to thoughts of their own.
Finally, it seems clear to me that Wittgenstein would have
conceived of the motivation behind the desire to produce a Theory
of Meaning as a prime example of the philosophers' 'craving for
generality' CB1.Bttf, p.19). It is the result of such a craving,
Wittgenstein argues, that we cannot accept the method of
investigating philosophical problems, questions about meaning or
the nature and workings of language, in terms of language-games.
Further, the 'craving for generality' can be redescribed as a
aHitucle teu>*rdS
'contemptuous the particular case" (Bl.B., p.17).
A
Interestingly, Wittgenstein includes the following remark in
his discussion of the craving for generality in the Blue Book,
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"I want to say here that it is never our job
to reduce anything to anything, or to explain
anything. Philosophy really is "purely descriptive'."
(Bl.B, p.18)
Further, I argue, the philosophical methodology which is
advocated in the Investigations is clearly one of elucidation
by description and not of hypothetical explanation. What is not
descriptive in the Investigations is either itself a tool for
description [ie. language-game] or is a plea for description as
the business of philosophy. Of course, it could be argued that
"criterion" is a tool for description and might be widely
applicable as a crucial feature of use and a non-theoretical
unifying concept. I do not think Wittgenstein would deny that,
in some cases, examining criteria could help to explain how we
use words as we do. Nor do I deny that we could assemble these
descriptions and classify them. But this is a very long way
from the type of Theory of Meaning which, for example, Baker
and Hacker [1976] wanted to see in Wittgenstein's later work.
In conclusion, it seems prudent to take Wittgenstein at his
word in this if there is to be any possibility of appreciating
the significance of his thought. I argue then, that it is not
simply that in the Investigations Wittgenstein fails to propound
a certain type of semantic theory but that the theoretical approach
to meaning, as explanation rather than description, is entirely
absent.
II OTHER MINDS
I have already outlined one approach to this problem in the
Investigations when considering remark 293. There Wittgenstein
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assumes a type of philosophical psychology and semantic theory which
readily gives rise to scepticism about other minds. Next he points
up certain bizarre consequences arising from that assumption and
finally rejects the conception. This, I argue, is intended to be a
Reductio Ad Absurdum of the type of position that scepticism about
other minds depends upon; of its metaphysical and, in a broad sense,
semantical presuppositions. There is a more positive side to
Wittgenstein's account of the matter but it is not one which will
necessitate a Theory of Criteria.
Scepticism about other minds is discussed in remarks 281-90,
though consideration of that topic is also evident elsewhere (293,
350, for example). The nub of Wittgenstein's argument in remarks 281-
90 concerns what might be described as the primacy of human being
vocabulary in ordinary discourse. The picture is that the concept of
a human being involves an implicit recognition of the existence of
other minds as a fundamental aspect of its meaning. To correctly
employ the concept at all is to acknowledge that the objects to
which it applies are exactly the sort of thing which sees, hears,
hurts, thinks and so on. Without this implicit recognition the
concept will have been radically altered. To reject that recognition
will be to reject our very linguistic training and will symbolize
not a philosophical assessment but a simple objection to convention.
This is eminently in keeping with Wittgensteinean methodology: not
to build a philosophical bridge over yawning metaphysical chasms but
to close the gap by preventing the division arising. In fact, on my
reading of Wittgenstein at this point his view is very similar to
the one spelled out by Strawson [1959] in his "Individuals". As such
Wittgenstein's account will, of course, be open to similar
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objections. It may be acknowledged, for example, that we are unable
to employ mental vocabulary without being able to utilise the
concept of a person. Further, that concept does not necessarily
apply uniquely to me. However, it could be argued that all we can
validly infer from this is that it is possible that there are other
minds, not that the existence of other minds can be proved.
Much of what Wittgenstein objects to in remarks 281-90, I argue,
is the formulation of the sceptical problem. The pertinent question
would be: human beings as opposed to what ? What sort of thing would
it be that might in all respects be like a human being and yet be
devoid of sensations, perceptions, even consciousness? In remark 420
Wittgenstein suggests that to seriously conceive of children as
automata will result either in the words becoming meaningless or in
the production of an 'uncanny' feeling. It is also implied that such
a conception of other human beings could not be maintained in our
ordinary social intercourse. What Wittgenstein does here is to
reorientate the epistemically primary from so-called colourless
bodily movements to human actions. It is a reorientation of the
logical priorities of Cartesian epistemology. The strategy is to
prevent the sceptic splitting bodily movements which can be known
directly from human beings which can only be the objects of self-
knowledge not of other-knowledge. It is not bodies that we know in
knowing human beings, or at least not only bodies. It is absurd,
Wittgenstein argues, to say that bodies feel pain, that it is a hand
that suffers rather than a person who is aware of pain in his hand:
"one does not comfort the hand but the sufferer."
(P.I. , 286 ) .
The very ability to conceive the world in the vocabulary of
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the sceptic is considered to be contingent upon the pre-mastery of a
more basic vocabulary and the prior possession of certain primordial
concepts, including that of a human being. The sceptic puts the cart
before the horse when he invites us to envisage persons as automata
or possible automata, for the ability so to conceive is parasitic
upon a prior recognition of the concept of a human being and its
application. The point here is a point of logical priority. The
sceptical picture of witnessing bodily movements and dubiously
inferring mentality becomes untenable when it is seen that if this
were the case it would be inexplicable why mentality should ever be
inferred in the first place. Alternately, having begun such a
practice why should it be confined to living beings ? Bodily
movements divorced from human beings cannot provide the foundations
of epistemology. What Wittgenstein takes as basic is the very
concept of a human being and its application. The implicit contents
of these concepts are construed broadly:
"my attitude towards him is an attitude towards a soul
I am not of the opinion that he has a soul."
(P.I., Pt.II, p.178)
This remark reinforces the point made in 281-90. The remark
itself has been identified by commentators as Aristotelian. The echo
of the Greek conception of the soul is plainly audible. It is not
that we infer the presence of a spectral entity, if that is not a
category mistake, but that concepts like that of a human being
already contain a recognition of the fact that what they are about
is living beings, with all that this entails. To speak of a human
being is not to speak of what is, or might be, inanimate but of what
has life. To say in that sense then that a human being does not have
a soul is to say that it is dead. This is why, in Plato for
instance, although the nature of the soul is up for grabs the
possession of souls by human beings is not [ie. Phaedo, for
example]. In "Eine Einstellung zur Seele" [1987] Peter Winch argues
that the attitude, the "Einstellung", to which Wittgenstein refers
is only intelligible at all in a social context. The attitude is
manifested in the reactions of human beings to each other as human
beings. In the Investigations, Part II, Section 4 Wittgenstein
contrasts "attitude" with "opinion". The contrast intended, Winch
holds, is that between being and not being reason-based. The
attitude is represented in instinctive reaction which needs no
justification from any rationalistic epistemology. It therefore
makes no sense to ask quite generally why we pity sufferers because
that is not something grounded in reason or inference, rather it
is an instinctive reaction which is basic here. It follows that
recognition of the social character of existence is a presupposition
of the attitude of human beings one to another, a point which
supports my own conclusion. In the last analysis Wittgenstein's
basic argument with the sceptic would be to hold that the
formulation of the sceptical position is nonsensical, or, is at
least, in Hintikka's [1962] phrase "a performative inconsistency' as
it challenges what is implicit in the very terms in which it is
stated. The point might be put as being that while possibly
meaningful, what the sceptic says cannot be true or false at all,
unless its false.
At the outset of Chapter Two I argued that Wittgenstein's
attitude to the sceptic is, invariably, to construe the sceptical
position as the product of misunderstanding and to argue against it
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by Reductio Ad Absurdum. The attitude to scepticism exemplified in
these two cases provides a thread of continuity throughout
Wittgenstein's work both during and after the Tractatus period.
Scepticism is described in the Tractatus as "not irrefutable but
obviously nonsensical" (T-L-P, 6.51). In the Blue Book (p.58-9) the
kind of extreme scepticism which leads to solipsism cannot be solved
by answering it with common-sense but by "curing the temptation to
attack common-sense". I have noted similar strategies in the
Philosophical Investigations at 293 and 281-90 and this is further
endorsed at 464 and 481. However, the theory of criteria is no part
of this idiosyncratic approach in any of the cases examined.
In the case in point it might be argued that the rejection of
scepticism as involving an abrogation of the meanings of the words
we use is itself a criterial approach and is therefore evidence of a
Theory of Criteria at work in the Investigations. But this
implicitness is not described by Wittgenstein in terms of criteria.
That term occurs twice during the passages mentioned [288/290]. The
first asserts that if the usual language-game is "abrogated" then a
criterion of identity for sensations is required. The second denies
that we use criteria to identify our own sensations. That
Wittgenstein did think that there were criteria in the usual case is
made clear, for example, in remark 269:
"Let us remember that there are criteria in a man's
behaviour for the fact that he does not understand a
word: that it means nothing to him, that he can do
nothing with it. And criteria for his "thinking that
he understands", attaching some meaning to the word
but not the right one. And, lastly, criteria for his
understanding the word right. In the second case one
might speak of a subjective understanding. And sounds
which no one else understands but which I 'appear to
understand' might be called a private language."
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Clearly, criteria are involved here, but not as a means of
refuting scepticism. Criteria provide ways of telling whether or not
someone understands a word. There is also, of course, the famous
remark 580 which asserts that: "An 'inner process' stands in need
of outward criteria". This would also exemplify the existence of
criteria in the usual case and might even be thought to endorse the
view that Wittgenstein held a Theory of Criteria. The single
sentence constitutes the whole remark however which compouds the
difficulties of exegesis and the fact that "inner process" occurs in
indirect speech ought to urge caution and prudence in declaring this
remark the cornerstone of any such theory. The point might be argued
that Wittgenstein intended "inner process" in a sense in which he
would only have discredited. As it stands the purpose of the remark
is less than completely perspicuous. Remark 404, on personal
identity, clearly does endorse the two points that there are
criteria in the usual case and that it is not by means of criteria
that I identify my own sensations or even myself:
"What does it mean to know who is in pain ? It
means, for example, to know which man in this room
is in pain: for instance, that it is the one who
is sitting over there, or the one who is standing
in that corner, the tall one with the fair hair,
and so on.-What am I getting at ? At the fact that
there is a great variety of criteria for personal
'identity'. Now which of them determines my saying
that 'I' am in pain ? None."
Again, in remark 377 Wittgenstein asks:
"...What is the criterion for the sameness of two
images ? What is the criterion for the redness of an
image ? For me, when it is someone else's image: what
he says and does. For myself, when it is my image:
nothing. And what goes for "red" also goes for "same"."
In the normal case, therefore, there are criteria for the
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identity of sensations and further I do not identify my own
sensations by criteria, but that implies no refutation of
scepticism.
Although the problem of other minds is not in question in
these remarks it is clear that we presuppose the existence of the
criteria, the criterial story is prior to scepticism and is not
adumbrated to refute scepticism. If the sceptic rejects the ordinary
criteria he will just lack criteria and will enter the realm of
nonsense or the attempt to construct a private language, which will
come to much the same.
Scepticism is the product of misunderstanding language but not
just misunderstanding the criteria. To return to Winch's point: it
is the einstellungen which is basic or primitive and that is
explicitly contrasted with the theoretical or the reason-based. For
these reasons scepticism is not refuted in the Investigations by
criteria but is shown to be nonsensical, the product of
misunderstanding language, a part of which might involve
misunderstanding criteria. Therefore, although Wittgenstein did
think that there were criteria in the normal case it is not by
appeal to them that he refutes scepticism about other minds.
Although later supporters of criterial theory may well have
exploited and developed arguments featured in Wittgenstein's work
this alone cannot prove that that work itself contains a Theory of
Criteria used to refute scepticism about other minds, even if it may
fairly be said to have inspired some.
Ill ON CERTAINTY
Criteria are often described as a form of evidence or grounds
- 77 -
for assertion which, when fulfilled, not only warrant the assertion
but guarantee the truth of the assertion. Further, recognition of
the satisfaction of criteria for an assertion, it is often held,
can constitute knowledge of the truth of that assertion, and this
despite the defeasibility of any assertion warranted by means of
criteria ie. Lycan [1971], Hacker [1972], Baker [1974], Baker and
Hacker [1986a]. Clearly, these are not uncontroversial claims and
serious doubt has, of course, been cast on the coherence of any such
concept in epistemological contexts by Wright [1984] in his "Second
Thoughts About Criteria". I consider the very challenging argument
of that paper in Chapter 6 but for the moment my primary interest is
confined to the interpretation of Wittgenstein's later philosophy
and to the allegation that a theory about criteria in the sense
outlined is integral to that philosophy.
The notions of doubt and knowledge receive detailed
examination, above all perhaps, in the very last of Wittgenstein's
writings On Certainty [1950-51]. If the view which attributes
such a theory to the later Wittgenstein is correct then it would
not seem unreasonable to anticipate some account of the concept
of criteria in that work, particularily in the light of the
controversial claims made on behalf of the notion as regards
knowledge. Further, such an expectation might seem the more
reasonable in the light of the fact that On Certainty is
regularily referred to by a number of commentators in their
exposition of criterial themes ie. Hacker [1972], Bloor [1984].
In fact however no reference can be made to Wittgenstein's use of
the term "criterion" in that work, simply because the term does
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not occur once in the text of On Certainty. It is therefore
legitimate to ask what it is that justifies reference to that
text to explain Wittgenstein's use of the term "criterion" when
Wittgenstein does not use that term anywhere in the text. The
answer to this question is provided by Hacker [1972] in terms of
the expression "grounds" which occurs frequently in the text and
which is said to enjoy a special logical relation to "criterion".
The nature of the relation in question is explained by what
Hacker [1972] terms "The Criterial Argument":
"The sense of a sentence is determined by its criteria.
The criteria for a sentence consist of the non-inductive
grounds for its application or use.."
(p.263)
The thesis is not given any textual reference at this point
but is said to "lie beneath the surface of Wittgenstein's remarks".
In the final chapter, "The Problem of Criteria", in a section entitled
"Some Logical Features of The Criterial Relation" (p.287 ), a textual
reference is given:
"In the Notes for Lectures he [Wittgenstein] argues
that the meaning of blindness is given by specifying
the criteria for blindness which are constituted by
the grounds for calling someone blind."
(NFL. p.285)
In the "Notes For Lectures" Wittgenstein uses the term "criterion"
once on the page referred to, as follows,
"What is our criterion for blindness ? A certain kind
of behaviour."
But the term "grounds" does not feature anywhere on that
page and hence the relationship between that term and the term
"criterion" remains basically unexplained. Therefore, no real
textual basis is given for the claim made in the Criterial Argument
and from the fact that there is no use of criterion in On
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Certainty it follows that the argument cannot be presented there.
Worse still, it is clear that there are, for Wittgenstein, different
kinds of ground and kinds of grounds other than criteria, for
example, symptoms. The fact that Wittgenstein does not actually use
the term "criterion" must cast doubt on the idea that by "ground"
Wittgenstein meant "criterion". The former is clearly a more general
term which might include, but cannot be exhausted by, the latter.
Finally, there is another, trivial, reason why criteria are not
grounds, namely, just because criteria are observable circumstances,
not sentences.
What then does the Criterial Argument actually come to ?
It cannot be the claim that criterial relations require grounds.
I have argued earlier [above, Chapter 1] that in the Blue Book's
introduction the bedrock that we hit is not a ground but a
convention. Criteria may determine what is to count as a ground but
that does not imply that the criterial relations are grounded. In
that sense the criterial relations are groundless. Equally, it
cannot be that everything which is a ground is a criterion. That
would abolish the distinction between symptom and criterion which
was the raison d'etre of the terminology in the Blue Book.
Importantly, the grounds mentioned in the Criterial Argument are
described as "non-inductive".
Let us now consider that description in the light of the point
of the Criterial argument: It allows On Certainty to be analysed
in terms of criteria via the notion of a ground. But, ex hypothesi,
not every ground is a criterion. That will be so only for uses of
"non-inductive" grounds. But if that is Hacker's argument then we
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are back to square one: there is no use of "criterion" in On
Certainty but neither is there any use of "non-inductive ground".
This difficulty cannot be circumvented by introducing the idea of a
grammatical connection. The claim would then be that any ground
which also reflects a grammatical connection will be criterial. But
is that so ? In "Scepticism, Rules and Language" Hacker [1986a] is
clear that it is not. Criteria are a subset of the set of internal
(grammatical) connections and are of a more complex order [for more
detail see below, Chapter Five]. How then can the Criterial Argument
be of exegetical value if it presupposes that we can recognize when
a ground is criterial in advance of a coherent distinction between
grounds which are and grounds which are not criterial. That
distinction is not familiar either from the Philosophical
Investigations or the preliminary sketches for such. The Criterial
Argument, I argue, far from lying beneath the surface of
Wittgenstein's remarks, compounds an error in recognising a second
theoretical, hypothetical and meaning-theoretic term therein. It is
a part of the frame through which the remarks are viewed, not a
hidden part of the remarks themselves.
The Criterial Argument is, at least, misleading in so far as
it suggests that in On Certainty it is criteria which confer sense
on a proposition. In the actual text Wittgenstein frequently
describes the language-game as a meaning-conferrer. The context of
an utterance determines its meaning (228-9, 348). The language-game
sets the limit to meaningful interaction. As a methodological tool
for philosophy the fundamental advantage of that concept lies in its
incorporation of social structure, context and in sharpening focus
on aspects of linguistic practice. That concept is clearly broader
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than that of a criterion. While the latter might be an important
aspect of the former I would be extremely reluctant to say that it
ultimately exhausted the concept of a language-game; if for no other
reason than the fact that numerous language-games proceed in the
absence of criteria. Not every language-game contains criteria, ways
of knowing or roles for doubt or justification. Unless the rules
allow for these moves then to try to so move is as ludicrous as
appealing to the rules of draughts to make a move in chess.
In Hacker's picture there exists a criterially-supported realm
of utterances in which recognition of the satisfaction of criteria
can confer truth, falsity, certainty and knowledge. This realm is
above all a grounded realm. But is this a plausible account of On
Certainty ? Certainly the term 'grounds' features in that work but
there can be no synonymity between that term and the term criterion
as Hacker intends it to be understood. In this text, as in the
Investigations, Wittgenstein is at pains to emphasise the
groundlessness of our believings (166). At 307 and 387 it is
emphasised that we can be certain in the absence of any grounds and
that the locutions 'not certain', 'as good as certain" and "I cant
doubt it' are all perfectly meaningful even where no grounds are
available. Propositions about our own experience and even the law of
induction are also held to require no grounds. Therefore when
Wittgenstein speaks of language-games as meaning-conferring he
cannot be speaking only of criteria. If he were vast tracts of
perfectly meaningful language would become meaningless. This is
again spelled out in remarks 559 and 560 where it is held that the
language-game is not based on grounds and is neither reasonable or
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unreasonable but like life "is there". The point might be put as
that while justification of particular reasonings occur due to
standards and criteria of correctness within a mode of reasoning
layed down in a language-game there can be no criteria of
correctness, no justification of a whole mode of reasoning, external
to the practice itself. In the remark that the language-game "is
there", with its air of return to the definition of what is
mystical in the Tractatus (T-L-P, 6.44), Wittgenstein is clearly
casting doubt on the idea that the concept of grounds provides the
best approach to language-games or is specially basic to them. In so
far as he rejects that idea, I argue, he rejects the spirit of
Hacker's whole approach. Grounds apply only in contexts, in language-
games, which accomodate them. These are only a subset of the set of
contexts; a fragment of all possible contexts. There is no
indication that at the bottom of every language-game, as a condition
of meaningfulness, there are criteria. To fail to mention that
subset to which grounds are essential might be a failure of
description. But to abstract that subset and impose it over the
whole of language, to take it as a reductive class, is a
philosophical sleight of hand which does no justice to Wittgenstein.
As an interpretative tool with which to carve up the text of
On Certainty criteria leave a great deal to be desired. But it is
not in terms of the contribution to a criterial interpretation of
Wittgenstein that the importance of the text inheres. The work does
contain, for example, much that anticipates contemporary debates and
it is in this, I argue, that its importance consists. The text
exemplifies a development, a broadening of descriptive horizons.
From description, in the main, of particular games in the
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Investigations there is movement at some points in On Certainty
towards meta-descriptions of systems of games. Further, the twin
concepts 'hinge-proposition' and "world picture' develop an idea
which is not entirely dissimilar to, indeed seems to anticipate, the
Quinean [1953] notion of a 'conceptual scheme" which features in so
many contemporary debates. The Quinean picture is of a core set of
propositions beleived to be true and strongly depended upon. This is
distinguished from a complementary set of peripheral propositions
which are in some sense less than fundamental. Shared belief in a
common core-set is shared admission to a conceptual scheme.
Incompatible cores represent distinct conceptual schemes,
"The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs,
from the most casual matters of geography and history
to the profoundest laws of atomic physics or even
of pure mathematics and logic is a man-made fabric
which impinges on experience only along the edges...
A conflict with experience at the periphery occasions
readjustments in the interior of the field..the.,
logical laws being in turn simply certain further
elements of the field."
( p - A- 2 )
The Wittgensteinean picture is perhaps less readily explicable
but in some ways there are clear approximations. The core of
propositions might be deemed Wittgenstein's world picture but only
with some reservations. It is not that the propositions comprising
the world picture are explicitly believed to be true. They may never
be questioned at all (167). They precede questions of truth and
falsity in order to provide a basis from which other propositions
are up for grabs, in terms of truth and falsity (94, 159, 162). It
is not that it would be impossible to test or examine any particular
component propostion in the light of others, only that it would be
unusual (163, 164). The world picture is not a hypothesis but a
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linguistic inheritance acquired through training (167). It is
acquired as a system and as a frame of reference. What would be
impossible, because of its senselessness and lack of meaning-
conferring context, would be to test large subsets of the system.
When learned the world picture propositions harden into rules.
These form bedrock. Empirical propositions, in terms of the analogy,
are fluid and flow over this river bed. However, the bank comprises
both rock and sand. Ultimately, there is not a clear division between
the rock and the waters above. But there is enough of a difference to
be important (94-100). Hinge-propositions form the world picture, the
river bed. These are the hinges on which the debate swings, the axis
around which the periphery revolves. What is a hinge in one game can
be tested in the light of a hinge in another. Something must hold
fast, but it need not hold universally. But this is true only of
some hinge-propositions, not of all. Some are considered more basic
than others. All are not equally testable.
Wittgenstein's point emphasising the lack of any clear
division here does echo many of Quine's [1953] remarks, for example,
that it is,
"..folly to seek a boundary between synthetic statements
which hold contingently on experience, and analytic
statements which hold come what may..by the same token
no statement is immune to revision."
[p. 43]
or that,
"The issue over there being classes seems more a question
of convenient conceptual scheme; the issue over there being
centaurs, or brick houses on Elm Street, seems more a question
of fact. But I have been urging that this difference is only
one of degree."
[p. 46]
There is further evidence that Wittgenstein's thinking at that
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time did indeed anticipate Quine's [1953] point; notably from the
Remarks On Colour which is largely contemporary with On Certainty.
The following passage is from Part 1, which Anscombe, the editor,
dates around March 1951:
"Sentences are often used on the borderline between logic
and the empirical, so that there meaning changes back and
forth and they count now as expressions of norms, now as
expressions of experience. (For it is certainly not an
accompanying mental phenomenon- this is how we imagine
thoughts- but the use, which distinguishes the logical
from the empirical one.)"
Of course, I am not suggesting that the analogy is a perfect
one, nor am I denying that there are important differences between
these authors. Neither do I pretend to have offered a completely
comprehensive account of that text; though I do hope to have
highlighted some interesting issues therein. My point has only been
to try to show how far removed Wittgenstein's concerns are in that
text from the construction of a Theory of Meaning whose core notion
is that of a criterion.
In On Certainty Wittgenstein makes clear that in order to play
the same language-game speakers must know and share that which
stands fast in that game. To know what the game means is to know the
preconditions of play. The propositions which constitute those
preconditions will be held fast in that game, yet in a different
game the truth of the same proposition may well not be settled in
advance of the procedures for establishing truth and falsity which
the game lays down. I do not contend that the positions outlined in
this text are uncontroversial, clearly they do require development
and defence. I do argue though that it is more in virtue of these
positions that the text is of value and not in its, remarkably poor,
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potential interpretability as a defence of a Theory of Meaning with
a core notion of criteria. Again, no doubt, there are certain
features of Wittgenstein's philosophy as presented in On Certainty
which have been endorsed by later theorists of criteria but that of
itself does not show that Wittgenstein himself held any such view
and if such theorists do wish to maintain such a view the fact must
be faced that one of the prime pieces of textual evidence for





In the preceding chapters I have addressed the issue of the origins
of contemporary theories of criteria. Those origins are universally
acknowledged by commentators, supporters and critics alike to have their
ultimate source in the later philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein ie. Baker
[1974], Hacker [ 1 972], Albritton [ 1 970 ] , Lycan [1971] and McDowell [ 1982]
to cite but a sample. In so far as I have been wholly concerned to date
with establishing the validity of the claim that Wittgenstein did not
outline any such theory in those later works and is properly understood
to have had only an inspirational role in this matter [above Chapter Two]
so far have I been able to avoid explicit reference to anything but the
most general features of contemporary theory in very schematic sketches.
The fact remains that the conclusion to this debate will itself say
nothing about the nature or coherence of that theory. Whether a full¬
blown theory of criteria can justifiably be attributed to Wittgenstein or
whether, if my arguments be accepted, no such attribution is justified is
of little consequence to the theory itself. The fact of this
interpretational matter'will neither prove nor refute the correctness of
the theory; nor will it settle the purpose or role it might have in
contemporary Philosophy of Language. For that reason it is now incumbent
upon me to offer answers to just these questions. The role and place of
the theory in the present philosophical scheme of things takes precedence
over its precise contours in the order of exposition.
I THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE
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It is often argued, for instance by Anthony Flew [1979, p. viii]
that an eminently sensible approach to the inquisitive newcomers' typical
questions: what is philosophy ? what is metaphysics ? what is moral
philosophy ? what is the philosophy of....? is to send the inquirer to
the seminal texts of the particular field which is the subject of the
inquiry. Teachers of philosophy will surely be familiar with this
strategy from discourse with intending students. As a method it may be
advantageous in that it can often do more justice to genuine questions
than brief, hastily formulated definitions which may well be unduly
limited by time, partisan or just fail to identify what it is in the
spirit of the subject which has captivated the inquirers' interest. This
methodology would at least force the inquirer to examine an actual text
before dismissing (or continuing) the matter rather than simply halting
that inquiry if the description given is found unpalateable, irrelevant
to the motive of the question (be it sound or unsound), or just
uninteresting. Suppose then that someone had asked: what is the
philosophy of language ? and further suppose that in the interests of
contemporariness a modern-minded teacher directed his questioner to any
of the works of Oummett or Davidson or even to the Oxford Readings volume
on language [Searle. ed. 1974]. In these works the questioner would find
that to a large extent the entire field revolved around one cardinal
hinge, namely the qestion: how are we to explain the fact that from
exposure to a finite stock of more or less grammatically well-formed
utterances the language-learner quickly comes to understand a potentially
infinite number of utterances ? Accounting for this phenomenon has become
a sine qua non not only of the Philosophy of Language but also of much
Linguistics. In fact, concern with this question cuts across a number of
academic boundaries and is debated by many of the most prominent and
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influential figures in each field. Dummett [1978], for example, gives
great philosophical weight to just this question and sees one particular
fact as being central to the whole of the Philosopy of Language, namely,
the fact that:
"..anyone who has a mastery of any given language is able
to understand an infinity of sentences of that language,
an infinity which is, of course, principally composed of
sentences which he has never heard before.."
(p.451 )
Similarily, from the "Philosophy of Language", Chomsky [Searle ed.,
1974] asserts:
"The most striking aspect of linguistic competence is what
we may call the creativity of language, that is, the
speaker's ability to produce new sentences, sentences that
are immmediately understood by other speakers although they
bear no physical resemblance to sentences which are familiar
..the fundamental importance of this creative aspect of
language has been recognized since the seventeenth century.."
(p.74)
In his contribution to the "Symposium on Innate Ideas" this attitude
is again exemplified [Searle ed., 1974]:
"Compared with the number of sentences a child can produce
or interpret with ease the number of seconds in a lifetime
is ridiculously small"
(p.122)
The assertion that a weighty predominance of the edifice of
contemporary Philosophy of Language rests heavily upon this fundamental
concern is surely an uncontroversial one. A priori, there is no reason
why this should not be seen as a highly pertinent question to which the
Philosophy of Language must provide an answer. The aforementioned
intending student, and indeed experienced philosophers, might therefore
be forgiven for proceeding to reason in the following way: The existence
of the phenomenon is undeniable. The solution to it is neither obvious
nor trivial. What kind of explanation is appropriate to that phenomenon ?
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Again there is no reason a priori why reasoning of this kind is unsound
nor the question which is its upshot misconceived. Yet, on further
examination, the student will be misled if he expects to find that debate
of his reflectively-framed question dominates the thought of these
authors. In fact, as Baker and Hacker [1986] point out, debate of this
question: "what kind of explanation is appropriate to the fact that from
exposure to the finite sample a child comes to understand a potentially
infinite number of unfamiliar utterances ?" constitutes only a tiny
fragment of the combined literatures of Linguistics and the Philosophy of
Language while factional rivalry within one ideological conception of
explanation comprises the rest. The form which the answer to that
question must take is already a presupposition of the debate, not a part
of its agenda. Again I turn to the works of Oummett and of Chomsky which
clearly bear this out. Dummett [1978], as mentioned more briefly above,
asserts that:
"The fact that anyone who has a mastery of any given language
is able to understand an infinity of sentences of that
language, an infinity which is of course principally composed
of sentences which he has never heard before, is one emphasised
not only by the modern school of linguists headed by Chomsky
but also by Wittgenstein himself and this fact can hardly be
explained otherwise than by supposing that each speaker has an
implicit grasp of a number of general principles governing the
use in sentences of words of the language."
(p.451 )
Chomsky's attitude is equally presumptive:
"A distinction must be made between what the speaker of a
language knows implicitly (....competence) and what he does
(his performance) Performance provides evidence for the
investigation of competence..a primary interest in competence
entails no disregard for the facts of performance. On the
contrary it is difficult to see how performance can be
seriously studied except on the basis of an explicit theory of
the competence that underlies it."
(p.73)
This attitude is equally prevalent in the views of some contemporary
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philosophers of mind. It is integral, for example, to Paul Churchland's
account of "Matter and Consciousness" [1984] which points up nicely the
extent to which such a view is presupposed not only in thinking about
language but in thinking about thinking. Above all for Churchland the
fundamental concern of the Philosophy of Mind is the study of "conscious
intelligence". My complaint lies not with Churchland's demarcation of the
field in those terms but in the fact that, again, the explanation of
conscious intelligence given is not always one that is argued for by
Churchland but is more often one that is presupposed. Consider, for
example, a few of Churchland's introductory remarks on Artificial
Intelligence:
"These rules [of arithmetic] you already know..So you already
possess a self conscious command of one formal system. And
given that you can think at all, you also have at least some
tacit command of the general logic of propositions as well,
which is another formal system. What is more interesting is
that any formal system can be automated."
(p. 100)
Why does Churchland say that unconscious knowledge of a formal,
mathematical system is a precondition of conscious thought ? No argument
is given to substantiate this claim, though it is far from self evidently
true. It is, of course, quite clear why Churchland holds such a view
given that author's attitude to Chomsky:
"..these artificial languages [ BASIC, PASCAL etc] are much
simpler in structure and content than human natural language,
but the differences may be differences only of degree,..the
theoretical work of Noam Chomsky and the generative grammar
approach to linguistics have done a great deal to explain
the human capacity for language-use in terms that invite
simulation by computer."
(p 16)
There is a hidden premise in Churchland's first point about
Artificial Intelligence, namely, that thinking is always thinking
linguistically. Again, Churchland doesn't feel he needs to provide
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argument for this conclusion. It is just presupposed. But once that is
conceded Churchland's reasoning obviously runs as follows: if to think
is to think in a language and we only learn a language in virtue of
something like Chomsky's rules which we know innately then unless we had
such innate knowledge language, and consequently thought, would be
impossible. Although this is already a considerable presupposition I will
make clear in the course of this chapter that Churchland in fact
presupposes more and that it is in virtue of these presuppositions rather
than any actual argument that he reaches the conclusion he wants about
Artificial Intelligence.
With specific reference to the work of Chomsky however, H. Putnam
[Searle ed., 1974] characterizes one Chomskian 'mode of argument' well:
"..there is the 'argument' that runs "what else could
account for language learning ?' The task is so incredibly
complex that it would be miraculous if one tenth of the
human race accomplished it without innate assistance.
(This is like Marx's proof of the Labour Theory of Value
..which runs, what else could account for the fact that
commodities have different value except the fact that the
labour-content is different)
(p. 133)
As indicated above this "mode of argument" is present not only in
the writings of Chomsky but also in those of Oummett. Putnam [Searle ed.,
1974] is rightly unhappy about what is an extraordinary form of argument.
Not least because it is no form of argument at all but is a form of
rhetoric. It is not even a genuine question but a rhetorical one in the
mouth of Chomsky. My inability to conceive of alternative forms of
explanation other than my own has no implications whatsoever for the
possibility of there being valid alternative conception : this must be
because the earth is flat, what else could explain it ? and so on ad
nauseam. Putnam does not bring fully to light what is unhappy about this
whole matter and himself has no developed alternative although he is not
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prepared to nail the lid tight shut on traditional learning theory. Baker
and Hacker [1986] do present an alternative (furthermore one which
naturally accomodates a central role for a criterial thesis although
these authors do not make anything at all of this potential) which I
shall discuss later in the present chapter.
II THE SCIENCE OF LINGUISTICS: A HYPOTHETICO-DEDUCTIVE MODEL.
Even at this early point in the discussion it already becomes
difficult to maintain an account of matters which is sufficiently general
to keep the cited authors under one and the same umbrella of enterprise
without running the risk of blurring the differences of detail (they are,
I argue, differences of detail, not of principle). The question I want to
put at this juncture is as follows: what kind of explanation is being
presupposed by Dummett and by Chomsky ? 8ecause the answer to this
question may not be identical in each case and in order to avoid the
charge of misrepresentation I shall examine this question with reference
to each author in turn.
Chomsky frequently reiterates that the formal theory of grammar
which is ultimately going to provide the answer to the question raised by
the "creativity of language" is itself an empirical hypothesis. [Searle
ed., 1974 p.122, 125, for example]. There may however be a divergence
between Chomsky and Dummett on the correct answer to the question of
whether the empirical hypothesis is, or is not, an hypothesis which
asserts the existence of certain hidden mechanisms whose operations,
characterized by the formal theory, constitute that understanding in
virtue of which speakers actually master their language. However, I would
argue that only an affirmative answer to that question could actually
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provide a solution to the creativity problem as conceived by either
author. It is clear at least that Chomsky is so committed to the concrete
existence of such mechanisms in the strong sense (of a mental 'ontology')
outlined. This is made perfectly obvious by Chomsky [Searle ed., 1974] in
a number of passages and in a footnote (p 72. 4.) where Chomsky corrects
A. Riechling's [1961] interpretation of his work:
"[Riechling] asserts that obviously I could not 'be
said to sympathise with such a "mentalistic monster"
as the "innere Sprachform" '. But in fact the work that he
is discussing is quite explicitly and self-consciously
mentalistic (...that is it is an attempt to construct a
theory of mental processes)."
"..a grammar is an account of competence. It..attempts to
account for the ability of a speaker to understand an
arbitrary sentence of his language..if it is a linguistic
grammar it aims to discover and exhibit the mechanisms that
make this achievement possible."
(Searle ed., 1974, p 73)
Chomsky's Theory of Transformational Generative Grammar is,"
therefore, an empirical hypothesis which both asserts the existence of
innate mental mechanisms which make understanding a language possible and
attempts to describe the operations of those mechanisms, to describe
those mental processes in which human understanding consists. That
description, if correct, (it is held always to be empirically evaluable)
will literally make explicit just how in fact the phenomenon of the
creativity of language is possible. Again I reiterate that my concern,
like that of the intending student, lies not in painting in the
mechanical fine detail but in ascertaining just what kind of explanation
is being given. At first sight Chomsky's mode of reasoning (if empirical
at all) is surely empirical in a strong scientific sense. It is most
readily subsumed under the hypothetico-deductive model familiar from the
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writings of Karl Popper [1963, for example], just in so far as it
conjectures imaginatively the existence of entities and their functions
in terms of which certain phenomena are to be explained and leaves itself
open to empirical refutation by the evaluational criterion of "fit" with
actual language-use. Given this situation is it now fair to say that the
model of explanation employed by Chomsky is the theoretical physicist's
hypothetico-deductive model which postulates entities and describes their
functions ? Plainly not. For Popper [1963, esp. Ch.1] the whole raison
d'etre of the methodology of conjecture and refutation consists in
falsification. What provides systematic constraints, guarantees
objectivity and ultimately, therefore, constitutes rationality on that
model is explicit testability. In a strong sense made clear by Popper
[1963] falsification makes scientific knowledge possible and therefore
makes scientific progress possible. By virtue of its role as demarcation
-criterion with respect to the scientific what is not testable and
genuinely falsifiable just is not scientific. Of course, it will be
argued that Chomsky [Searle ed., 1974] has provided empirical evaluation
criteria by means of which refutations may be effected. But that
criterion is only of application to any given grammar of a given
realization of the ultimately innate mechanism. The innateness hypothesis
is not refuted when a grammar or grammars is refuted; only the individual
grammar is. In Kuhn's [1964] terms the scientist not the paradigm is
being tested. The innateness hypothesis is not itself a testable
hypothesis. The evaluation criteria do not apply to it, for the very
existence of performance is evidence for competence. Every time a child
learns a language the innateness hypothesis is confirmed. There is no
test, crucial, conclusive or otherwise for the concrete existence of the
structure-independant faculte de langage. John Lyons [1971], who is far
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from an ardent critic of Chomsky, acknowledges just the lack of
scientific testability involved:
"Chomsky ..is commited to the view that "if an artificial
language were constructed which violated some of these
general principles, then it would not be learned at all..
(The Listener, 30th May, 1968 p.688). But this hypothesis,
as Chomsky's critics have pointed out, is not subject to
direct empirical verification... Nor is it at all clear how
one would go about designing an acceptable psychological
experiment bearing less directly on the issues involved."
(p.111 )
In a later footnote Lyons [1971] cites a response by Chomsky to this
charge:
"He..[Chomsky]..suggests that I should point out that ..
it is generally accepted by modern empiricists 'that
meaningful hypotheses, in general, must only meet the
condition that some possible evidence have some bearing
on them"
(p. 1 H)
It should be pointed out here however that not all empiricists are
logical positivists, as Chomsky seems to presuppose. It might also be
noted that not all of Chomsky's critics are empiricists in any sense and
that the only 'possible evidence' seems to be the phenomenon of the
creativity of language which, when seen in Chomskian terms, can but
confirm Chomsky's view. The point is not that the innateness hypothesis
is meaningless because it lacks testability. It is rather that in so far
as these hypotheses lack testability so far are they unscientific. In
short, there is nothing which could count as- a refutation of that
hypothesis, empirical or otherwise. But in these terms the Chomskian
Theory of Understanding, far from being a genuinely scientific
hypothetico-deductive conjecture, is essentially a Conventionalist
stratagem a la Popper [1963 esp.Chl].
I would also suggest that if we return to the particular grammar
at hand, namely Chomsky's, it would be found that no area of performance
- 97 -
could even be seen, conclusively, not to fit. Not least because there is
no fully articulated Theory which any piece of evidence could be seen not
to fit in such a way as to produce a refutation rather than an artful
extension or re-drawing of boundaries. But the philosophy of artful
extension is the philosophy of the conventionalist twist; not of
conjecture and refutation.
It can only be concluded therefore that the type of explanation
presented by Chomsky is not as straightforwardly scientific as it might
first appear. This fact prevents, for the moment, any further question
being raised as to whether or not the type of explanation being offered
is adequate to the explanation of the original phenomenon; that is a
point to which I shall return.
However, I would be prepared to argue that the innateness hypothesis
functions as the Lakatosian [1978] 'hard core' of the Chomskian research
programme, or, in Kuhn's [1964] terms, defines the Chomskian paradigm. If
we accept that scientific theories are more articulated, composed of more
distinct parts, than Popper [1963] could comfortably allow, then the
innateness hypothesis mig.ht be seen to be the frame for explanation, that
which makes explanation possible. As such it would be held fast such that
it was not itself up for grabs in terms of truth-value but determined
what was so appraisable. The innateness hypothesis would then be a very
different mode of description from the empirical, metaphysics rather than
science. In these terms it might still be allowed that the accumulation
of anomalies might bring about change at this level in the structure (it
is clear that many contemporary linguists might want to see Chomsky as a
necessary step on the way, even if the way is not clearly signposted)
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III THE MACHINE IN THE GHOST
I will now consider a characterization of the type of explanation
Chomsky is proposing which is not unrelated to the type just considered
above and which, I believe, lies at the heart of Chomsky's thesis. Before
outlining my interpretation it will be useful to consider a few more of
Chomsky's remarks:
"..it makes sense to say., that you and I know English,
for example, that this knowledge is in part shared among
us and represented somehow in our minds, ultimately in our
brains, in structures that we can hope to characterize
abstractly, and in principle quite correctly, in terms of
physical mechanisms"
[Chomsky 1980, p.5]
Again I refer to Chomsky's [1971] reply to Riechling cited earlier
[above, section 2] and to Chomsky's [1980, p.185] analogy between the
language faculty and a "physical organ". It seems quite clear that what
Chomsky is offering as explanation to the creativity of language is in
fact a causal explanation. When the hearer hears a novel utterance this
is processed by the alleged mechanisms referred to which are conjointly
sufficient to produce understanding. More properly, on exposure to
initial finite stock innate, structure-independent principles will
conjointly produce a grammar for the given language. Next, on hearing a
novel utterance, that utterance will be processed by the rules and
principles of the formed grammar in various ways. The effect of this
processing will be precisely an understanding of the meaning of that
utterance. The repeated iteration of that process will make actual the
possibility of understanding an infinite number of novel utterances; at
least in principle ie. in the case of the Ideal Speaker-Hearer. In his
"Semantic Theory and Tacit Knowledge" [1981] Gareth Evans is clear on
this point, as clear, at least, as the very notion of tacit semantic
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knowledge allows him to be. Evans' paper is itself a reply to Crispin
Wright's "Rule-Following, Objectivity And The Theory of Meaning" [1981].
Wright considers three views of tacit knowledge; the third of which
interests us here. This 'third option' defends a strong sense of tacit
semantic knowledge adequate to representing the compositionality
constraint on semantic theory for, it is held,
"..all the interest of the theories or sub-theories which
have been constructed lies in their capacity to exhibit
the meanings of complex expressions as a function of the
meanings of their parts."
(p.118)
This feature is described as "structure-reflection" by Prof. Wright.
Wright [1981] is critical and, rightly, sceptical about the idea of a
'strong sense of tacit knowledge' which the third view defends and Evans
[1981] notes that,
"It would be unfair to complain that Prof. Wright did not
make this third option terribly clear, for it is one of
his points that it is not very clear."
(p- 120)
Despite this obvious constraint Evans goes on to make lucid one
possible account of a tacitly known semantic theory capable of
representing the structure-reflecting characteristic in terms of
dispositions to judge utterances as tokens of sentence-types with
relevant, associated truth- conditions. Of the notion of disposition
employed in his account Evans remarks:
".it is essential that the notion of a disposition used
in these formulations be understood in a full-blooded
sense. These statements of tacit knowledge must not be
regarded as simple statements of regularity, for if they
were anyone who correctly judged the meanings of complete
sentences would have a tacit knowledge..When we ascribe to
something the disposition to V in circumstances C, we are
claiming that there is a state S which, when taken together
with circumstances C, provides a causal explanation of all
the episodes of the subject's V-ing (in C)....The decisive
way to decide which model is correct is by providing a causal,




In all of these claims I think Evans is both perfectly articulate
and perfectly correct. If the theory is really worth its salt this is
exactly what it must deliver. Having said that, I think there is more to
the point that the very notion resists precise formulation and I have
graver doubts about this possibility, for even if such an explanation can
be given let us not presuppose that it is the kind of explanation that
we require, that it is even appropriate. I will make clear my doubts in
the process of argument.
But first I wish to forestall an objection here: if, as is indeed
the case, Chomsky is a dualist, how can the mind (which contains the
language faculty) link into the causal chain ? This is, of course,
nothing other than the traditional mind/body problem and in the quoted
remarks the lie is given to this point. Ultimately Chomsky, and
Churchland, are simply identifying mind and brain, holding both equally
susceptible to neurophysiological explanation. I can now make clear the
extent of my complaint against Churchland. In presupposing a Chomskian
account of language-acquisition Churchland has presupposed an analysis of
thinking which already involves a materialist analysis of mind. It then
becomes very easy for him to reach the comfortable conclusion that the
programme of so-called strong Artificial Intelligence is entirely well-
conceived and bound to culminate in success. All that has to be done to
create a thinking, metal mind is to reproduce the Chomskian formal theory
which exists in the wetware of the meat machine and automate that system
in some man-made machine. My point is not yet that strong Artificial
Intelligence is misconceived, but that Churchland has simply presupposed
the entire story which he requires to get his view off the ground without
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ever making clear to the reader that he has done so. On the
interpretation of Chomsky, Lyons [1971] makes plain Chomsky's version of
dualism as follows:
he [Chomsky] differs from Descartes and most philosophers
who would normally be called 'mentalist' in that he does not
subscribe to the ultimate irreducibility of the distinction
between 'body' and 'mind'....he [Chomsky] makes the point
that 'the whole issue of whether there's a physical basis for
mental structures is a rather empty issue' because, in the
development of modern science, 'the concept "physical" has
been extended step by step to cover anything we understand",
so that 'when we ultimately begin to understand the
properties of mind, we shall simply ..extend the notion
"physical" to cover these properties as well. He does not
even deny that it is possible in principle to account for
mental phenomena in terms of 'the physiological processes
and physical processes that we now understand'."
(p.107-8)
It is precisely this ultimately reductionist version of dualism and
the explanatory monism which makes the mental (eventually) explicable in
physical terms which in turn makes dualism compatible with the type of
explanation which, I suggest, Chomsky is offering. By parity of reasoning
the appeal to dualism is rendered ineffective.
It is worth emphasising that this locates a mechanical procedure at
a very deep level of consciousness. The (ultimately) neurophysiological
hardwiring which constitutes the language-acquisition device and equally
constitutes understanding is not available to the subject. It is not
known but cognized. It is cognized in an essentially non-cognitive sense.
It is UNconscious intelligence. That is, it is not in the stream of
consciousness whose daily turbulences and perturbations compose a mental
life. Rather it is situated at a deeper level in the geist which cannot
be reached by conscious introspection. It is, to paraphrase, the machine
in the ghost. I do not wish to labour with criticism of the notion of
innateness. The faculty clearly fails to satisfy adequate criteria for
knowledge. Simply calling this knowledge something else without amending
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its role in the Theory in any way is a sleight of hand which one does not
have to be a philosopher to feel suspicious about. I do not believe that
Chomsky has provided any reason to reconsider Locke's classic refutation
of the Cartesian brand of innateness and in either form the hypothesis is
as dubious now as it was then. Again my concern lies in what kind of
explanation is being given and, I argue, the role of competence is that
of a causally deterministic mechanism (or group of mechanisms) with
respect to performance. What makes us rightly recalcitrant to accept a
causal explanation of language-use in the way I have suggested Chomsky
invites us to is surely the following thought: isn't that type of
explanation explicitly contrasted with the type of explanation we would
want to give of correct language-use ? It is certainly in stark contrast
with the type of explanation which any competent speaker would give. But
the explanations of the speaker under Chomsky's regime will actually be
taken only to be inductive evidence for the existence of the machine
whose mechanics our ordinary explanations grope feebly towards.
The fact that language-use (performance) could be explained causally
does not imply that any such explanation could satisfactorily answer the
question raised by the creativity of language. Certainly, there exist
neurophisiological prerequisites to language use but it is by no means as
certain that reference to these facts is sufficient to explain the
ej-
questionAmeaning. To provide a purely causal story in answer to that
philosophical question is surely just to have missed its point. As
Waissman [1965], in another context, makes clear:
"We shall say that the meaning of a sign 'a' is the
effect which it should have, not the effect that it
will have. This, of course, is nothing but a
contribution to the grammar of the word 'meaning' to
prevent it being confounded with that of the word
'effect'."
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( p . 1 0 2.)
I do not expect that this will convince those involved in the type
of research to which I have referred. To people working within the
confines of this particular ideology it will clearly require a Kuhnian
gestalt-switch, a pardigm-shift, to come to see that this is so. To date
I have been concerned only to raise some doubts as to the scientific
status of the explanation involved and to appeal to intuitive good sense
about language-use to see the inappropriateness of either type of
explanation. In the section following the next I will adumbrate some
philosophical argument to ground these doubts but first I shall extend my
treatment from Linguistics to the Philosophy of Language.
In terms of the metaphor in the preceding section Baker and Hacker
[1986] stands to the dogma of the machine in the ghost as Ryle's "The
Concept of Mind" [1949] stood to the dogma of the ghost in the machine.
The former work has not enjoyed the reception of the latter and is
therefore considerably less influential. Despite this I accept the
soundness of the critique presented there and am in broad agreement both
with many of its critical arguments and with its alternative solution to
the problem of creativity. I hasten to add that the arguments I deploy
can be attributed to those authors only where explicitly stated; those
authors cannot, of course, be held responsible for errors in my own
thought as represented here and below. References to works are as quoted
and are to Baker and Hacker [1986] only where stated; I do not confine
myself to the sources to which those authors refer. At the end of this
Chapter I present a critique of the positive views of that text (and
their alleged pedigree). Finally, I emphasise that the text contains not
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a single mention of a theory of criteria. It uses, but does not mention
or appraise, the latter term in the ordinary way. Hence, while I include
myself in the luddite spirit, as it were, Baker and Hacker cannot be
blamed for any of my positive views.
IV WHAT IS A THEORY OF MEANING ?
As Baker and Hacker [1986] take pains to argue (rightly) Theorists
of Meaning in contemporary Philosophy of Language are notably less
enthusiastic about committing themselves to strong psychological theses
than their counterparts in Linguistics. In particular the question of the
psychological or physiological reality of Theories of Meaning is one for
which philosophers such as Oummett and Davidson are less keen to make
strong claims on behalf of their theories. What I earlier referred to as
'mental ontology" will be the focus of the current section. Here, I shall
argue, Theorists of Meaning can be represented on a sliding scale of
committment, as it were, with Chomskian linguists at the top and, I
argue, theorists such as Donald Davidson at the bottom. The crux of the
question in which I am interested has been well put by Putnam [Searle ed
1974]:
"..the I.[innateness] H.[hypothesis] is supposed to justify
the claim that what the linguist provides is 'a hypothesis
about the innate intellectual equipment that a child brings
to bear in language learning'. Of course,even if a language
is wholly learned it is still true that linguistics
'characterizes the linguistic abilities of the native
speaker", and that a grammar 'could properly be called an
explanatory model of the linguistic intuition of the native
speaker'. However, one could with equal truth say that a
driver's manual 'characterizes the car-driving abilities of
the mature driver' and that a calculus text provides an
explanatory model of the calculus-intuitions of the
mathematician." Clearly it is the idea that these abilities
and these intuitions are close to the human essence, so to




This is well put and applies equally to Theorists of Meaning. That
is, let us suppose that the Theorist of Meaning is putting forward his
formal theory (actually his formal theories ie. of sense, of force, of
type-sentences as abstract objects etc.) merely as a way in which he can
represent by a recursive theory how to grind out an infinite number of
sentences in that formal theory each of which is assigned "truth-
conditions". That is, where the notion of a truth-condition is to be
understood as a technical term of that theory, say, in the Tarskian
sense, in which the names of well-formed formulas of the object-language
on the left hand side of the biconditional are taken into statements in
the meta-langOage on the right hand side ie. (ip) = ip. If this is the case
then I would argue that just in so far as it is understood as a
conjunction of formal devices making no claim either to apply to anything
other than the formal language[s] with which it is concerned or to exist
in the mental ontology of speakers so far is it both unobjectionable and
a possibly useful object for (contrastive) comparison with natural
language and no doubt many practical uses in the broad field of computer
science. As Putnam [Searle. ed., 1974] makes pungently clear however this
is not what Chomsky is claiming. Nor, I argue, is this what Dummett is
contending. If this were all that a Theory of Meaning purported to be
then it would be opaque why it was thought to bear upon the problem of
the creativity of language. That is, it would not be the case that the
formal device constituted a Theory of Speaker's Understanding in terms
of which that phenomenon could be explained. It would also be less than
perspicuous that it was a theory about meaning in natural language rather
than of the term 'meaning' understood as a technical term of the formal
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art. In fact Dummett, at least, is making the strong and not the weak
claim here. A few of that author's remarks will make this obvious:
"We..derive our knowledge of the sense of any given
sentence from our previous knowledge of the senses
of the words that compose it ..any theory of meaning
which is unable to incorporate this point will be
impotent to account for the obvious and essential
fact that we can understand new sentences."
(Dummett, 1981. p.4)
"..philosophy has as its first..task, the analysis
of meanings..the deeper such analysis goes, the
more it is dependant upon a correct general account
of meaning, a model for what the understanding of an
expression consists in.."
(Dummett, 1981. p.699)
"A theory of meaning will..represent the practical
ability possessed by a speaker as consisting in his
grasp of a set of propositions..the speaker derives
his understanding of a sentence from the meanings of
its component words the knowledge of these
propositions that is attributed to the speaker..[is]
..implicit knowledge."
(Dummett, 1976. p.70)
"..until we have, for..one..central notion for the theory
of meaning, a convincing outline of the manner in which
every feature of the use of a sentence can be given in
terms of its meaning as specified by a recursive
stipulation of the application to it of that central
notion, we remain unprovided with a firm foundation for
a claim to know what meaning essentially is."
(Dummett, 1976. p.137)
It is made quite explicit in the cited remarks that a formal theory
of the type outlined above is implicitly known by speakers. The question
remains however whether the formal theory merely represents the implicit
knowledge of the speaker or whether the speaker actually possesses and
'knows' that formal theory. If the latter, psychologistic view is the
case then it is from that theory, its dictionary (lexicon), axioms etc
that a speaker derives his understanding. On this view, possession of the
formal theory would make understanding possible for it would be the
interaction of heard novel utterances with the formal mechanisms which
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would produce an understanding of that utterance and, for such thinkers,
unless such a theory is postulated we can neither answer the question
posed by the problem of the creativity of language nor can we ever lay
legitimate claim to know what meaning even is. If the theory of meaning
is so construed then it seems to be a theory of understanding in the
strong Chomskian sense. Even though the formal character might deviate
from that pardigm to some extent, still the presence of the theory plus
the hearing of the sentence looks conjointly sufficient to produce
understanding of the latter. But, if this misrepresents Dummett, if the
former, non-psychologistic view is Dummett's view, that is, if, according
to Oummett:
"A theory 9f meaning of this kind is not intended as
a psychological hypothesis... is not concerned to describe
any inner psychological mechanisms which may account for
his having those abilities. If the task of the theory of
meaning is merely to give a proper analysis of what the
speaker can do then why is implicit knowledge of the theory
..attributed to the speaker."
(Baker/Hacker [1986], p.340)
Further, these authors go on to ask why Dummett describes that
implicit knowledge as knowledge which ".. issue[s] in the ability to
speak" (ibid. p.359) Dummett is caught between Scylla and Charybdis.
Either he is committed to the strong theses which the cited remarks seem
to imply, but to which he seems reluctant to commit himself, or he is
committed to a thesis which is insufficiently strong to provide a
solution to the problem for which it was designed. Unless the knowledge
of the formal theory is attributed to the speaker in such a way that it
can generate his understanding of the novel sentences then that theory
cannot actually explain how it is that we do so understand. A similar
price might also prove to be the cost of asserting such a thesis however.
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V A CRITICAL APPRAISAL
The decisive battle in the war of the entire issue I have discussed
in the present chapter is clearly to be fought out in the terrain of the
philosophy of meaning, understanding and explanation. What runs through
the philosophies of Chomsky and Oummett as a common core is the belief
that understanding a language will ultimately prove to be a matter of
operating a calculus which is implicitly known, in Oummett's view, or
whose basic structure is, in the case of Chomsky, innately given. These
derivations in the case of any given speaker will be so internalized as
to be inscrutable not just to other language user's but to that speaker
himself. Understanding will consist in the conjunction of these mental
processes and the philosophy of understanding will consist in unearthing
these processes and displaying them as a formal calculus or recursive
theory. Given that what a speaker understands when he understands a
sentence is the meaning of that sentence the meaning of that sentence
will be identical with the product of those mental processes,the last
line of the derivation as it were. Meaning, on the Chomskian model at
least, will be a matter of mental process. Admittedly, that may not be
Oummett's view of meaning. Perhaps meaning is to be given sentence by
sentence by assertability-conditions and for mathematical statements in
terms of proof procedures but nonetheless, unless the Theory of Meaning
is implicitly known by speakers at the end of the day then there is no
'full-blooded' Theory of Meaning.
In Chapter Two [above] I outlined a number of arguments from
Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations which sought to establish at
least four points. Firstly, that fundamentally different concepts apply
to understanding as against mental processes; regardless of how precisely
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these latter are constituted. Secondly, that no mental process could
provide a sufficient condition of understanding. Thirdly, that no mental
process could provide a necessary condition of understanding. Finally,
that it is extremely problematic how words could ever come to be used as
they are if understanding a word is construed as being ultimately a
matter of making mental connections; as, say, associating symbol and
meaning at the atomistic level of the linguist's lexicon. It is fair to
say that the upshot of this plethora of arguments is that: "..nothing is
more wrong-headed than calling meaning a mental activity.." (P.I. 693).
These arguments still seem cogent to me and Chomsky has said nothing to
persuade me of their invalidity. It is not, perhaps, incumbent upon
Dummett to argue against this body of work but it is surely not
unreasonable to expect Chomsky to do so. That is, it seems clear that
Dummett's view, as expressed in Dummett [1978], is that:
"Among those ideas of Wittgenstein which..relate to the
main outlines that a successful theory of meaning must
assume..we can..select some about which it would be
universally agreed that any attempt to construct a theory
of meaning must come to terms with.."
(p.452)
Unfortunately, that attitude does not seem to have been shared by
Chomsky. However, acceptance of the validity of Wittgenstein's arguments
must be wholly incompatible with any thing but the rejection of that type
of view which I have been considering as regards Chomsky. Hence, I would
seem to be back at square one in terms of answering the question of
creativity.
Before turning to consideration of a positive account of that
question I will offer a critical appraisal of Dummett's conception and
present some qualms about that question itself.
Firstly, if I may refer again to Dummett [1976]. When a paper like
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this is read for the first time close attention must be paid to the terms
meaning and understanding which are often used in non-standard ways ie.
the question of "...what meaning essentially is" [ibid, final
paragraph]. I would suggest that what is actually going on is more a
matter of redefinition than clarification. Argument is given to persuade
the reader to see meaning in a particular way or ways ie. as equivalent
to truth-conditions or to conditions of assertability. Thus persuaded we
come to accept new ways of talking about meaning, to change our use of
the term, so as to see better what was really meant by it (prior to the
change). In this way new uses come to be along with new criteria for
explaining, justifying and criticising the use of it. This must be in
part why first exposure to such work involves a certain philosophical
disorientation. Taking truth and meaning as examples, we might come to
see meaning as being given by truth-conditions. The question I wish to
raise is whether this is a matter of discovery or of definition. Is it
not that in changing our criteria for the use, justification and
criticism of meaning we come to say that meaning is truth-conditions
rather than to see that it is. The terms are, I argue, redefined
theoretically and the newly legitimated uses have much more the character
of technical terms in a philosophical theory. This is more a misgiving
than an argument but in view of the entrenchment of belief in this area
it seems legitimate to utilize full means of persuasion.
One of Baker and Hacker's [1986] arguments: the argument against
action at a distance (in linguistic rules not in the laws of Physics)
which might be felt more philosophically respectable (it is in fact a
Reductio Ad Absurdum) runs as follows. Both Chomsky and Dummett speak of
certain linguistic rules and principles as partly constituting a
speaker's implicit knowledge. Admittedley, for Dummett, there can be no
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guarantee, a priori, that the theory actually reflects the actual
workings, as it were, of a speaker. Nonetheless, it seems clear that such
rules never explicitly feature in speaker's explanations of meaning, nor
do they feature in teaching, criticising or commending use. Further, if
such rules were incorporated in any such way there is no guarantee that
they could even be recognized for what they actually are. There is a
sense in which these rules are never actually followed. It will be
replied that they are followed implicitly. But is the notion of a
linguistic rule which does not, and could not, feature in speaker's
explanations etc itself a coherent notion ? Is it not the case that for a
symbol to be a symbol it must be actually and publically used as a symbol
and be recognisable explicitly as such ? It follows from this type of
view that what is given by speakers as explanation, justification and
criticism of use is not the meaning of the term used. But if what is
explained in explaining the meaning of a word is not the word's meaning
then what is it that is being explained ? Is it not the case that anyone
who denied that what is explained when a competent speaker correctly
explains the meaning of an utterance is the meaning of that utterance
would usually be taken either to have misunderstood the concept of
meaning or to be rejecting that conception and offering one of his own ?
The upshot of these concerns is what Baker and Hacker [1986] term "the
argument from logical space". The point is that there is not enough
logical space within one and the same concept of meaning for both our
ordinary practices with meaning which recognize that correct explanation
can give meaning and the Theorist of Meaning's practice with meaning
which recognizes no such thing.
I now depart from Baker and Hacker [19863. It seems clear that the
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theorist of meaning will argue that what is explained when the meaning of
an utterance is explained by a competent speaker is itself simply
empirical evidence for his having understood the meaning of that word;
even if the constraint that explanation and use must harmonise is
imposed. Alternately, it could be argued that an ability to give such
explanations forms part of linguistic competence. This is perfectly
correct. But if that is so why do we need to posit implicit knowledge to
speakers at all ? If the question is what kind of evidence there can be
for attributing knowledge of meaning to a speaker then the answer is what
better evidence could there be than the ability to produce explanations,
to correctly use, to criticise and to teach use ? But all this is not
simply empirical evidence for someone's knowing the meaning. Rather his
knowing the meaning consists in these abilities. Again the question
arises why must such knowledge be implicit or tacit ? If I were to
explain my saying: "He's in pain !" by invoking criteria for pain ie. I
say "look he's screaming etc. He must be in pain because that's just what
it is to be in pain!" is what I have said simply empirical evidence for
my knowing the meaning of the term pain ? There is considerable contrast
here with the modes of explanation I have been considering. In this case
something public explains my understanding of the terms I use, it
justifies my saying and explains the meaning of what I have said. It
invokes a standard, or norm, and, as Baker and Hacker [1986 A] put it,
formulates a rule. But all of this is explicit and there seems no good
reason why my formulating an explicit, consciously-known rule for the use
of the word "pain" through my explanation, based on the meaning-
specifying criteria, should only add up to empirical evidence for my
implicitly knowing other rules which I cannot produce but in which my
understanding "really" consists. This is the argument from logical space.
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Once ordinary, in this case criterial, explanations of meaning are
admitted as explanations of meaning there is no space left for appeal to
tacitly known rules. Again, I do not accept that our ability as regards
compositionality need be implicit when we can actually and consciously
explain why we use words in sentences as we have been taught and as we
would teach others. Why must we deny that this is sufficient and
postulate implicit knowledge where explicit knowledge already exists ?
I would argue for conscious composition which we have been consciously
taught. The rules we use must, in principle at least, be capable of being
consciously formulated. Conscious composition becoming habitual,
subconscious and reflexive with time and repeated use seems a far more
plausible candidate than rules which are not and cannot be inferentially
involved in an agents' beliefs, desires or ordinary knowings, be those
rules implicit or innate.
In my view it is as a form of explanation of meaning that the value
of criteria consists. That is, in a form of explanation which cites only
the public, the explicit in order to teach, justify and criticise. This
form of explanation can explain meaning and can indeed provide evidence
for understanding. Understanding (and misunderstanding) can be obviously
exemplified in this way. But does this "evidence' simply give empirical
support for understanding ? Of course, in the case I have outlined it is
quite possible that I am wrong, unlike the effect of a mechanism, it may
be that I have been duped by an actor. In other words,even if there are
circumstances which are criterial for P and even if, in this case, those
criteria in fact obtain it remains quite possible that P does not.
Therefore, this type of criterial inference cannot be entailment. If P
were entailed by the criteria it just would not be possible that I be
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wrong about P given the criteria. But, as I have argued, that is clearly
not the case.
Despite the defeasibility involved in the assertion it is clearly
not possible that I was wrong about the meaning of the term I used. The
criteria determine what counts as evidence for pain. The criteria for
pain are part of what that term means. A term's criteria are, by
definition, necessarily good evidence. In this sense criterial
explanations involve explicit appeal to and thus formulate simple
(informal) rules to which competent speakers are agreed. Thus the
criterial relation is a meaning-relation. So the relation between my
criterially-based use, my criterial explanations and my understanding the
meaning of what was explained cannot be simply empirical. My argument is
that knowing the meaning of "pain" just is knowing the criteria and
explaining, using, criticising and teaching on that basis. Further, if
that is so, what else do we need to explain my understanding of that term
as a speaker.
There is a further argument in Baker and Hacker [1986] which I will
adumbrate in support of the line of reasoning I have been developing. I
follow the title of that text [1986] in naming the particular argument
"the argument from sense and nonsense". The argument is itself of
Wittgensteinean vintage and exploits the notions of context-dependence
and purpose-relatedness which I have already outlined [Chapters 1 & 2
above]. The point is made that explanations of meaning are purpose-
relative and that meaningfulness of utterances generally are context-
dependent in the following sense. Baker and Hacker [1986] raise the
question of whether a competent speaker can establish what an utterance
means solely on the basis of a knowledge (implicit or explicit) of
semantic rules ? The existence of the science of pragmatics in the
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tripartite division of linguistics acknowledges the legitimacy of concern
with context among those whom Baker and Hacker oppose. Baker and Hacker
point to the hierarchical nature of the tripartite division in whiclr
pragmatics features lowest and are themselves arguing a much stronger
case than that science can allow. Their thesis is that whether an
utterance is sense or nonsense is determined by the context of that
utterance. Terms are explained relative to paradigm cases of their proper
application without which there could not be explanation (learning and
teaching). The paradigms themselves are just sets of circumstances and
are themselves circumstance-dependant. Therefore, whether an utterance is
sense or nonsense.whether an explanation is an explanation of meaning
depends equally upon the context and the purpose of the utterance or the
explanation.
Independently of those authors a thought-experiment comes to mind
which may support their conclusion. Imagine a grammar ruled out as
nonsense a sentence which speakers consented to as meaningful outlining
contexts in which it seemed so to them. Presumably this would be a
ground to reject that grammar. Now imagine an utterance -such that in no
possible context it had sense and an utterance which could be guaranteed
to make sense in every possible context. My question is: what would a
Theory of Meaning rule out and conversly what would it admit in ? How
could that Theory map every possible meaningful utterance in advance of
use which can authorize new ways of speaking ? Again independently of
those authors I make the point that the paradigms to which they refer
feature circumstances which are criterially related to the terms they
explain. This makes clear the role of criteria as standards, points up
the fundamentally normative role they perform and emphasises their
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importantly non-inductive nature.
In both Theories of Meaning and of criteria there are operative
conceptions of rules, understanding and explanation. The content of
these concepts vary to an extent which I think endorses the argument from
logical space. It is equally plain which is the more intuitive account.
Of itself that quality cannot guarantee correctness yet, I argue, if we
are to transgress the bounds of the intuitive we have a right to expect a
rationale to do so. I do not accept that an appropriate or sufficient
reason has yet been outlined by those Theorists to whom I have referred.
The Theory of Criteria in my sense is not a theory of meaning in the
sense to which Wittgenstein was opposed and neither, I will argue, is it
a sufficiently generally applicable notion to constitute the core notion
in a theory of meaning in the sense in which Oummett has proposed. The
criterial circumstances of P are determinants of P's meaning which fix
limits on its applicability. They need not express the full significance
of P in every possible context, every game in which it has a role. Many
utterances have no criteria but are not for that reason meaningless.
Nonetheless, where there are criteria for P, these specify what P means
and are not simply empirically or symptomatically related to P. In other
words I do not accept that all grammars, the procedural rules or
presuppositions are the same in every universe of discourse. Grammars are
various and form a continuum which will not easily facilitate the
identification of a Oummetian notion of such centrality as to explain
meaning uniformly throughout. I argue that within the disparate forms of
language very different notions might be central to understanding
meaning. In the light of the diverse nature of language how could meaning
be a concept which allows a precise mathematical function from a single
central notion to specified uses for the entirety of a language ? The
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purpose of examining particular grammars is to expose a logic which we
already use. Why should it be the case that the patterns of rational
thought are uniformly dichotomised in every circumstance ? Certain
grammars exhibit a different pattern of reasoning and there is no reason
why others might not contain still other inferential structures. It is
always possible, in practice not in principle, that the inference be
defeated. This is part of the context of the inference. What is not
possible is that the entire pattern should be out of synchronisation in
every case. The existence and practical success of the pattern refutes
that claim. Justifications of particular inferences occur due to
standards, criteria of correctness within a mode of reasoning. But there
can be no criteria of correctness for the criteria of correctness. The
mode of reasoning contains the possibility of justification but there can
be no justification of the whole mode of reasoning external to the
practice itself. It may not be meaningless to assert the possibility of
such a breakdown but it is difficult fully to so conceive the world. If
the world did so alter would we know what to say at all ? Would language
even be possible without stable connections ?
In my remarks above I do not intend the term 'grammar' in the
Wittgensteinean sense, if that is a completely clear sense. The sense in
which the Theory of Criteria is a logic or a grammar is that in which it
provides the procedural rules of the activity. It is the logic of the
social institution or structure. Classical logic would be a grammar in
this sense and any logic text-book would be a Theory of Grammar.
If asked what they mean speakers might give criteria in the sense
I have outlined. They would not supply a recursive theory but explain
in ordinary mundane ways. The evident difficulty for linguists in
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describing the full empirical reality of their theory and for
philosophers in establishing in a detailed way what kind of theory is
appropriate is testimony to the lack of availability of such a Theory.
In what"sense do language user's know something which they do not and
cannot bring to consciousness ? In this sense what could I not be said
to know ?
VI AN ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION
Even if my critical appraisal is accepted the question of the
creativity of language remains unanswered. But is this as mysterious a
phenomenon as we have been led to believe ?
Firstly, I follow Baker and Hacker [1986] in challenging the idea
that a child can actually understand an infinty, potential or otherwise,
of novel utterances. This seems a gross exaggeration. Certainly it will
understand many words and sentences but there will remain many which it
will not understand, words which have to be learned, sentences which are
not fully perspicuous. Oo we ever stop being in this situation and
possess some sort of complete linguistic understanding ? I think this is
a misleading way in which to approach the matter and, like Baker and
Hacker [1986], suspect the point here is more properly that the concept
of number is not a helpful one in this context. This intuition can, I
think, be developed by examining the value of the notion of an Ideal
Speaker-Hearer. Just how helpful is that notion ? The problem is, I
argue, that no Actual Speaker-Hearer is ever in a sufficiently
approximate position. That is, it is surely just wrong to think that any
actual speaker really does understand an infinity of novel utterances.
Certainly, an actual speaker can gain an understanding of novel
utterances, but this will be more of a long, hard, learned slog than is
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presupposed by the type of view I have been considering. This is not to
deny structure-reflection, rather it is to deny that we can make sense
of the Ideal Speaker-Hearer in any useful way. I would argue that we
cannot justifiably attribute to any Actual Speaker-Hearer the same sort
of recursive structure, whose deductive closure will involve potential
infinities, that we attribute to the Ideal Speaker-Hearer. Of course, it
will be argued against this that we could bootstrap, up to the Ideal from
the Actual by repeatedly adding one, as it were, and thus that a Sorites
Paradox arises. But despite the Sorites Paradox the theory about the
understanding of the Ideal Speaker-Hearer will still not be a
description of the Actual Speaker-Hearer's understanding, to which, I
argue, unlike the Ideal Speaker-Hearer's understanding, a limit must
apply. Further, it remains possible that an answer to the Sorites Paradox
will emerge; perhaps in terms of a distinction between certain kinds of
transitivity in certain contexts.
Further, it is worth noting that, even for novel utterances, the
criteria of understanding remain the same. Again, I have already argued
that meaning and understanding are of the nature of abilities, capacities
to do things. If as Baker and Hacker [1986] suggest we pause to examine
other human abilities in the way in which we examine these abilities the
matter will seem ridiculous. The fact is that when we are able to ride a
bike we are thereby able to recognise and ride an infinite number of
bicycles but no one argues that this phenomenon requires a recursive
theory as an innate mechanism. Admittedley this example, unlike a
language, is non-representational, but the same point clearly holds good
for painting in just that representational sense. It seems clearer here,
perhaps, how inappropriate it is to apply the concept of number to an
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ability; for it is precisly this extensibility in which the ability
consists. In addition, the relation between an ability and its exercise
is plainly not causal. It is both possible to possess an ability to do
something but to fail for whatever reason to do so and to do something by
luck or fluke rather than ability. Obviously, both the bicycle and
painting analogies might well be objected to as lacking any analogous
structure and as not being rational, at least, not in the same sense, as
the ability to speak a language. In a recent review of "Language, Sense
and Nonsense" in the Times Literary Supplement [Jan 11th, 1985] Crispin
Wright notes that often "..focus is lost in the jumble of rhetoric and
repetition.." and certainly the bicycle analogy has a rhetorical air.
However, Wright's comment must be put in context with his further remark
that, "Baker and Hacker have a good hand here". That is to say, despite
its rhetorical air, the bicycle analogy does point to a crucial factor in
the debate which requires a great deal more consideration, namely, the
question of the nature of abilities. Baker and Hacker are not alone in
holding that question to be vital to progress in this field. An excellent
account of the importance of just such questions is given in Dummett's
[1987] recent "Reply to Prawitz":
"I have for some time been dissatisfied with what I
wrote earlier about understanding and knowledge... it
..is essential that speech be treated as, normally,
the conscious activity of a rational agent : his
reasons for speaking as he does are assessed on the
basis of what he is presumed to know or suppose,
including what he knows or supposes to be the meanings
of his words...Whether or not understanding is properly
termed knowledge, it is like knowledge in providing part
of the basis on which the intentions underlying utterances
rest. It is probably too simple minded to say that it
consists of an implicit knowledge of a theory of meaning
for a language. The dichotomy theoretical/practical
knowledge is too crude to be applied to knowledge of a
language. If I cannot ride a bicycle I may still know what
it is to ride one; but if I do not know Tibetan, I do not
know what it is to speak it. Our need is therefore not to
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dispute over whether knowledge of a language is genuinely
knowledge, still less over whether it is theoretical or
practical knowledge, but to refine our excessively coarse
conceptions of theoretical and practical abilities."
(p.283)
In these remarks an important emphasis is given both to the notion
of understanding as an ability, and to the idea of speech as a
"conscious" activity. There is no rhetorical air to these remarks which,
I argue, are fundamentally correct and indicate clearly and lucidly the
way forward towards a solution of what remains a deep problem. Both in
the case of Baker and Hacker [1986] and Dummett [1987] there is evidence
of a far better approach to the problem I have been considering and,
furthermore, one which does not involve a notion of 'innate' or
'implicit' knowledge. Despite this, the (mainly Wittgensteinean)
arguments which I have highlighted must represent constraints on the type
of account which can ultimately be given. Those constraints may not, of
course, completely preclude the construction of Theories of Meaning,
though they might well cast very serious doubt on the viability of a
"full-blooded" Dummettian Theory of Meaning. Again my own arguments are
t
not the only ones which tell against that enerpnse. Wright [1987], for
A
example, offers some very challenging arguments against the "global"
requirement ie. that the Theory should be neutral as to the target
language. It may well be that different stories about meaning turn out to
be appropriate to different areas of discourse, possibly, relative to the
purpose of the enquiry and therefore it may be that Dummett's view is too
essentialist, or, at least, over generalised. Further, in Chapter Six I
hope to cast doubt on the view that an account of content can be given
from outside the area of discourse, as it were, at least in the case of
psychological language.
Finally, explanation of a concept is normative and has a social role
- 122 -
of citing standards of correctness. This is particularity clear where
criteria are concerned. We point out "cues for use as David Bloor
would have it [1984], "ways of telling" in McGinn's terms [1984] and
means of identification. But these are no more than the ordinary criteria
used in teaching, learning, critcising and justfying. They determine what
counts as evidence for what, when it is appropriate to say, what it means
to be an X, to be in X, to have X. These ordinary rule-formulations are
explicit knowns generally agreed to and obviously used. What is very
different in this from Chomskian rules is precisely that if a rule
explains an action the rule itself must be known to the speaker and be
capable of figuring in his intentions, explanations etc. This hardly
seems an unreasonable or unduly stringent demand. I conclude with Baker
and Hacker that the answer to the question which the creativity of
language poses: how can a speaker come to understand numerous sentences
following exposure to a finite stock ? is either trivial: he has
mastered a language or is the request to adumbrate every skill, every
ability which being a language-master involves. The latter might indeed
be a promising research programme but that will not be facilitated by
misconcieving from the start the job at hand. In the last analysis
contemporary philosophy of language has confused the object of a
legitimate and deep sense of wonder with a deeply mysterious object.
VII A COMPARISON: LANGUAGE AND STRUCTURE IN MODERN CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY
It has recently been argued, by Henry Staten [1985] for example,
that the profoundest affinity between linguistic philosophers of the
Anglo-American and Modern Continental traditions exists between
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Wittgenstein and Derrida. Concern with language and structure is, of
course, common to both these authors and to both traditions but I will
argue that the affinity between the two authors and that between the two
traditions is fundamentally misdescribed by Staten, and others, and in so
doing will compare the type of view which I have discussed in the present
chapter with the approach familiar from Modern Continental Philosophy. I
proceed critically however from a consideration of the views of Henry
Staten [1985] and Newton Garver [1973].
On page fifteen of his "Wittgenstein and Oerrida" Staten explains
Derrida's concept of "differance" (with an "a") as, "temporally extended
syntax" . Newton Garver expresses a similar view in his preface to
Derrida's "Speech and Phenomena" when he describes "differance" as:
"the phonemic structure of the sound system which provides
meaning, intelligibility"
(p. xxv) .
Notably, Garver also describes "grammar" as the ability to:
"..put together words in acceptable phrases and modify
those words as required. The details of this requirement
are studied by grammarians; and though superficial from
the point of view of philosophical problems it is
nonetheless a prerequisite to other sorts of competence."
(p. ix).
Both authors are concerned to establish some form of common ground
between Derrida and contemporary philosophy of language and the
definitions of differance quoted serve to orient our understanding of
that term in a linguistic direction. Ultimately, for Staten this is a
first step towards bringing the later Wittgenstein into the picture.
Both therefore attempt to make that step from Derrida to the Philosophy
of Language, at least partly, via a linguistic reading of "differance"
and both, I argue, do so only in a confused and confusing way.
In a sense, of course, Staten and Garver are right to describe
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concern with syntactic structure as common both to the Anglo-American
tradition of philosophy of language and to Derrida. But it is utterly
mistaken to think that there is any real point of intersection here with
the later thought of Wittgenstein. Further, both Staten and Garver
describe differEnce and not differAnce in Derrida and are wrong to
think that the latter is to be found anywhere in modern Anglo-American
linguistic philosophy. But Garver is most obviously mistaken about the
value of grammar to philosophy.
As I have argued more than once; to a great extent the entire field
of contemporary philosophy of language, and much linguistics, revolves
around one cardinal hinge: answering the question posed by the so-called
problem of the creativity of language. The answer to this essentially
Chomskian question: how, from finite linguistic input, is infinite
output (in principle) possible ? is always and invariably given in terms
of just the ability which Garver describes as grammar. In addition, the
answer is conceived as literally formal, a recursive theory. As many
philosophers of language and numerous linguists have argued: structure-
reflection, compositionality, is vital to the axioms of any theory of
meaning. It is also widely held that there is some right answer to this
structural question in terms of which we will cash out another right
answer: the answer to Chomsky's question, once and for all, even if the
precise character of either answer presently eludes us. Here then is a
clear a concern with structure. But explaining language-use and language-
acquisition by, and as, a formal calculus is nothing other than anathema
to the later thought of Wittgenstein as, of course, is everything that
Chomsky's question presupposes.
As regards structure, grammar in Garver's sense, and syntax, the
point of contact between the two traditions lies not, on the Anglo-
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American side, in the later philosophy of Wittgenstein but in more
orthodox linguists and linguistic philosophers. Further, while many such
orthodox thinkers at times pay a certain lip service to Wittgenstein the
question of the creativity of language, which includes the concern with
structure, is not one of those times. Furthermore, on the modern
continental side, the real point of intersection, the linking of
linguistic structural concerns is really not in Derrida, but in one
aspect of Saussure as expounded by Derrida in his essay on "Differance"
[ 1 973].
The connection between Saussure and the contemporary philosophy of
language is motivated by Saussure's conception of the proper object of
study of linguistics as 'la langue' which can be taken to be directly
comparable to Chomsky's notion of competence as the proper object of
linguistic investigation. On this, Jonathan Culler [1976], the author of
the introduction to Saussure's "Cours" and the fontana modern masters
volume, points out that:
"La langue, Saussure argued, must be the linguists primary
concern. What he is trying to do in analysing a language
is not to describe speech-acts but to determine the units
and rules of combination which make up the linguistic
system."
(p.30)
But how close is 'la langue' to Chomskian competence and is this in
effect what contemporary philosophers of language are up to ? I would
argue that it is not. In taking sentences to be the products of
individual choice and therefore as belonging not to la langue but to
parole Saussure precludes from la langue the very stuff of which
Chomskian linguistics is made. Saussurian syntax just does not include
concern with regular patterns, with the rules of combination which make
possible the Chomskian creativity story. Of Saussure, Chomsky himself has
- 126 -
said:
"He [Saussure] was quite unable to come to grips with the
recursive processes underlying sentence-formation and he
appears to regard sentence- formation as a part of parole
rather than la langue of free and voluntary action rather
than systematic rule. There is no place in his scheme for
'rule-governed creativity' of the kind involved in the
ordinary everyday use of language."
[Culler, 1 976 p.83]
While we can accept a broad similarity of orientation then we must
also accept a profound disanalogy between, on the one hand, la langue
and parole, and on the other, competence and performance. A disanalogy
furthermore on the very issue which Chomsky's philosophical import
depends upon.
Both contemporary philosophers of language and Saussure might
well agree that, in a sense, the correct composition of differences,
conceptual and phonemic, constitutes meaningfulness, though it is
doubtful they would agree on much else and indeed doubtful that they
would agree in the same sense. The overt Holism of Saussure stands
opposed, for example, to the molecular, or atomistic, positions which are
prevalent among theorists of meaning and again, while for Saussure, in
some sense, it is the differences which are ultimately important, more
important than the signs, it is doubtful that, say, Crispin Wright, could
really, in one of his own phrases, get any sort of grip at all on that
idea. As Culler [1976] asserts in a telling phrase, "..when one actually
analyses a language it becomes extremely difficult to avoid speaking as
if there were positive terms" (p.86)
Conversely, it seems to me that what is of interest to Oerrida about
language is precisely the play of differences, in the Saussurian sense,
involved among the signs of the system but not, unlike Wright etc, the
play involved in a particular language (English, French etc). Rather,
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Derrida is interested in the play of, "traces" which makes differences
possible and is therefore the condition of possibility of concepts.
Because differance is the possibility of systematic signification it
might be spoken of in relation to any sign system whatsoever. Indeed,
Oerrida discusses it not only in relation to Saussure but also in
relation to Nietzsche, Levinas, Hegel and Heidegger such that all are
cases of the writing most characteristic of our epoch. But this
expository strategy remains, quote, a "blind tactic". Derrida denies that
the play of differances can be mapped rationally in a right order for it
is the 'origin' of all our terminologies and classifications and is not
derived from them. Differance "opens up the space for philosophy". It is
a 'point' beyond every particular structure and its reflection and as the
possibility of structure it cannot be formally characterised at all. In
fact, it ultimately can neither be named nor said. While the Anglo-
American tradition might be said to be interested in the differences
which structure particular sign-systems Derrida, it seems to me, despite
likely denials, is involved in a more overtly metaphysical inquiry into
the play of differances which is the possibility of structure. So there
is a profound disanalogy between both traditions at the very (Chomskian)
juncture where an analogy might really seem pertinent to the Anglo-
American tradition and equally, what Derrida finds most appealing about
Saussure is the very point at which most philosophers of language cease
to want to follow. But I have conceded a broad similarity of orientation
between Chomskian and Saussurian linguistics, as indeed Chomsky admits,
could that similarity not provide a basis for bringing in Wittgenstein ?
Certainly, yes, but only as an example of someone profoundly opposed to
any such investigation in principle, ie. only as someone who could not be
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further removed in his attitude to language.
I will not however conclude completely negatively on this subject
and I am prepared to argue for a more genuine point of contact
explicitly between the writings of Derrida in "Speech and Phenomena" and
those of Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Investigations, that is, a
direct link unmediated by appeal to some common interest in syntax or
the philosophy of language, contemporary or mediaeval. I begin from a
notable and interesting stylistic point of contact between the writings
of Wittgenstein and Derrida, which Garver and Staten do not note, and a
sort of fundamental agreement of "einstellungen" between these two
authors. This can best be seen when Derrida [1973] asks: "What is
differance ?" [p.145]. For even to answer that question in its own
terms, is already to make a mistake, to lose philosoph-ical depth:
"If we answered these questions..we would fall below the
level we have now reached. For if we accepted the form of
the question, its own sense and syntax we would have to
admit that differance is derived and ordered from the
starting point of a being-present".
(p. 145)
Now compare Wittgenstein's remarks that:
"a sensation..is not a something but not a nothing either"
(P.I. , 304)
and further:
"One ought NOT to ask WHAT images are..but how the word
'imagination' is used. The first question also asks for
a word to be explained; but makes us expect a wrong kind
of answer."
(P.I. , 370)
Again, to answer the question in its own terms is already to make
a mistake. It is to presuppose the metaphysics of substance, or, in
Derrida's case, the metaphysics of presence.
To make clear that a more important point of agreement underlies
the stylistic similarity I will examine what Derrida actually says about
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differance. The term is introduced as a multivalent one with at least two
senses. The first is simply that of non-identity or difference. The
second is of deference where what is denied is put off till later. Staten
and Garver have got hold only of the first sense. Brief discussion of
that sense has already involved appeal to the notion of a trace. The
notion of a trace is a denial of the notion of the presence of the
present and self-presence which Husserl's transcendental phenomenology
depended upon. For Husserl language is a matter of indication and
expression. In its indication a sign stands for something else,
anticipates something not present. Indication is essential to
communication but inessential to meaning Expression is the semantic
content of the sign which is present only in self-present consciousness.
As I understand him, Oerrida's first complaint is with the idea that the
imagination as the means of expression is adequate to the notion of
entirely self-present meaning. In fact Oerrida holds the imagination to
be itself produced from modified past experience and therefore not
exclusively or self-sufficiently present. This is a good point and ,1
argue, is equally true of conscience. The second argument challenges the
very notion of presence, of a pure present moment. Any moment or trace
intrinsically involves past and present as aspects of its very nature:
"the trace retains the mark of a past element and is
already marked by relation to a future element"
(p. 142)
Derrida uses the [Husserlian] terms "retention" and "protention"
to mark these features. Therefore, the trace constitutes the present but
that already invoves past and future. What the present is is itself
determined by what is not present. So the present is not simple or
primordial. The present is derivative from the play of differances. This
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brings us to the second (deference) sense of differance. The trace is a
dynamic, self-constituting and self-dividing interval. As such it
involves both spacing: the becoming spatial of time in the subdivision
of the interval, and temporalization: the becoming temporal of space.
Thus what for Husserl was pure meaning, the self-present moment becomes
in Derrida the synthesis of traces which is the play of differance. The
ramifications of such a view are striking for neither meaning nor self
are ever purely present. In one sense then Derrida is denying that
meaning is ever present and asserting that meaning arises only out of the
play of differances within a system of signs.
It is at this juncture that the link with Wittgenstein's later
thought becomes clear. Both of the remarks I have quoted are from key
passages in two of Wittgenstein's Private language Arguments, I use the
unusual plural deliberately here. Now, the arguments against private
language form the penultimate stage in a movement, a philosophical
process which defines the later works, and which I will briefly outline,
necessarily in a very sketchy way. The first step is to ask: what is the
meaning of a word ? this is answered only negatively as we would expect
for the question is of the same type as: what is an image ?, what is a
sensation ? Progress depends not on answering the question but on
transforming it, which Wittgenstein does, by absorbing it into the
question as to what it is to understand the meaning of a word ?
This movement is clearly illustrated both in the Blue Book and in the
Philosophical Investigations. The next stage, which particularily
interests us here, is contained in the Investigations, so there is a
nicely chronological pattern to the movement, where Wittgenstein deploys
a range of arguments against the idea that meaning is a mental process
and indeed against the idea that meaning is ever present to us in
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consciousness, in whole or in part. The final and most famous step is the
conclusion that meaning is use and thus Wittgenstein proceeds to the
question of what it is to use, to follow a rule.
Like the Wittgenstein of the Investigations, Derrida argues that the
process of signification is a move away from self-presence, in so far as
it does not begin with self-presence but is constructed from the
convention and practice of public language. This vigorous critique of
the idea that meaning is ever present certainly gives us a better point
of intersection between Derrida and Wittgenstein and we might see the
Husserlian position as the ultimate private language which would in fact
make language impossible. Having acknowledged a genuine agreement and
affinity I want to return to Staten [1985], simply to refute his
interpretation of Wittgenstein and in that way show that the kind of
agreement that Staten finds is illusory.
Firstly, there is the question of a mythical Wittgensteinean
deconstructive impulse. In "Wittgenstein Deconstructs" Staten argues
that:
"Wittgenstein wanted to loosen up crystallized patterns
of philosophical thought to force real thought..for
which he would have no ready made answers but would
have to forge new language sequences.."
(p.64)
and that:
"In the continued movement of his language the reassuring
forms of usage which he has previously struck as though
bedrock become impediments., and deconstruction renews.,
this is the deconstructive impulse."
(p.65)
Firstly, I argue, there are no "new language sequences". One set of
jargon is not replaced by another and the Investigations is defined by
the absence of what Staten [1985] describes as the first stage of
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Wittgenstein's Deconstruction. Secondly, there is no second stage, for
there is no 'as though' about it. We just hit bedrock in ordinary forms
of reasoning and explanation (ie. Bl.B p.24, P.I., 217). Again, on p.75,
Staten [1985] argues that Wittgenstein's method is one of destabilization
of these reassuring forms of usage, that what is important to
Wittgenstein is syntax and that his method is 'blind and mute'. But
Wittgenstein does not destabilize ordinary use, nor is his method of
ubersicht of use as clarification, leading to the solution of
philosophical problems, in any sense, 'blind and mute". Further, while the
contemporary philosophy of language might be described as preoccupied
with syntax and semantics, Wittgenstein is defined by his lack of
preoccupation with such. In short, if this is the deconstructive impulse
then it is a myth.
The extent to which Staten consistently misrepresents Wittgenstein
is exemplified in two particular commentorial errors. Firstly, Staten
Y)
(p.90-1) refers to Rush Rees" claim that Wittgenstein described himselfA
as a disciple of Freud*. Staten admits that the extent of the influence
is hard to gauge but then quotes the Rees remark, quotes Freud and leaves
/i
the implication clear. But this completely misrepresents Rees remark and
Wittgenstein's attitude by taking a single phrase out of any context.
Wittgenstein does say this, according to Rees, but he also says:
"Once when Wittgenstein was recounting something Freud had
said and the advice he had given someone, one of us said
that this advice did not seem very wise. 'Oh certainly
not', said Wittgenstein, 'but wisdom is something I never
would expect from Freud'."
(L & C, p.41)
Further, Wittgenstein himself is reported as saying,
"I have been going through Freud's "Interpretation of
Dreams" with H. and it has made me feel how much this
whole way of thinking wants combatting"
(L 8, C, p.50)
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Further, Staten (p.95) describes Wittgensteinean "grammar" as a
"joke" and: "family resemblance is a., pun, or a rhyme". No textual
reference is given to where Wittgenstein says this, and in fact the
reference that is given (31), in appended notes, is to Derrida's "Margins
of Philosophy'1. This type of commentary is shoddy, misrepresentative
and completely misleads the reader. Finally, I have to draw attention to
a pattern of argument in Staten [1985] which is exemplified in his
interpretation of Wittgenstein. In many cases Staten considers, and
offers unusual accounts of, arguments contained either in the
Philosophical Investigations or On Certainty and attempts to justify
highly unorthodox interpretations by reference to isolated remarks from
Zettel. But while some of the remarks which compose that text can be
dated by cross-reference to manuscripts numerous others simply cannot be
dated and might well have been written in the 30's. It cannot be a
legitimate strategy, I argue, to settle the interpretation of issues in
Philosophical Investigations and On Certainty by reference to obscure
remarks whose purpose simply is not clear.
As to Derrida, I argue that he can only be understood with reference
to his own tradition, not to the later Wittgenstein. In Oerrida's essay
on Differance the deeper point is more reminiscent of Hegel than
Wittgenstein and it is Hegel whom Oerrida explicitly quotes and discusses
immediately prior to raising the question of what differance is:
"The infinite, in this simplicity is-as a moment opposed
to the self-identical -the negative. In its moments, while
the infinite presents the totality to (itself) and in itself,
(it is) excluding in general, the point or limit; but in this,
its own (action of) negating, it relates itself immediately to
the other and negates itself."
(p.lU)
The play of differance always involves a postponement of something,
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as we have seen, and Derrida describes this as a "crossing out" (ie.
p. 134) in anumber of passages. This negating movement is much more
reminiscent of Hegelian dialectic than the later Wittgenstein and this is
endorsed by Derrida's remarks about "..the very profound affinities which
differance thus written [ie. with an "a"] has with Hegelian speech.",
(p.145) and indeed, it is held, "A definite rupture with Hegelian
language would make no sense" (p.145). Finally, I note Derrida's claim
that "if the word 'history' did not carry with it the theme of a final
repression of differance, we could say that differences alone could be
historical."
However, even here there is less in common than we, and perhaps Derrida,
might like to see for the word history does carry with it the theme of a final
repression. Again, on p.149 Derrida asserts that:
"we shall call differance this active discord of the
different forces and of the differences between forces
which Nietzsche opposes to the entire system of
metaphysical grammar"
But Nietzche's megalomaniacal, heraclitean metaphysical analysis
of existence in terms of a plurality of forces, locked not in a
conservative, English Utilitarian and polite, struggle for survival but
driven- by a heinous will to power also carries with it the theme of
eternal recurrence which posits some underlying order, transcedental
pattern. Hence, if John Lewellyn [1987] is right in asserting only,
"A Point of ALMOST Absolute Proximity to Hegel" then the same holds
good of Derrida's proximity to Nietzsche.
It is appropriate to close, as Derrida himself does, on the inherent
difficulty in clarifying differance which is ultimately neither word nor
concept but the condition of possibility of both. Given the role of
differance as a point of origin and its status beyond language, beyond
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metaphysics perhaps, it is by its very nature not just difficult to
express but, ex hypothesi, inexpressible. In the attempt to express the
inexpressible there might be a more genuine meeting of minds. For Oerrida
clearly has in common with the early Wittgenstein an inability to heed
the warning of the seventh proposition of the Tractatus:




Concern with Wittgenstein's use of the term "criterion" is
conspicuously absent from Baker and Hacker's text "Language, Sense
and Nonsense", but that was not the only publication made by those
authors that year (originally 1984). In contrast, "Scepticism Rules and
Language" [1986A] does contain an account of the notion of a criterion,
which is given a new, but still prominent, role in Wittgenstein's later
philosophy. In the present chapter I propose to critically examine the
role and nature of the concept of a criterion which Baker and Hacker
1 1986A] attribute to Wittgenstein and to compare that conception to
Crispin Wright's first thoughts about the notion of a criterion and its
possible role as regards anti-realist semantics in his "Anti-Realist
Semantics: the Role of Criteria" [1982]. I do not intend to offer any
detailed criticism of Wright's [1982] account here, simply because Wright
himself goes on to outline certain deep problems which no criterialist
can afford to ignore in his own "Second Thoughts About Criteria" [1984].
My critique of Baker and Hacker's [1986A] account will culminate in
highlighting a question which those authors are aware of, but do not
themselves answer, and which provides the very basis of Wright's [1984]
'second thoughts', which argue that this particular question cannot be
properly answered and therefore that the notion of a criterion must be
rejected as incoherent. That question, together with Wright's [1984]
critique generally, will be fully and critically examined in Chapter Six.
I SCEPTICISM RULES AND LANGUAGE
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In what follows I cannot pretend to have offered anything more than
the briefest sketch of the nature and importance of the rule-following
considerations. In the present context I am concerned only to unearth and
examine the concept of a criterion which Baker and Hacker's ,[ 1 986A]
contains. To that end I move rapidly through the early chapters and limit
my account to the background necessary to understand the later chapters
which contain the account with which I am primarily concerned.
Baker and Hacker's [1986A] text does not contain any explicit
retraction of earlier positions, despite the fact that a great deal
clearly has changed. As might be expected, given the argument of
"Language, Sense and Nonsense" [1986], the term "constructivism" is not
to be found in either the table of contents or the index and no attempt
whatsoever is made in this work to attribute a Neo-Constructivist
semantics, or any other kind of semantics, to the later Wittgenstein. .
Instead, Wittgenstein is taken to have identified meaning with ordinary
explanations of meaning and, it is held:
"To cut meaning down to the size of accepted explanations
is to eliminate the logical space in which theories of
meaning move and have their meaning"
(p.118, par.1)
This claim is itself a version of an argument which I have called
"the argument from logical space" [above, Ch.4] and is familiar from
"Language, Sense and Nonsense". Criteria, therefore, cannot any longer be
taken to provide "A New Foundation For Semantics" [Baker, 1974] in
Wittgenstein's later work and this fact bears witness to a fundamental
change in Baker and Hacker's attitude to the interpretation of
Wittgenstein's later work.
As its title suggests "Rules, Scepticism and Language" treats
mainly of rule-scepticism and is in the first instance a book about the
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philosophy of following a rule. The motivation for that concern can be
seen as identical with that underlying the publication of "Language,
Sense and Nonsense" [1986], In each case the authors see themselves as
attempting to correct a fundamental and highly influential
misunderstanding of Wittgenstein's later work. Further, while that
consideration certainly provides an impetus to the publication of the
work, it may also be the case there is at least one less explicit
motivational factor at work. The equation of meaning with "accepted
explanations" is the premise from which the argument from logical space
is inferred. That premise is not an unproblematic one but is plainly
essential to Baker and Hacker's [1986] position. If that position is to
be a tenable one its premise must be defended. But, it is against the
viability of just that premise which the force of rule-scepticism is
directed.
In relevant recent literature (such as Wright [ 1 980], Kripke [1982.],
for example) formulations of rule-scepticism have frequently been arrived
at in the following way:
To understand what a word means is to know how to use it in
appropriate contexts; to know what to do next with it. Knowing what to do
next with a word is a matter of being able to follow the relevant rules
of correct employment. Action and explanation testify to that ability in
the individual case. At any given point of use however, a rule of
potentially infinite applicability will have been applied only a finite
number of times. At that point an indefinite number of interpretations of
the rule will be equi-viable on the basis of past uses (the adder might
be a Kripkean quadder etc.) As Wright [1980] has pointed out, there is no
basis, a priori, for non-zero probability assignments among the available
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interpretations. How then do we know which rule we follow, or even that
our usage is rule-governed at all ?
Of course, the foregoing story involves a certain picture; a picture
of the meaning of a word as a cumulative history of its past uses. Each
new occa sion of use is added independantly to the set of old uses. The
challenge is to provide a criterion of identity for the rule governing
the word. When are we following the same rule ? In fact, the argument is
a radically self-destructive one. If we cannot know that we ever use
words one way rather than another then we cannot know that we use them
significantly at all. There is, therefore, no reason to accept the
significance of the rule-sceptic's remarks. The sceptic might reply by
claiming to dispute only past uses while clinging firmly to present use
to do so. But that is exactly what is at issue: what is present use ? An
indefinite number of possible interpretations are available. This is,
therefore, no way out.
Rule-scepticism is disputed by Baker and Hacker [1986A] on a number
of other grounds however. Firstly, the possibility of future divergence
from past use might be accounted for in terms of misunderstanding the
explanation of the rule. The fact of any agreement in past or present
use, and surely such exists, is a fact which testifies to there being a
shared understanding of a common rule. The sceptic apparently fears the
future and its attendant potential for divergence. But such divergence is
only possible if today's apparent understanding conceals
misunderstandings which will generate, in Wright's [1980] phrase,
"radical semantic variations". Crucially however, no explanation of a
rule is ever identical with the rule, rather, explanation is an
expression of the rule. The key assumption here is that following a rule
must necessarily involve a prior interpretation of that rule. It is this
- 140 -
assumption which permits infinite, equi-viable interpretations at any
given stage and thereby provides the sceptic with a foothold.
Baker and Hacker [1986A] are highly critical of many aspects of
Kripke's [1984] account of rule-following. As is well known, Kripke's
[1984] reading of remark 201 in the Investigations is one which focuses
on the statement of rule-scepticism without taking seriously enough the
remainder of that remark in which Wittgenstein describes an inherent
"misunderstanding" in the formulation of the sceptical paradox. That
misunderstanding consists however in positing an interpretation for every
case of following a rule and inferring that the posited interpretation
determines the meaning of the rule for its follower. 8ut, Wittgenstein
argues, "interpretations..do not determine meaning" and "any
interpretation still hangs in the air along with what it interprets."
[P.I. 198] There is, therefore, more to meaning than interpretation. As
is the case with explanation, interpretation is not identical with the
rule but is its expression.
It can be plausibly argued, I think, that to explain or interpret a
rule is not completely constitutive of understanding the rule and though
it contributes to such it by no means exhausts the meaning of the word
governed by the rule. The effect of explanation depends upon reaction. It
is precisely in appropriate reaction that understanding most importantly
consists. In going on we manifest the fact that we know how to go on and
exemplify understanding. The appropriate action and reaction need not be
mediated by interpretation and explanation though these might be elicited
on request. Hence:
"there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an
interpretation but which is exhibited in what




The rule is therefore expressed in corresponding explanation and
interpretation. But if those explanations and interpretations diverge from
the normal, where and only where meaning is clearly prescribed, then we
do not attribute understanding but misunderstanding. In other words, to
possess an interpretation, to explain, does not imply knowing how to go on.
This alone does not entail the ability to follow the rule. If we do know how
to go on then we react in a manner similar to those whose form of life we
share. In On Certainty, remark 402, Wittgenstein quotes Goethe's
proclamation that: "In the beginning was the deed". For Wittgenstein it
is not justification or interpretation but action which begins the
language-game. Action does not presuppose interpretation nor is
justification in any sense presupposed. Action and reaction are at the
bottom of language-games, beyond justification. Reaction may be
responsively imitative, repetitive and instinctual but none of these
characteristics require interpretation. In so acting and reacting, so
doing, we partake in a custom and a culture which ultimately confers
normativity and embodies the criterion of identity for following the
rule. At this level, therefore, Baker and Hacker's [1986A] criterion for
meaningfulness would seem to hold up rather well. That my explanation is
acceptable to fellow language-users is a plausible criterion for my
knowing what I mean.
But now it will no doubt be argued that rule-scepticism, or at least
an appropriate analogue, could be reformulated to apply to the community.
In this form the Sceptic's epistemological challenge demands a criterion
for the identity of the rule at the community level. Baker and Hacker
could of course argue here that the sceptic has just dug too deep. In
seeking a criterion of identity at this level the sceptic is looking for
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a justification of our practices. Here he has misapplied the concept of
justification to something other than its correct extension. While the
language-game prescribes what is to count as a justification within the
boundaries of that game it does not make sense to ask for the
justification of that which determines what is to count as a
justification. It might be argued that as regards the sameness of the
rule what the community counts as sameness is sameness. What the
community prescribes, teaches, and commends as knowing how to go on, or,
going on in the same way, just is knowing how to go on etc. This need not
be a statistical rather than a normative point. The point is that both
factors count here. The former is in harmony with the latter not in
conflict. Of course, correct applications of " + 2" or the word "red" are
not settled by statistical survey but are inherited by the community or,
perhaps, preserved within it. These are ultimately aspects of a culture
and those who share that culture share certain common reactions and
linguistic inheritances. The sameness of the rule is guaranteed in the
first instance by our agreement in a language, in use, which is an
agreement in practices. Secondly, it is assured by a more basic
"agreement in judgements" and a sameness of instinctive reaction. Not
surprisingly:
"the word "agreement" and the word "rule" are not unrelated
to one another. They are cousins. If I teach anyone the use
of the one word he learns the use of the other with it". (PI-/21"
Most of these, and other, arguments are featured in Baker and
Hacker's "Rules, Scepticism and Language" [198BA], In employing them
against Kripke I think these authors may already have gone further than
is necessary. Kripke's account of rule-scepticism in Wittgenstein's
"Philosophical Investigations" is given in Chapter 4 of his "Rules and
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Private Language" [1984]. It is enough to refute that piece of commentary
to re-examine Kripke's prime piece of textual evidence; remark 201, which
I have already mentioned. Kripke's [1984] desire to attribute rule-
scepticism to Wittgenstein far outruns the plausibility of the actual
text for such a reading. In addition, that author might also be referred
to Wittgenstein's attitude to scepticism in general which, I have argued,
is consistently unsympathetic. Of course, regardless of whether or not
Wittgenstein himself was a rule-sceptic, it remains an independent
question how we are to deal with rule-scepticism and whether or not it is
really acceptable to contend that what the community accepts as "going on
in the same way" really is going on in the same way. Further, there is, I
think, a price to be paid for taking the kind of approach we have been
considering to rule-scepticism at the community level. That is, it just
is not clear that there are no further meaningful questions about
objectivity and the criterion of identity of use at the community level.
Baker and Hacker's [1986A] approach here is to challenge the picture
of a cumulative history of use to which each new use is added. In the
sense intended, it is argued, there simply are no new uses. The whole
argument is held fallacious because applying the rule to something to
which it has not previously been applied is not itself a new application
of the rule but is a matter of going on in the same way, and doing that
is not in any sense unprecedented. Explanations, it is held, terminate in
series of instances plus a similarity rider. When the sceptic has been
given this much he can be given no more, just because there is no more to
give. To the accusation of irrationality Baker and Hacker [1986A] answer
that the pattern of explanation elucidates a grammatical connection and
this shows what is rational. There can be no such thing as justifying
grammatical connections, asking why pain-behaviour is evidence for pain,
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for example, because the act of querying grammatical connections is not
the expression of doubt but of misunderstanding. That is to say,
according to Baker and Hacker [1986A] the rule and its applications are,
ultimately, inseparable. The use fixes standards of correctness and the
practice of use is the rule. The relation between the rule and its
applications, according to Baker and Hacker [19B6A] is an "internal
relation" and there can be no further questions, those authors argue, no
possibility of doubting those internal relations. This point, I think,
distills the disagreement I have been considering. For, in a sense, the
sceptical arguments of Wright [1980] and Kripke [1984] recognise the
internality of rule and applications, and establish that it is not clear
that there is more to following a rule beyond applications. To the more
sceptical authors however, it appears that, if all we have to go on is
past use, then there is a serious indeterminacy about which rule we are
in fact following, and therefore a further question as to whether we are
actually ever following a rule. Of course, most contemporary authors are
reluctant to accept a so-called 'rules as rails' conception, and are even
more reluctant to take on board the obvious Platonist implications of
such a view. Oespite that fact, many such contemporary authors feel that,
in following a rule, we keep faith with something, as it were, even if we
are not, ultimately, clear about what it is we keep faith with.
In contrast, Baker and Hacker hope not so much to answer such questions,
but to prevent them from arising, to expose them as confusions, as
pseudo-questions, pseudo-doubts. For Baker and Hacker, if we are to doubt
at all we must just accept the internal relations. Doubting the internal
relations is not, it is held, a kind of doubt but a kind of
misunderstanding, a rejection of the very concepts we use. It is at this
point that the concept
II
- 145 -
of a criterion is brought into play.
CRITERIA AND INTERNAL RELATIONS
The term "criterion" is explained by Baker and Hacker [1986a] in
two later sections: "Scepticism and Internal Relations" and "Internal
Relations and Criteria". In those sections the authors first outline the
notion of an internal relation as a non-inductive but defeasible relation
embodied in grammar and exemplified by the pardigm of the relation of a
desire to its fulfillment. The notion is further defined by the claims
that a relation is internal if it is inconceivable that the relata be
otherwise connected and impossible that any third entity should mediate
between them. Being embodied in grammar internal relations must enter
into the meanings of propositions. Indeed, Baker and Hacker [1986A]
explicitly contend that if one "..disrupts an internal relation.." one
thereby "robs the proposition of part of its meaning" (p.99). Internal
relations, therefore, will be determinants of, but not constitutive of,
the meaning of the relevant proposition. The concept of an internal
relation is, fundamentally, a semantic concept. The criterial relation
fits into this scenario as a proper subset of internal relations:
"..the relation between outward behaviour and an inner
state which Wittgenstein [calls a] criterion is laid down
in grammar..this internal relation does not rest on any
third thing."
(p.110)
In relation to the paradigm case of an internal relation criterial
relations possess a greater degree of complexity, just in virtue of the
defeasibility of any criterially-based assertion. With reference again
to the relation between inner state and outward behaviour, already
acknowledged as criterial, it is held:
"..there is a point of similarity between the kind of
internal relation involved in this case and the simpler
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kind exemplified by the relation of a desire to its
fulfillment.."
(p. 110)
Criterial relations are thus represented as a higher-order, more
complex kind of internal relation. Statements corresponding to internal
relations are held to possess the characteristics of rules of grammar and
therefore to be "tautologousM or "necessarily true" (p.112), but as
regards criterial relations, it is held:
"..the statement 'if someone acts thus, he's in pain' is
not a tautology....Criterial support is defeasible."
(p.110)
It is, I think, misleading, and strictly incorrect, to describe
"criterial support" or "criteria" as defeasible and the point must be
made that it is the criterially-based assertion, and only the assertion,
which is defeasible. However, it is further held that to restrict
internal relations to tautologous cases alone is to "narrow attention to
a proper subset of statements that have the role of rules for use"
(p.112). Baker and Hacker's [1986A] reasoning is, I think, that criteria
are a subset both of the set of internal relations and of the set of
rules for use. In this work then attention is shifted from criteria as
meaners, as constitutive of meaning, to criteria (or the assertions
which they support) as defeasible, internal relations determining
meaning; limits or markers delineating content. Criteria remain
fundamental to meaning in so far as any failure to construe the internal
relations appropriate to a proposition correctly amounts to a distortion
of the meaning of that proposition and therefore to a misunderstanding of
it. This then is the most recent of Baker and Hacker's characterisations
of Wittgenstein's use of "criterion".
In itself the position seems a strong, well-defined one in keeping
with the general anti-theoretical standpoint as regards meaning developed
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in "Language, Sense and Nonsense" [1986] but does it represent the later
Wittgenstein's position ? It is an obvious initial strategy to seek
confirmation of Baker and Hacker's [1986A] hypothesis in Wittgenstein's
later work. Evidence for the hypothesis is, unfortunate.ly, extremely
scarce. Philosophical Investigations contains only one mention of the
concept of an internal relation located in a discussion of 'seeing as' in
Part II. Nothing of the relation between that notion and the notion of a
criterion is explained in that passage. More to the point, no reference
to any such discusssions in the Philosophical Investigations is to be
found in Baker and Hacker C1986A]. Instead reference is made to
discussions in the Tractatus and the Philosophical Remarks. As is well
known, much of Part One of the Investigations is devoted to severe
criticism of many of the central ideas of the former work, including such
concepts as simplicity, determinacy of sense, the relation of language to
reality and so on. Proposition 4.014 of the Tractatus, for example,
describes an internal relation of depiction, in the sense of shared
logical form, between proposition and fact. My point is that even if this
remark can be used as evidence for Baker and Hacker's [1986A] hypothesis
those authors just have not presented the independant argumentative
support to show how these ideas survive their own critique in Part One of
the Investigations, and again, in what sense they are at work in the
positive elements of that text.
Even the staunchest supporters of Wittgensteinean continuity would
not accept that his position at the time of writing the Philosophical
Remarks is identical either with that of the Tractatus or with that of
the Philosophical Investigations. Again, my point is just that Baker and
Hacker [1986A] do not offer any persuasive argument justifying the view
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that what is often taken to be a brief verificationist phase in
Wittgenstein's thought is actually more obviously consonant with the
later Investigations. If Baker and Hacker [1986A] are correct they have
not made clear why their readers should believe them to be.
There are at least two questions here which, I argue, the authors of
"Rules, Scepticism, and Language" 1 1 986A] have not lucidly distinguished.
The first concerns the use made by Wittgenstein of the term "criterion"
in his later work. The second and separate question concerns what can be
made of the concept of a criterion in the contemporary philosophy of
language. At this stage of the inquiry the latter must take precedence
over the former for, although I have tried to cast doubt upon the
plausibility of "Rules, Scepticism and Language" as an answer to the
former question, we might readily concede the exegetical validity without
having made any progress whatsoever in terms of the latter, more
important, question. There is no room here for an argument from authority
to the effect that because that is what Wittgenstein said it is therefore
true. As regards Baker and Hacker's C1986A] conception of a criterion as
a candidate for the correct notion which would be of value to the
contemporary philosophy of language, rather than purely of interest to
Wittgenstein scholars, there are a number of respects in which I
wholeheartedly agree, but others where I have deep qualms.
Most importantly, it must be emphasised that the conception of a
criterion developed in Baker and Hacker's [1986A] text, which conception
is attributed to Wittgenstein, is itself, in a sense, a case not yet
proven. That is to say, defeasibility, that characteristic which is
alleged to distinguish criterial support from entailment, and is
acknowledged by the authors to be both the most controversial and most
problematic aspect of the notion of a criterion remains a deep problem.
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Serious doubt has been cast on the very coherence of the concept and
particularily on its connections with notions such as truth, knowledge
and belief. Yet of this feature Baker and Hacker write:
"Philosophers have notoriously found difficulty in making
sense of Wittgenstein's remarks about criteria. The crucial
problem is to explain how an internal relation can be
defeasible..Wittgenstein suggests that undefeated criterial
support renders the proposition supported certain.
How can this be ?"
(p.111)
In fact, I have already cast doubt on whether Wittgenstein suggested
any such thing in Chapter One when I noted Wittgenstein's claim that the
criteria do not put the sensation beyond doubt. Be that as it may, there
is a further question beyond one of pedigree, namely, can sense be made
of such a notion ? Baker and Hacker's [1986a] answer to their own
question is, unfortunately, that:
"This is not an occasion for resolving these conundrums.
Pro Tempore the merest sketch must suffice."
(p.111)
But if that is not the place to so pronounce then Baker and Hacker
[1986A] attribute a position to Wittgenstein which they do not fully
explain and further expect their readers to take on board a radical and
controversial relation without tackling the deep problem which lies at
the heart of this whole area. The argument in the sketch referred to runs
as follows: the rule-sceptic infers from the fact that any criterially-
supported assertion can be doubted that he can intelligibly doubt the
criterial relations themselves. Further, the rule-sceptic fails to
appreciate that to grasp the rule is to know what counts as following
the rule. Now, the first of these points is clearly a good one. The rule-
sceptic's argument seems plainly invalid. Equally, the second point
appears reasonable. But the problem is this: do these points
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satifactorily explain how 'undefeated criterial support' makes a
proposition certain ? Further, what is the sense of 'certain' being
employed here ? If that term is used in a subjective sense, the asserter
will feel certain, then we may concede the point. But if that term is
being used in an objective sense then, I think, the following point must
be made: in any case of an undefeated criterially-supported assertion
there can be no guarantee that the assertion is true, that we have
knowledge here, if the assertion is to be a genuinely defeasible one.
Can we even make sense of the idea of defeasible knowledge ? This robs
Baker and Hacker's argument of its glory, for it now looks as if there
is a further question as to whether or not a criterially-supported
assertion, understood as defeasible, is in fact a true assertion ? How
do we ever get criteria! knowledge ? No amount of equivocating with the
term "certain" will explain how undefeated criterial support adds up to
knowledge, and, in this context, that must surely be the sceptic's point.
Given the very prominent role of the notion of an internal relation
in Baker and Hacker's [1986A] account of rule-scepticism and the
unanswered questions of defeasibility and knowledge and of defeasibility
and meaning serious doubt must, in the last analysis, be cast on the
effectiveness, firstly, of Baker and Hacker's [1986A] refutation of rule-
scepticism and secondly, on the value of that notion of a criterion
presented by those authors. Before turning to examine in detail the
questions I have mentioned I propose to briefly outline Wright's [1982]
first account of criteria.
Wright begins his "Ant i
III FIRST THOUGHTS
-Realist Semantics: The Role of Criteria"
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[1982] by suggesting that a plausible account of the type of
assertibility-conditions account of meaning which, for example, Dummett
favours over truth-conditional accounts, might be given in terms of a
notion at least relevantly similar to Wittgenstein's notion of a
criterion. Criteria are initially characterised as defining a term, as
being publicly accessible and as typically being multiple. Wright [1982]
then goes on to explain the contrast between criteria and symptoms, as
outlined in the Blue Book and then notes Baker and Hacker's [1974] claim
that undefeated criterial support confers certainty on the supported
proposition:
"Baker and Hacker take it..that the satisfaction of
criteria confers certainty..if certainty is taken to
apply to all and only statements which may not
reasonably be doubted, then - since what may
reasonably be asserted cannot simultaneously be
reasonably doubted - the satisfaction of a statements
criteria will..pre-empt any reasonable doubt about it;
for it will now be part of the content of the statement
that it may reasonably be asserted in those
circumstances."
(p.244)
Interestingly, even at this early stage, in a footnote [6, p.244]
Wright points out that
"..it is doubtful whether this is a sufficiently robust
sense of 'certain'."
Wright [1982] suggests that the assertability-conditions theorist
will distinguish between criteria and symptoms in order to give an
account of misunderstanding in terms of misconceiving the criteria for a
sentence. However, Wright [1982] notes that such an account does not yet
make clear how misunderstanding could be manifest in behaviour. The
difficulty is compounded by the endless possibilities of explaining
apparently abberant use in terms of "idiosyncratic" desires, beliefs etc.
The problem, Wright [1982] concludes, is to provide an account of the
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type of situation in which explanation in terms of misunderstanding is
clearly the appropriate type of explanation. Further, if the criterialist
wants to invoke criteria at this level he will have assumed that criteria
are required to properly distinguish between explaining meaning and
pointing to empirical facts. Wright [1982] goes on to stipulate a conception
of criteria {D1..Dn} for an assertion S such that questions as to the
obtaining of the criteria are decidable and such that those criteria are
S-predicative of S and therefore provide a non-circular account of the
assertibility-conditions for S.
The criterialist now has two options: either there are cases of
{01..On} supporting S which produce non-contingently true instances of
that schema, criterial instances, or the description of the assertability
conditions for S do not provide full understanding of S. If the latter
view is correct ostension will be required to communicate understanding
of the relevant conditions for S, hence the former view will deny the
possibility of ostension. If we take the ostensive alternative, Wright
[ 1 982] argues, we might ask what grounds the community's belief that the
expression really is warranted by conditions of the type ostensively
explained to us. The inter esting response will be one of puzzlement and
inability to explain hinting at a conventional relationship, rather than
a response which tries to adduce empirical evidence. The first response,
Wright argues, describes conventional support and characterises the
notion of *criteria:
"..the connection..is one of conventional support if and
only if we would consider it acceptable in certain circumstances
to assert S on the basis of such a state of affairs ; and we
would not require, in order for someone to be credited with a
full understanding both of S of what state of affairs had been
ostensively explained, that he know what it would be empirically
whether occurences of that type of state of affairs really did
provide reason for believing S and find that they did not."
(p.252)
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"..a particular state of affairs is a *criterion..if and only
if it affords conventional support in the sense just explained.
Truth-conditions ..are a sub-class of *criteria"
(p.252)
If meaning is to be explained here, Wright [1982] argues, then
recourse cannot be made only to symptoms, viewed as giving defeasible
empirical support. For the model itself cannot make clear those
defeasibility-conditions. Hence the assertibility-conditions theorist
must have recourse either to criteria or to *criteria. Wright goes on to
note the obvious problem of criterionless cases for the criteria-inclined
assertion-condition theorist:
"Our question now is: will an assertability-conditions
theorist who is ready to grant that a particular class of
verification-transcendent statements possess no criteria be
committed to their possession of *criteria instead ?"
(p.252)
The difficulty here, as Wright points out, is that:
"Failing recourse to criteria or *criteria..the theorist
lands himself in the incoherent position of having to grant
that there is an empirical question about the adequacy of
any particular explanation of the use of S into which no
effective..investigation can be conducted."
(p.253)
Wright, of course is interested, primarily, in a more general,
even global, notion suitable for use in a theory of meaning based on
assertibility-conditions, as opposed to truth-conditions. From such a
standpoint then either knowledge of criteria, *criteria, or both
will be prerequisite to adequate explanation. Wright goes on to explore
the plausibility of such an approach with reference to the test-case of
statements about the past.
The existence of standards of correctness, it is held, and the ability
of the community to produce a mastery of such language in the linguistically
mature must at least protest against, if not refute, the claim that there
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can be no criteria for past tense statements, but the issue is not
fully prosecuted here. Wright [1982] now follows Baker and Hacker in
concluding that a criterial theory could not be a global theory of
meaning:
"If, as in Hacker and Baker, the criterial relation is
regarded as holding between statements, then an anti-realist
who held that the meaning of every statement is determined by
its association with criteria would commit himself to an
impossible model of how an understanding of any statement
could be acquired."
(p.258)
The impossibility, as Wright notes in a footnote (14, p.259) arises
from the fact that the criteria for each criterially-explained statement
must themselves be explained in terms of criteria which again require criterial
explanation, and so on, ad infinitum.
Therefore, it is argued, the criterialist assertibility-conditions
theorist must recognize a base class of statements whose meanings are not
criterially given, if he is to escape from the hermeneutic circle. Hence,
Wright [1982] subsequently explores the question of the extent to which
the anti-realist can accept a truth-conditional analysis, at least, in
order to determine the nature of that base class. Among the possible
candidates for a class of effectively decidable propositions
observational statements appear the most initially plausible. But,
Wright [1982] notes that the verification of any such statement
presupposes a notion of spatio-temporal positioning and the cognitve map
which allows judgements about that to be made is itself a defeasible and
revisable empirical theory which therefore cannot provide the kind of
conclusiveness required by the notion of verification; particularily
given the possibilities of illusion. If we have just chosen the wrong
candidate, it is held, then the right one must be indexed to the here and
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now and be devoid of proper names, definite descriptions and sortals which
presuppose futures or pasts. Worse, the possibility of an abnormal
position or state of the observer drags defeasibility back into the
picture even in the retreat to "seemings" and we are pushed further back
to a degree of privacy which is nothing other than completely discredited
[ie. Chapter Two, above]. Thus, it is held, there is no special problem
about undecidable statements, for defeasibility is simply all-pervasive.
If there is no plausible base-class, Wright argues, then two options
are available:
"The first course would be to look to a base class of statements
whose meaning was determined by their association with *criteria.
But of the realization of these *criteria there would be provision
for no other description save by the use of the very statements
whose assertion they non-contingently supported."
(p.265)
"The second alternative is to break with the assertibility-
conditions conception of meaning and to look to a base class
the correct use of whose members, while something on which any
opinion is essentially defeasible, is thought of as founded..in
human reaction alone..an anti-realist who takes it [this option]
will have little justifiable complaint if he is regarded as a
neo-idealist."
(p.266 )
In conclusion, I do not propose to critically assess Wright's [1982]
remarks here, although it will be clear that Wright is dealing with a notion
of a degree of generality the very idea of which I have already been highly
critical. I will however attempt to assess that authors own second thoughts
[1984]. In each of the conceptions of criteria I have outlined in this chapter
the notion of defeasibility has an undeniably definitive role and yet so does
the desire of each author to preserve a notion of certainty, of truth or of
knowledge. The question of the compatibility of these two considerations forms
the basis of Wright's [1984] later critique and it is to the question of that




Crispin Wright's "Second Thoughts About Criteria", published in
1984, has presented contemporary philosophy of language with the most
sceptical, provocative, challenging and demanding discussion of the
concept of a criterion. In that paper the concept of a criterion is
described in terms of the following five cardinal features:
"..that recognition of satisfaction of criteria for P
can confer sceptic-proof knowledge that P; that P's
criteria determine necessarily good evidence for P, and
thereby fix its content; that the criteria for P will
typically be multiple; that satisfaction of a criterion
for P will always be a public matter; and that to know of
the satisfaction of criteria for P is always consistent
with having, or discovering, further information whose
effect is that the claim that P is not justified after
all."
(p.383)
It is then argued that:
"..it is seriously unclear whether,..the fifth feature,
defeasibility, can be made to harmonise either with the




"But criteria would not be interestingly different from
public truth-conditions if defeasibility was waived;
and jettison of the meaning feature would threaten the
knowledge feature as well. While to forgo the knowledge
feature would be to deprive the notion of what most
advocates have seen as its principal point."
(p.383-4 )
In fact the paper unfolds a range of problems which cast doubt upon
the coherence of the concept of a criterion so described and raises the
question of the relationship between the concept so characterised and
Wittgenstein's use of the term "criterion". In what follows I will
discuss each of the problems outlined and will assess the allegedly
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Wittgensteinean pedigree of each of the features of that conception of a
criterion.
I DEFEASIBILITY AND KNOWLEDGE.
The first question raised is that
defeasibility with knowledge. The
objection":
of the possibility of reconciling
point is formulated as a "simple
"If I claim to know that P I will be understood to be
claiming that my belief that P is guaranteed correct;
so I must have a conclusive basis for that belief if
my claim is to be true. But knowledge that criteria for
P are satisfied is to be consistent-by defeasibility-
with my obtaining further information as a result of
which I no longer have a basis for the belief that P
at all. Information that is genuinely conclusive for
a certain belief, however, cannot lose that status as
a result of being added to; so knowledge that criteria
for P are satisfied cannot ever amount to knowledge that
P-the two states have different essential characteristics."
(p.384)
The same point is emphasised again on page 386:
"..for to stress, recognition of satisfaction of criteria
for P cannot, consistently with their defeasibility, be
held to constitute knowledge that P without contravention
of the truism that knowledge entails the truth of what
is known."
Wright [1984] explicitly acknowledges his debt to John McDowell's
"Criteria, Defeasibility and Knowledge" [1982] for the simple objection
['3', p.384, '3"-notes, [6]-references]. McDowell's [1982] doubt about
the viability of criteria is expressed in the first section of his paper
and a brief quote makes clear the same epistemological worry motivating
Wright's "Second Thoughts":
"..the criterial view does envisage ascribing knowledge
on the strength of something compatible with the falsity
of what is supposedly known. And it is a serious question




What the point comes to is that while knowing that P entails that P
is true, which in turn entails the fact that P, having criterial reasons
to claim to know that P cannot entail that P is true or that P is in fact
the case; if the criterial assertion is to remain a defeasible one. What
is lost in conceding the point is precisely the first feature: "that
recognition of satisfaction of criteria for P can confer sceptic-proof
knowledge that P."
Suppose then that we do not concede the point. What must be provided
to answer the challenge of the simple objection ? The key to the form
any answer must take is given in the following phrase from the simple
objection: "...obtaining further information as a result of which I no
longer have a basis for the belief that P at all". In other words,
underlying the simple objection is the formal point that the logic of the
concept of truth is monotonous:
1' Kt0 P Tto ' P ' *t ' P '' where to' "*'s intended as
some fixed "now" or present moment.
If I know that P at some given moment then not only must 'P' be true
at that moment but 'P' will always be true and, indeed, 'P' was always
true. Therefore, it is a notion of timeless truth which the formal claim
of monotonicity of truth brings into play here. Of course, there is the
independant claim, specifically about knowledge, that:
2. p -> (V t) ( (if t is later than or equal to tQ) -> Kp).
If P is known at a given moment then P is known at that moment and
at all times later than that moment. While this might be said to hold
for objective knowledge, in a Popperian sense, it is far less plausible
as regards more mundane knowings, or any account of knowledge involving
reference to belief states. One obvious objection would be, simply, that
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we might forget. In conclusion, were it not for the claim about the
monotonicity of truth formulated above, the criticism of (criterial)
knowledge involved in the simple objection would be less than
perspicuous. Consequently, what is required to answer the challenge and
to save the first feature of a criterion is a non-monotonic logic in
which clear sense can be given to the notion of 'defeasible knowledge".
That is, a logic must be developed which validates, has as a theorem, the
denial of the thinning condition familiar from classical logic, ie. a
logic whereby the addition of information 'Z' to the left hand side of
the formula 'X entails Y" can bring it about that Y is now not entailed
at all. In effect, I argue, the first (simple) objection already
involves the second of Wright's [1984] criticisms and in addressing
myself to the underlying formal point I hope to say something of
relevance to both. However, in my own treatment of these questions I
follow Wright's [1984] order of exposition.
Recent attempts to formalize just such a notion of non-monotonicity
have certainly been made. What is less certain is whether any of them can
deliver the goods. In order to answer that question the proposed logics
must be critically assessed. In Chapter Five of his "Logics for
Artificial Intelligence" [1984] Raymond Turner defines non-monotonic
logic in the following way:
"Non-monotonic logical systems are logics in which the
introduction of new information (axioms) can invalidate
old theorems"
(p.61)
The definition is illustrated by an example borrowed from Dov Gabbay
[1981]. The situation described is as follows. A tour operator offers
flights from New York to Paris and Stuttgart. At 12:00 hours Stuttgart
discovers that due to a terrorist occupation of Paris airport all Paris
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flights will be re-routed. Stuttgart also knows that the New York flight
took off and presumes that it did so on schedule. Stuttgart then assumes
their flight will be re-routed to London and infers that its passengers
will arrive tonight from London. This conclusion is referred to as 'D'.
At 14:00 hours however Stuttgart learns that take off had been delayed
by two and a half hours. It is then assumed that the pilot would have
returned to New York and it is concluded that '-0", the passengers will
not arrive tonight.
If non-monotonic logic is to provide the basis of a reply to the
simple objection then this example ought to be similar to the case of
criterial reasoning. It might be argued that the case parallels the
criterial one quite well. In each case an expanded state of information
leads to a conclusion which contradicts a conclusion made earlier on the
basis of a thinner state of information. The problem as regards
knowledge is that if we now know that -0 at time t2 then, by
monotonicity, we did not know that 0 at time t1. Otherwise it looks as if
we can deduce a contradiction and refute 'non-monotonic knowledge' by
Reductio Ad Absurdum.
Turner [1984] considers a number of attempts to formalize, in a
coherent way, the condition of non-monotonicity. The first system is
that of McDermott and Doyle [1980] and its subsequent elaboration in
McOermott [1982]. McDermott proceeds by introducing a consistency
operator "M" to a first-order modal language, Ln. A possible worlds
semantics is given proceeding from the notion of a modal frame "M" for
Ln as the quadruple [ W, D, R, F ] such that:
"(i) W is a non-empty set (of possible worlds).
(ii) D is a non-empty set.
(iii) R is a binary relation of accessibilty
between elements of W.
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(iv) F is a function which assigns to each pair,
consisting of an n-place function symbol and an element
of W, a function from 0 to D and to each pair, consisting
of an n-place relation symbol and an element of W, an
element of 2 to the D
(p.62)
The relation: "M semantically entails g,w,A" read as: assignment
function g satisfies the wff A at world w in frame M, is then recursively
defined.
McDermott [1982] and Turner [1984] argue that different properties
of the accessiblity relation 'R' generate distinct modal systems. When R
is reflexive modal logic T is obtained. If R is reflexive and transitive
S4 is obtained. Finally, if R is the equivalence relation S5 is
obtained. The semantic basis of McDermott's account of non-monotonic
inference is therefore a monotonic one based on the notions of semantic
entailment in T, S4 and S5 respectively. Turner [1984] goes on to
identify a rule of inference, possibilitation, as the heart of
McDermott's [1982] account of the non-monotonic fragment of the logic:
"'Can't infer -A", then MA." ie. if -A is not provable then A is
consistent. (There is in fact a misprint of "A" for "-A" in Turner's
text.) As Turner [1984] notes:
"..the notion of inference in the phrase "can't infer"
is not to be identified with any of the relations,
semantic entailment in T, semantic entailment in S4,
semantic entailment in S5, but is to be obtained from
such a relation by ..bootstrapping..; we require a
relation of entailment..which satisfies: If -A is not
entailed then MA is entailed."
(p.63)
Here I can do no better than to cite the concise account of the
formal manoeuverings given by Turner [1984]:
"We begin with an enumeration ( Ai, i = 1, 2, 3, ...) of
the wff's of L . Let S be some set of premises and
"semantic entailment" some underlying notion of entailment.
Then put:
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S 0 = S
and
L - if for some 8 in L MB is a member of Si and Si
n . ., nentails -8
Si + 1 = Si U (MB i) - if Si U (Bi) is consistent
Si - otherwise.
We then put S aleph = U Si. Obviously, S aleph may depend
upon the particular enumeration selected. As McOermott &
Doyle point out that if S = ( MC -> -D, MD ->-C) then either
MD or MC will be selected (but not both) according as C or
D is encountered first in the enumeration. To circumvent
this problem McDermott and Doyle make their relation of
non-monotonic deducibility independant of any particular
enumeration by defining: S non-monotonically entails A iff.
S aleph semantically entails A, for every enumeration of L .
As can easily be seen non-monotonic entailment satisfies tRe
so-called rule of possibilitation."
(p.63)
This then is a formal theory of non-monotonic inference. But before
we can ask how this might help in the criterial context it must be noted
that it is not yet a wholly satisfactory theory. Turner [1984] notes
that if a formula A is entailed non-monotonically in S5 then A is
semantically entailed in S5 anyway. In other words, non-monotonic S5
demonstrably collapses into monotonic S5. While this shows that non¬
monotonic S5 is consistent it equally demonstrates the redundancy of all
non-monotonic reasoning in that context; a highly undesirable
consequence. Conversely, the fact that non-monotonic T and S4 do not
collapse into their monotonic counterparts shows that non-monotonic
reasoning in these contexts is not redundant but does leave the question
of the consistency of these systems hanging in the air. In fact Turner
points out that for the non-monotonic systems the theory, LMC -> -C which
is consistent in monotonic S4 and T is inconsistent in the non-monotonic
systems. There are therefore concrete grounds to doubt the consistency of
these systems.
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Further, McDermott and Doyle omit any semantics for the consistency
operator "M" from their original [1980] presentation. One interesting
implication of "M" lies in the consequences it has as regards the notion
of possible worlds in the system. Clearly, if "MA" is to be understood as
the consistency of A then possible worlds cannot be understood in the
ordinary way as determinate states of affairs (or information). Rather,
the picture is of a world evolving as a developing state of information
such that, initially, we may have neither "A" nor "-A" and, subsequently,
as the state of information develops, it becomes the case that A. The law
of excluded middle cannot hold for such worlds which simply are not
totally decided or determinate at any given stage. If the worlds were
determinate then it would be difficult to see how any two worlds could be
anything other than strictly inconsistent.
In short, it just is not clear that the McDermott/Doyle system, in
its present form, provides a coherent picture or a workable logical
system which can stand on its own legs. Therefore, there can be no real
hope of using this formal theory, just as it is, as a basis for a reply
to the simple objection from monotonicity in the case of criteria.
Dov Gabbay [1982] provides an alternative approach to the problem
from an intuitionistic basis which exploits the notion of (increasingly
complete) states of information over moments of time. Again, reading 'M'
as "plausible' or 'consistent' I quote Turner's definition:
"A Gabbay Structure, T = [T,"less than"] where T is a
non-empty set (moments of time) and "less than" is a
reflexive and transitive relation on T, that is, for each t,
t', f' in T we have t "less than" t and (t "less than" t' &
t" "less than" t'" implies t "less than" t'')."
(p.65)
Gabbay also exploits a function h which assigns the values 1 or 0 to
each atomic formula at a moment of time and the function is applied to
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every wff by recursive clauses. In addition h is subject to the
following stipulation: if h assigns the truth-value surrogate '1 * to a
formula at t, h must also assign 1 to that formula at t'.
Turner notes that Gabbay's account of implication derives from
Kripke's semantics for intuitionistic logic and that:
"The operator M is interpreted as true of a wff, at a
moment in time, if it is true in some possible
continuation of that time."
It is also noted that -A and MA are mutually exclusive in the sense
that both cannot hold at the same moment in time. Gabbay defines a
notion of provability, A proves B, as, if function h assigns 1 to A at
some moment then h so assigns to B. Gabbay claims three advantages for
his system over the McOermott / Doyle system. Firstly, the rule -MC / -C
which was invalid in the early system is validated in Gabbay's system.
The same is also true of the rule M(A&8) / MA. Finally, (MC, -C) is
inconsistent under the Gabbay regime but is not so for McDermott and
Doyle.
Turner goes on to explain Gabbay's notion of non-monotonic
provability by reference to Reiter's [1980] default reasoning, where a
"default" is of the form:
"A (X): MB 1 (X) MBm (X) / C (X)
where A (X), B1 (X)...MBm (X), C (X) are wff whose
free variables are those of x = x1..xn. A (X) is
called the prerequisite of the default and C (X)
the consequent. An example of default reasoning is
the following:
BIRD (X) : MFLY (X) / FLY (X) we are to interpret this.,
as "if x is a bird and it is consistent to assume that
x can fly then infer that x can fly'. The crucial
observation here, of course, is that some birds cannot
fly.
Gabbay's rule of non-monotonic inference is just the
transitive closure of Reiter's default rule."
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(p.67-8)
While Gabbay's [1982] system might represent an improvement on the
McDermott / Ooyle system in the respects claimed, actually applying
Gabbay's system to criterially-based language remains problematic. Of
course, that system was not originally addressed to the problems of
criteria. Despite this fact, criterial interpretations of the system can
be made. These interpretations are mine and not Gabbay's. One
interpretation might be illustrated by reference to the following
principle which holds on Gabbay's account: MA V -A. Presumably, "MA"
ought to be read along the lines of "A is not at present criterially
ruled out" . That reading would however raise questions about what it is
to rule out an assertion criterially. One obvious response, though not
the only one, would be that A is ruled out criterially just in case A is
defeated. On this view a criterial negation will just be a defeated
assertion. Now, MA V -A could then be taken to say that: 'either A has
not been defeated or A has been defeated', that is, either A is defeated
or it is not. If the obtaining or not of defeaters is taken to be a
decidable matter and non-monotonicity does not occur at the level of
criteria and defeaters, then it is to be expected that at that level the
law of excluded middle will hold. In other words, at that level on the
suggested construal, MA V -A would act as a surrogate for the ordinary
law of excluded middle. If A is defeated then it is ruled out and we may
(criterially) assert its negation. If however A is not defeated then,
while we may have no basis actually to assert A, A is clearly not ruled
out. Therefore, we may conclude that MA, A is consistent.
Here, of course, we have presupposed that we can simply read "-A" as
meaning that "A has been defeated" which would mean that the truth of
negations, and therefore falsity, is in fact monotonous while the truth
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of unnegated sentences is supposed not to be. However, the alternative to
accepting such an asymmetry might itself lead to far less plausible
claims. An obvious strategy to resolve the asymmetry might, for example,
involve appeal to a more complex theory invoving positive criteria for
negated sentences ie. criterially-based claims about the falsity of
negated sentences; but it is not clear that any such theory could remain
faithful to the conception of criteria under discussion. The first job of
a criterion is surely positive, as a basis for the positive assertion of
something. I would want to deny that we ever have negative criteria,
criteria for the absence of something. In a case of, say, pretence, I
would not want to argue that we have a criterion for someone's not being
in- pain. That somet>ne is not in pain surely follows from the internal
conceptual relations which prevail here but recognition of the
satisfaction of pretence-criteria primarily provides a basis for the
positive assertion that someone is pretending and not for the absence of
anything. I would want to argue that we do not assert -A criterially,
rather we withdraw the assertion of A because of some defeater 0. That
is, it seems far more plausible to argue that rather than there being
criteria for someone's not being, say, happy that someone was not happy
could follow from their being, say, in pain, for which there existed
direct criterial support. In other words negations of this type follow
not from 'criteria for negations' but from internal meaning-relations.
Formally then, there could be no reading for C 0-> -A other than (3 DA)
DA £ W, where 'DA' is a defeater of A and W a specified context. On this
account we might explain C 0-> ( B -> -A) as: -( C 0-> B) V (3 DA) DA £ W.
Again, the rider that the first disjunct is not assertable in isolation
must be stipulated.
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It must also be emphasised that it just is not obvious that any
defeater is itself a criterion for something else. Although that
possibility need not be ruled out completely, the claim that every
defeater is always a criterion for something else seems an
unrealistically strong claim. It must be more realistic, I argue, to
claim that negations are introduced derivatively from conceptual
interconnections formally reflected, perhaps, in meaning-postulates while
the primary purpose of criteria remains positive. Thus, read purely
criterially, I would argue, it is not clear that sense can be made of the
claim that B -> -A. Therefore, rejecting the asymmetry outlined in my
first account seems to force upon the criterialist a story about negation
which might be the simplest way to avoid asymmetry, but which may also
involve sacrificing some very plausible intuitions about criteria and
negation. I return to this subject again later in the present section. At
this stage however, as regards Gabbay's system, I argue that although it
does represent a substantial improvement it still leaves open which type
of criterial interpretation the formal system admits and thus it remains
an open question how that account might form the basis of a non-monotonic
theory of criteria.
Finally, with the notion of a partial model, intended to represent
an incomplete state of information, Turner C 1 9 8 4 ] presents his own
account of non-monotonic reasoning:
"A partial model for L is a structure M = [0, F] where
D is a non-empty set and F is a function which assigns to
each n-place relation symbol (for each n greater than 0)
of L an n-place function C"3 from 0n to { t, f, u }"
(p.69)
Turner proceeds to formally characterize the notion of a plausible
extension of a partial model understood as an increasingly complete
state of information, as follows:
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"Let M, H" be partial models of L. We shall say M' is an
extension of M just in case for each n-place relation.C,
~1 1
of L (each n greater than 0) CJ' is an extension of C
(considered as functions from 0 to {t, f, u}. We write
M "less than" M' to signify that M' is an extension of M
....if M" is a plausible extension of M then M' is an
extension of H."
(p.70)
The relation is held to be reflexive and transitive. A semantics
is then set up, based upon a three-valued system due to Kleene.
In the last analysis however Turner concedes that:
"Of course, just as in the case of the accessibility
relation between possible worlds in modal logic, we
cannot spell out exactly what this means. The notion
will remain somewhat vague".
(p.70)
This, I think, is a poignant and acute observation which must, at
the end of the day, cast a shadow of doubt on the ability of such formal
systems to offer a solid basis for a reply to Prof. Wright's [1984]
'simple objection'.
It is also conceded that the non-monotonic system is much less "well
behaved" than its monotonic counterpart. In other words, despite the fact
that both Gabbay and Turner have developed systems which claim to be
improvements on the original McDermott / Doyle system, the same types of
difficulty of both the formalism and the underlying intuitions re-
emerge, albeit in a different form. In short, the current, highly
programmatic, state of the semantic theory of non-monotonic inference
does not presently provide any sort of basis for a general counter to the
appeal to the monotonicity of the concept of knowledge. Neither is it at
all clear how any existing system could be read criterially, in
particular. Despite this, if one is to uphold the kind of conception of
criteria which Wright [1984] outlines, a solution to the problem of non-
monotonicity which is presupposed must be developed. Failing that, the
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first of the cardinal features must therefore be jettisoned as,
currently, indefensible.
A better approach to the specific problems raised by criterially-
based language might be to proceed from the concept of a "context"; where
a context is understood to be composed of true or false sentences
describing criteria and defeaters. The truth-value of P, the criterially-
based assertion, would be computed on the basis of the assignment of
truth-values to the criteria and the defeaters which constitute the
context. The theory would have to be a recursive one at this point
including both ordinary connectives and a criterial operator. P, the
criterially-based assertion, will be true in a context when descriptions
of the criteria in that context are true and descriptions of defeaters
are false. P will be false when the descriptions of the defeaters are
true. A context might be understood as analogous to the notion of a world
employed in much contemporary modal semantic theory and at that level the
logic of each context would be classical and therefore bivalent.
Although this approach exploits the conceptual apparatus which
modern 'possible worlds semantics" provides I do not take a realist
position in my understanding of-the formal theory. Rather, I hope to
give the basic formal framework a primarily epistemic interpretation in
terms of notions such as those of belief-sets or assertability. This
understanding will cut free the metaphysical and ontological baggage
which comes with realist readings and will permit the modelling of
criterial assertion without taking the ontologically unnecessary on
board. The semantics is presented only as an illustration, or formal
explanation, and makes no claim to exist in the brains of criterial
reasoners in any Chomskian sense [above Chapter A]. Despite my
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reservations about those claims however it would be absurd to argue that
formal theory qua formal theory is philosophically misleading just in
itself. Rather it is the status of the formal theory, the ontological and
metaphysical claims made on its behalf which might be objectionable. No
such claim is made here. The status of the theory is that of an
illustration.
What can be said here will only amount to a sketch for a semantic
theory but the basic picture is, I argue, fundamentally correct.
Further, it should be noted that I am indebted to D. Lewis [1973] whose
work "Counterfactuals" has been a source of inspiration for many of my
own ideas though, of course, none of my errors can be blamed on that or
any other author. As stated the theory will be a modal one which will
require a recursive theory specifying the combinations of criteria and
defeaters indicated informally above, together with a recursive theory
for P, the criterially-based assertion, in complexes somewhat as
follows:
1 . Base Clause: C Of P
In every case P is understood as prefixed by "C Of" representing
criterial relative necessity, as assertability on that basis is the
notion in play throughout. Only those contexts where C is true, where the
criteria actually hold, are considered. I do not consider contexts in
which the criteria do not hold. C Of P will be true iff there is no world
in which P is defeated which is less far fetched than any in which it is
undefeated. Otherwise C Of P will be false. The notion of far fetchedness
involved presupposes a formal relation of closeness or similarity of
possible contexts to the actual context. I characterise that relation as
"..being at least as similar to the actual as..". This relation will be
transitive because when a context A is at least as similar to the actual
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as a context B and context B is at least as similar to the actual as
context C then context A will be at least as similar to the actual as
context C. It will also clearly be reflexive in that every context will
be at least as similar to the actual as itself. The relation will not be
a symmetrical one however for if we consider two contexts such that the
latter is more far fetched than the former then while the former is at
least as close to the actual as the latter the converse obviously will
not hold. Further, because connectivity does not hold here, there is no
guarantee that it will always be possible to compare any two contexts
for similarity to the actual. Intuitively then a criterial necessity
will be one which holds over all the equally plausible nearest
contexts.
2. Negation:
It will be clear from the discussion of Gabbay above that I will
not claim a sensible reading for any form of criterial denial ie. 1 . C 0->
-P will not have a reading. Instead I will deal with what must be an
implication of 1 : 2. -( C 0-> P ), read as, even if C holds it does not
give us an inference-ticket to P, because there is a defeater showing in
the ordering. While 2 can be seen as an implication of 1 it is clearly a
weaker claim than 1. 1 and 2 are not therefore equivalent. Negation is
primarily external, both because my interest here is in assertability and
non-assertability and in virtue of the fact that there is no strictly
criterial denial, because there are no negative criteria.
3. Conjunction and Disjunction:
(i) C (H (P 5, Q) iff. C 0-> P and C 0-» Q.
(ii) C <H (P v Q) iff. C 04 P, C 04 Q or both.
4. Implication:
- 172 -
(i) C (H ( P 4 Q) iff. (C 04 P) 4 (C 04 Q).
Further,
(ii) C 04 (-P V Q) iff. (C 04 -P) v (C 04 Q).
So, from (-P v Q) it follows that ((3 Dp) Dp G W ) v ( C 04 Q).
However, I do not take the first disjunct which indicates that there
exists a defeater of P as being equivalent to -( C 04 P). Again, while (P
4 Q) follows from (-P v Q), the latter will not follow from the former.
Further, if (C 04 -P) then -(C 04 P), by definition. Hence, the
antecedent of (i) is false, and the (material) conditional must therefore
be true.
I take C 04 -(P v Q) as equivalent to (3 D pvq) D pvq 6 W and I take
C 04 (-P & -Q) as equivalent to (C 04 -P) & (C 04 -Q), ie. (3 Dp) Dp G W
and (3 Dq) Dq G W. Further, C 04 (P v Q) is taken as equivalent to C 04
(-P 4 Q) from which it may be inferred that: ( C 04 P) v -((3 Dq) Dq G
W) V -((3 Dp) Dp G W) v (C 04 Q). Finally, I think it clear that such an
account can give a place to a criterial surrogate for the law of
excluded middle, C 04 (P v -P), read as ((C 04 P) v ((3 Dp) Dp G W)) v -
(3 Dp) Dp G W) v -(3 D-p) D- p G W). Therefore, while excluded middle
does hold, I do not expect bivalence to hold as regards criteria; for
while an assertion may not be defeated there may not be a basis to assert
it. Further, it seems clear that dissection will not hold. Finally, the
metalanguage would appear to be a classical one in that we can infer
from, ( C 04 B) 4 (3 Da) Da G W, that, -(C 04 B) v (3 Da) Da G W. Of
course, this can amount to no more than a sketch of a formal system
although, I argue, it must indicate the right way to proceed.
As regards criterial implication: when B 04 A holds, the nearest
worlds are such that whenever B holds, A holds. If now however some C
turns up such that when both B and C hold A does not, ie. C is a defeater
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of A, the worlds will re-order such that the nearest are now those where
B and C hold but A does not. It is important to note that "B 0-* A" still
holds but if "(B & C) (H A" holds then B is no longer sufficient for A.
The logic of criterion cannot therefore be represented in only one set of
worlds but requires the transformations as well. It is in terms of the
transformational re-ordering that I would hope to find the basis of an
explanation.of the non-monotonic features of criterial language
explaining the transformations cognitively, in terms of change in one's
picture of the world-ordering. The transformational moves might, it is
hoped, be a function but, of course, defining it is a deep problem, and
my account remains no more than a sketch for a helpful illustration.
Although the suggested approach does seem to be an improvement it cannot
in its present form provide a solution to the problem raised by Wright's
[1984] simple objection.
That problem is only a problem for the concept of a criterion as
characterized by the five cardinal features, however, and is not any kind
of problem for an alternative conception, which does not take the point
of the concept to consist in the acquisition of sceptic-proof knowledge;
if indeed that is a real possibility. Before outlining my own conception
of a criterion I will consider the question of the (allegedly
Wittgensteinean) pedigree of the Knowledge feature. The answer to this
latter question will, I argue, shed light on the former.
I have already argued that Wittgenstein did not use the term
"criterion" to refute scepticism in the Investigations [above Chapter
33, and this in itself would be surprising if that author really had held
that criteria could provide sceptic-proof knowledge. Further, I have also
noted [Chapter 1] Wittgenstein's claim, in the Remarks on the Philosophy
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of Psychology Vol. 1, that recognition of the satisfaction of criteria
does not put the existence of the sensation beyond doubt. Again this
would be a surprising remark if Wittgenstein had held that recognising
the satisfaction of criteria could confer sceptic-proof knowledge. More
to the point is the reason which is given for the fact that the existence
of the sensation is not put beyond doubt, namely, that there are no such
criteria. Of course, it could be that Wittgenstein did adhere to a
conception of criteria which incorporated the knowledge-feature, but
thought it inapplicable in the case of sensations. Even if that were the
case however, the point would still hold that the concept of a criterion
nonetheless was not introduced as a way of refuting scepticism across
the board.
In Chapter 1 I tried to explain Wittgenstein's role with respect to
contemporary characterizations of criteria, and argued there that many
features of contemporary theories are simply not present in
Wittgenstein's later work but are attributed to him only by certain
commentators. This is a case in point. But there is more to be said.
Regardless of pedigree the first feature is plainly indefensible as it
stands. What might be both defensible and of value against scepticism is
a distinction with which I replace the first feature I have jettisoned.
That distinction is one between the imaginability of the negation of P
and the existence of a ground to doubt that P. This distinction is
integral to any reasonable conception of a criterion regardless of
pedigree. I will therefore first make clear the nature of the distinction
and its point in the context of scepticism before examining its breeding,
as it were.
II JUSTIFICATION AND BELIEF
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It will already be clear that in relinquishing the knowledge feature
we are left with, at strongest, a belief feature. Rather than discussing
truth and knowledge therefore I will discuss justification and belief. I
am aware that even the coherence of criterial versions of these notions
is challenged in Wright [1984], but as a first step towards salvaging a
coherent notion of a criterion a few preliminary remarks are necessary.
From the standpoint of a criterion as a basis for belief, as a basis
for claims to know, understood defeasibly, it can be seen that there is
an ambiguity in the formulation of the Knowledge Feature: "to know of
satisfaction of criteria for P is always consistent with having further
information whose effect is that the claim that P is not justified after
all." To be clear, the point is not that after all P was never justified,
but that after all P might not be true. While truth may be analytic of
the concept of knowledge it clearly is not analytic of the concept of
justification.
If what we are talking about here is criteria as reasons to believe,
or defeasible warrants to assert, then the following, rather Popperian,
point might be argued against the need for any such notion. It is often
held that speakers frequently just say without recourse to grounds or
warrants of any sort. No doubt it would be blind to ignore this fact, but
here it is worth stressing the importance of reason-giving to speakers.
In the epistemological context it seems just as blind, just as pointless,
to deny that speakers have and give reasons for their judgements.
Knowledge claims and beliefs often do stem from just such reason-based
roots. This in turn motivates and explains behaviour; behaviour whose
existence it seems equally pointless to deny. A speaker has good reason
to claim that P when he recognizes the satisfaction of criteria for P and
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the absence of any reason to doubt that P. Surely this is when many
knowledge claims are actually made. Claims may even be made in the
knowledge that the negation of what that claim asserts is perfectly
conceivable. But if there is no present reason anywhere available to
doubt the truth of the claim, is it in some sense a dubious claim because
of that ? To return to the point, a criterialist will accept that S knows
that P only if P is true, but will not accept that S never had any
justification for the belief that P unless P is true. While it may be
argued that a defective justification is no justification at all it must
be noted that even defective justifications ground claims to know,
motivate behaviour etc. The role of defective justification will, I
think, be proved an important one, for even a defective justificatiorr may
lead happily, though accidentally, to a true claim, as, indeed, a guess
might.
It is in virtue of the fact that criteria are the learned paradigms
of use and of their roles as reasons, justifiers and conditions of
assertion that they do offer an account of why speakers claim, as they
do, to knowledge, namely, on the basis of criteria which they learned
when they acquired language; even though the correctness of their claims
cannot be guaranteed. Secondly, nothing which has so far been said
departs significantly from actual use or condemns in any sense speaker's
understanding. In those cases where speakers clearly do recognize the
satisfaction of criteria they will not hesitate to assert. They will
unequivocally make claims to know, say, of pain. In so doing they will
exemplify their linguistic training. Moreover, because criterial
relations are conventional norms, to deny the conclusion of the
criterially supported claim must be to possess an understanding of that
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situation's aberration from the norm. Denial will require special
justification. Here it begins to be clear why the theory has been thought
to provide Sceptic-proof knowledge. The only doubt admissible as coherent
in these situations will be grounded doubt and the burden of proof will
be transferred to the Sceptic. Lacking altogether any such evidence,
denial must imply either lack of understanding on the Sceptic's part or
his mere objection to convention; to ordinary forms of language and
discourse. In the total absence of contravening data, to refuse to assert
is to reject linguistic training in the applicability of concepts.
While this clearly restricts or mitigates scepticism it does not
amount to "Sceptic-proof knowledge"; but if we are to give up our
ordinary ways of talking and reasoning, at least the onus is on the
sceptic to give us a good reason why, on pain of being considered to have
failed to understand linguistic goings-on. Here, in the ready transfer of
the onus of proof, lies the anti-sceptical value of the theory. The fact
that we do not have a final refutation of scepticism here, is not the
fault of the theory but of those who issued extravagant promissory' notes
and claimed too much on its behalf.
Again, the claim is that if there actually is no concrete reason to
doubt that P or to claim that -P then the sceptic is objecting to
convention and rejecting his linguistic training. This is not to say
that the negation of P is not imaginable, conceivable or logically
possible. But is the very imaginability or logical possibility of -P
itself a reason to doubt that P when P's criterial circumstances obtain
? If the psychological impossibility of my believing that P does not
entail -P, then why should the psychological possibility of my imagining
that -P, in the absence of ANY present reason, entail or even ground -P ?
This point is reflected in the Dialogic [below Chapter 7] by the fact
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that doubt, though an act, is not an assertion. The logical possibility
of -P is neither a proof nor a ground for -P. Just because -P is
imaginable in the absence of any reason to doubt does not mean that -P is
a reasonable basis on which to proceed. A society which did take this as
a sound basis for action would be an irrational one far removed from our
own, with concepts of knowledge and negation equally as distant. In fact
there may well be problems of radical translation here, for that
society's concept of negation is essentially different from our own.
Rather than the familiar account of the negation of P in terms of it not
being the case that P the alternative society maintains an account of P's
not being the case" as equivalent to it being impossible that P. The
modalities of such a society might be a perverse realization of a non¬
standard modal system, but it would, for all that, be perverse. If our
hypotheses, beliefs and knowings are to be any aid to our survival then,
I think, that society might be a dangerous and perhaps short-lived
society. As I have implied, it is one which we cannot even fully make
sense of. In general, I think it would be acknowledged that when
listening to a recording, an actual scratch sounds significantly worse
than several logically possible scratches.
At its strongest then the criterial claim is that a claim to know
is, by definition, reasonable, just in those cases where the criteria
obtain and is not reasonable where a genuine defeater obtains. This claim
is as strong a claim as I wish to make at this juncture, urging that the
first feature be replaced by the notion of criteria as learned norms, and
by appeal to the distinction between the imaginability of the negation of
the criterial claim and the existence of a concrete ground to doubt. If
we characterise the simple objection as the following conditional: 'if
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recognition of the satisfaction of criteria is always consistent with
further information turning up which defeats that claim then satisfaction
of criteria just cannot add up to knowledge' then, it might be argued,
the conditional fudges an important matter and must be denied. That is,
although it is fair to say that further information could turn up to
defeat the assertion, this is to say no more than that speakers make
criterial assertions against an explicitly understood background of
defeasibility. It does not follow from this that it will always be
rational to expect that one's assertion be defeated. In fact in many
cases that would be quite irrational. My argument is that in the type of
situation in which the burden of proof is transferred to the sceptic, the
very last thing to be expected is that the criterial assertion be
defeated".
A different response might however be made, and it is one which it
is worth pausing to consider. The response is exemplified, for example,
in P. Klein's [1981] "Certainty: A Refutation of Scepticism" which
attempts to reconcile defeasibility and knowledge. Klein's account is not
couched in criterial terms, but by giving it a criterial reading the
•plausibility of his approach might be tested in the light of the present
considerations. In terms of the conditional I have been discussing,
Klein's argument would proceed by agreeing with the antecedent: that
recognition of the satisfaction of criteria is always consistent with
further information turning up which defeats the claim. Klein would
however deny the consequent: that recognition of the satisfaction of
criteria cannot add up to knowledge. The crux of Klein's claim is that
the absence of defeaters or overriders and the absence of any ground to
doubt or the presence of only irrelevant or non-genuine defeaters,
together with full criterial justification, ensures that P is certain on
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the basis of the criterial evidence. In other words if we add to the
satisfaction of the criteria, as a premise to the argument, the condition
that in the present circumstances no defeaters actually obtain, that, it
is held, will be sufficient to entail the conclusion of the inference.
That is to say, if it is known that the criteria are satisfied and that
defeaters are absent then, Klein argues, it is known that P is true.
There is nothing to override it, nothing to defeat it and not even any
ground to doubt it. This claim is bound to raise a number of objections
not the least of which will be that despite earlier claims have criteria
not now been accorded the status of entailments ? But Klein claims that
this is not so and warns against such an interpretation in the following
way. Even in cases where defeaters are absent it is not that nothing
could defeat the criterially-based assertion. That would make the
descriptions of the satisfaction of criteria themselves entailing. The
point, Klein argues, is that nothing defeats the assertion in the present
context; as a matter of fact. The absence of defeaters is the absence of
ways to falsify. If the claim has not been defeated it has not been
falsified. If there is nothing in the set of evidences which could defeat
it, then it cannot on that basis alone be falsified.
This then is Klein's [1981] proposal. But it is difficult to see why
this is a solution rather than itself a problem, for the guarantee of the
absence of defeaters which was introduced as a premise in the argument is
not, and could not be, itself another set of evidence, access to which
could provide Cartesian certainty. What counts as a defeater could not be
simply specified in a finite list in advance of a context. That nothing
will turn up to defeat a claim in a given context is not something upon
which one could base a claim. It is a wholly extrinsic factor. For the
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moment I will hold my doubts in abeyance so as to further examine Klein's
proposal.
By Klein's [1981] 'criterial model of knowledge' we know that P
when: (1) We have a full non-defective justification of P and (2) There
are no defeaters of P. But, if -P were the case we could conjoin -P to
the left hand side of the inference to P and thereby defeat the
justification, making it both defective and defeated. So, if P is non-
defectively established and there are no defeaters of it then -P is ruled
out because it is itself a defeater which would generate a defective
justification of P. Therefore, P -> --P. But the evidence will still not
be entailing because what rules out -P is just the absence of any
defeater, NOT the evidence itself. The assertion based on criterial
evidence itself remains perfectly defeasible in practice, not just in
principle. Any criterial assertion is always defeasible by a relevant set
of defeaters. But where every member of that set is absent it is
undefeated, P is established and -P is ruled out. Now, even though P ->
--P, P itself is still not entailed. According to Klein that is just to
fudge the distinction between defeating the inference to -P and
establishing that P. Hence, it is held: (1) To establish that P is to
defeat the inference to -P; for it could then be conjoined to the left
hand side of the inference. Of course, it is not being held that, (2) to
defeat the inference to -P is to establish that P. The fact that the
inference to -P is defeated might support X, Y, Z or nothing at all. It
may bear no relevance to P. So, even if we conclude --P on the basis of
evidence of defeat we cannot validly conclude that P. So, it is not a
theorem that --P -> P. That is to say, P is not entailed; its status
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remains not proven. In fact, if we run the same initial argument for P,
for -P, we get :(1) -P is fully justified. (2) There are no defeaters.
So, (3) P is ruled out, ie. - P -> - P. This is the criterial consequence.
Therefore, to know that P is to know that -P is not the case, ie.
P -> --P. To know that -P is to know that P is not the case ie.
-P -> -P.
Presumably, it is not being held that if P is known then necessarily
P is the case. P does not become a necessary truth in virtue of being
known. Nor can it be held that if P is known then necessarily nothing
could defeat P. That would mean that P was entailed whereas, criterially,
there are always possible defeaters of P. But because P cannot be known
ie. justified and undefeated AND defeated at the same time - M I P is
known & (3d) d defeats P ). Substituting -P which is a defeater of P for
the second conjunct in the sentence above: - M ( P is known & -P is the
case ). Hence, L ( If P is known Then it is not the case that -P ) or
L ( KP -> --P) .
The problem with all this is that the entire edifice of argument
depends upon the notion of a 'clear cut case' in which not only are
there, as a matter offact, no defeaters but this is known to be so.
While Klein's approach tries to preserve the defeasibility of the
evidence it leaves the status of this extrinsic knowing of the absence
of counterevidence very problematic. How do we know that this condition
holds ? Klein admits that in the last analysis accepting that there are
such cases, or accepting that THIS is such a case may not even be a
matter for argument. Klein does argue that pointing to examples from
everyday experience is persuasive and that it is more counterintuitive to
deny that there are such clear cut cases. Despite this the worry clearly
remains that there is nothing to prevent iterative scepticism of the form
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: do we ever know that we know ? from running rampant here. I have
already argued that we cannot just introduce the absence of defeaters
into the argument as a premise and, now it seems that it is only if we
accept an article of faith, accept that it is certain that no defeating
evidence will turn up, that we can claim certainty for the conclusion of
the criterial inference. It is only by assuming that we can know of the
absence of counterevidence that we can argue that the criteria can give
us knowledge. At the end of the day, the most basic foundation of Klein's
argument is not something which is either justified or justifiable.
Klein is by no means alone in his attempt to reconcile the
defeasible nature of critera with the highly plausible claim that if
S knows that P then P must be the case. Another attempt at such a
reconciliation is contained in Gordon Baker's [1974] article on criteria
in "Law, Morality and Society". Although there is no presently available
formal characterisation of criteria, Baker's paper is very near to the
mark here as it contains definitions of a degree of precision which
easily give rise to what would appear to be the most obvious route to
formalization. Acknowledging what has gone before Baker argues that
criteria do provide sufficient evidence for assertions of pain,
proposition P, unless some members of a set of defeaters of P obtain, let
us say pretence or mimicry criteria. It appears that there are a number
of possible symbolic representations of this claim that criteria,
together with the absence of defeating evidence, warrant P. For instance,
1 . X , - D -j— P
2. X H (P v D)
The first of these sentences might be taken to represent Klein's
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[1981] proposal. However, I think that, strictly speaking, Klein's
proposal is better represented as 3. X, -D -\— --P. The two sentences
1. and 2. are however logically equivalent if the entailment is taken
classically, and I note that, in the latter case, even if X holds both P
and 0 could be true in virtue of the inclusive nature of logical
disjunction alone. Due to the equivalence, of course, if the latter will
not do then neither will the former. This is itself an undesirable
consequence, but the situation is worse still. In fact, X and D as they
occur in these two sequents must, ultimately, be interpreted as sets.
Here X is the criterial set for P, D a set of defeaters, and P our pain
proposition. Both sets X and D are themselves infinite sets. The set X of
criteria for P and the set D of defeaters of P will be incompletely
specified, just because we cannot know in advance exactly what will
count as a criterion or what will count as a defeater in any situation.
These will not therefore be closed lists. Criterial inference cannot
therefore be formally characterised in that way as neither X nor D could
be well-defined. Therefore any adequate formalization must make appeal to
a semantical, model-theoretic notion, for only in that framework can
infinite sets be unproblematically accomodated.
Baker is aware of the problem presented by these infinite sets and
attempts to overcome them, for D at least, by arguing that the defeaters
will at least be of distinct types and this will provide a finite list.
Hence, formally:
Let A1 be a set of defeaters of a type: {a11, a12, a13,...a1m}
Let A2 be a set of defeaters of a type: {a21 , a22, a23,...a2n}
Let Ak be a set of defeaters of a type: {ak1 , ak2, ak3,...akp}
I take Ak to represent some finite cut-off point in the list.
Hence,
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we have the set: At U A2 U A3...U Ak
Now, something is a member of the original set of defeaters "D"
in our sequents only if it is a member of the union of sets of types of
defeater. ie. ip £ D iff. <p G A1 U A2 U A3..U Ak ie.
k
ip £ D iff. ip G U {Ai} = A
i= 1 i
With the two sentences reformulated set-theoretically, Klein's
sentence can now be read as 'C' & -Oq) q 6 A |— 'P'p where the turnstile
represents semantic entailment. The idea then is to treat the new
sentence as meaning that there is a finite subset giving you an inference
ticket to P. That is, P is deducible from the finite subset. But
entailment is not well-defined here and really ought to be semantic.
However, once it is realized that in fact A must itself be an infinite
set if any sense is to be made of it, then it can be seen that even the
finite set of infinite sets is of no real help, because it must be the
case that all of its members must fail to hold. Further, because we
cannot know in advance what individual members of any particular set
might be, each individual set will itself be incompletely specified ie.
the sets: {A2} , {A2> to {Ak} remain incompletely specified. This cannot
provide a solution. In the last analysis to accept the infinite set at
all, to speak of it as not holding in a given case and so on, is all on a
par with the notorious notion of a ceteris paribus clause for law-like
statements in scientific contexts, and that is surely just the type of
move which Klein invited us to make by taking on board, as an article of
faith, that such and such a case was in fact a clear cut case. I conclude
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therefore that neither Klein [1981] nor Baker [197^3 takes us any further
forward towards an answer to Wright's [1984] simple objection than the
semantic theory of non-monotonic inference did.
Interestingly, under the Klein/Baker scheme just discussed the same
type of construction must be made for the set X of criteria for P and it
is very far from obvious that such cumbersome and incompletely specified
definitions could ever satisfy the condition of teachability. If this
were the form of any initial definition or explanation of meaning would
that be a teachable form ? The sets are unspecified and unspecifiable for
every situation on the basis of any single case. Though that qualm might
be overcome in the last analysis it does not augur well for proponents of
any such view, and I do not believe that this type of account accurately
represents how criteria are learned. They must be learned as more
simplistic inferences understood against a background of defeasibility.
Precisely what counts as defeating evidence must also be learned. The
complexity of possible defeaters may be less immediately grasped than the
simple rule and degree of appreciation of social, and evidential cues to
asserting defeat may develop' as language-mastery deepens. But that
complexity can never be completely specified in advance in any learnable
definition. It is not obvious either that this type of formal framework
has enough scope to do full justice to the finer points of criterial
reasoning. Finally, there remains a more fundamental reason why none of
the attempts to reconcile criteria as defeasible evidences with objective
knowledge could ever be made good and that reason will become clear in
the following section.
Ill DEFEASIBILITY AND THE MEANING FEATURE
So far in the present chapter I have discussed issues arising from
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the first challenge to the coherence of the concept of a criterion as
described in Wright [1984]. In the light of that discussion I have
relinquished the first, "knowledge feature", on the grounds of its
indefensibility. In addition I have argued against the claim that such
a feature has a genuinely Wittgensteinean pedigree and have maintained,
against current orthodoxy, that the acquisition of sceptic-proof
knowledge is not the main point of the concept of a criterion. In place
of the knowledge feature I have argued for the recognition of the
satisfaction of criteria as a reasonable basis for knowledge claims and
have urged a distinction between the imaginability of the negation of P
and the existence of a concrete ground to doubt P, which, I hold,
provides the basi$ for a dialogical transfer of the burden of proof to
the sceptic. In the sections below I shall try to give some further
substance to these views while addressing the second major objection to
the coherence of the concept of a criterion presented in Wright [1984].
That objection concerns an alleged incongruence between the defeasible
characteristics of criteria and their role as content-fixers.
My strategy will be to address each point to which I will object,
as these arise in the course of the article. Over pages 291-293 Professor
Wright explains that because we cannot test anyone's understanding of
statements whose truth-conditions lie outside our recognitional grasp by
reference to those very truth-conditions, the anti-realist is faced with
the dilemma of either giving truth-conditions which we can so grasp or
admitting that:
"..for these statements he is well advised to prefer the
second response: their meaning is explained by reference
to conditions of warranted assertion whose obtaining is
not sufficient for their truth."
(p.393)
Further, it is held,:
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"..for the assertion-conditions theorist every contingent
statement must be associated a priori with at least some of
its assertion-conditions.."
(p.393)
It will be clear from my Chapter 4 that the enterprise of
constructing a global theory of meaning concieved in realist or anti-
realist terms is not the purpose of my own defence of the coherence of
the concept of a criterion. Nor do I wish to lay claim to having
anything to say about "every contingent statement". Therefore, before
going any further it may be prudent to make clear my own position,
particularily as such notions as 'testing for understanding" and
'explaining meaning' are under discussion. My own position here is a
logical development of some of Wittgenstein's arguments in the
Philosophical Investigations. As a logical development however I take
full responsibility for them and would be extremely reluctant to
attribute my own account to any other author. My own view is a logical
development in so far as it proceeds from Wittgenstein's own
distinction, familiar from Chapter Two, between language which pertains
primarily to public physical objects and that pertaining to sensation. In
many of his remarks in the Investigations Wittgenstein is at pains to
emphasise the distinction between the bearer of a name and the meaning of
a name (ie. 40-45), or between what a word means and what it refers to.
Despite this, that author does acknowledge that the referent, the bearer
of the name, can be used to assist in teaching the meaning of the word.
In Chapter Two I argued that Wittgenstein was at pains to emphasise the
important differences between the grammar of the public physical object
language-game and that of psychological language. In particular, I
discussed this issue with reference to Wittgenstein's claim that a
sensation was no sort of object but was only considered as such when the
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grammar of the language of sensation was confused with that of physical
object language. Despite his denial of the Cartesian, and indeed the
Classical Empiricist, conception of sensation I argued that this did not
imply that Wittgenstein was espousing the view that what the language of
sensation referred to was, purely, behaviour. I denied, with
Wittgenstein, that a sensation, if not a something, must therefore be a
nothing. Rather, Wittgenstein tried to cut a middle path between
behaviourism and the object conception urging that both were mistaken. In
the present context what the object theorist has got right is that the
language of sensation refers not to behaviour but to sensation and that
it is the presence or absence of the sensation which settles questions of
truth and falsity. Where a mistake is made is in thinking that the
psychological phenomena referred to could be used to teach or test the
meanings of those referring terms. The behaviourist makes precisely the
opposite mistake when, accepting that behaviour has a vital role in
teaching and testing the use of the language of sensation, he moves to
argue that sensations are nothing other than the behaviour. The way in
which a middle path is cut out here is to accept from the object theorist
that the language of sensation refers to sensations understood as
psychological phenomena, while accepting from the behaviourist that such
phenomena cannot be used either to teach or test meaning. If the meanings
of sensation terms cannot be taught by reference to the psychological
phenomena then they are taught by reference to something more like
behaviour. I say 'more like behaviour' because I do not wish to confine
myself only to behaviour, be it linguistic or not, but want to include
circumstantial and contextual features and, in extending the analysis to
emotion, to allow a role for the object of the emotion, should one exist.
- 190 -
In other words, it is by means of criteria that the meanings of
psychological terms are taught despite the fact that it is the
psychological phenomena, and not the criteria, which our use of
psychological language is about.
If we now return to the original distinction between psychological
terms and public physical-object,language the vital difference between
these two ways of talking, I argue, lies at the level of basic teaching
and learning. That is, while in the case of the language of physical
objects, the object itself might enjoy a useful role in the teaching of
the meaning of the word to which it stands as referent, this is precisely
what is not possible in the case of psychological language; not least
because the referent in these contexts is never any sort of object at
all. There is, therefore, a fundamental reversal of logical priorities
here; for while in the public object case the referent can be used to
establish, illustrate and teach the meaning; in the psychological case
the meaning, given by the criteria, is used to establish the referent,
even though the criteria are not that which is referred to. However, none
of this implies that our talk about toothache is about toothache-criteria
rather than toothache. The meaning of 'toothache' is given by its
particular criteria and those criteria fix what toothache is. It is in
terms of criteria that we fix the referent of that term, and in terms of
criteria generally that we identify, distinguish and classify the
meanings of the psychological terms we use. If toothache were not in
general expressed as it is then, whatever the feeling, it would not be
toothache. Furthermore, our talk about toothache cannot be reduced to
talk about anything else. What makes a particular assertion of toothache
true is not just facts about toothache-criteria as distinct from facts
about toothache. For the facts about the criteria for toothache are
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themselves facts about toothache. Our criteria for toothache are criteria
for toothache relative to our concept of toothache. Even in the first
person we acquire our linguistic understanding of what our feelings are
and classify and discriminate them by means of the criteria which fix the
meanings of the terms we learn. Later, of course, we need not identify a
particular sensation by, say, observing our behaviour, that would clearly
be absurd; but that does not imply that our understanding of the meanings
of the psychological terms we use, even of ourselves, is not, ultimately,
given to us in criterial terms. This is the whole, holistic, story and
there can clearly be no other mode of access to our inner life, in so far
as that life is conceptualised, other than in terms of an understanding
of the language of the inner life which is taught and learned on the
basis of criteria. Our talk about toothache criteria is, therefore, in a
deep sense, talk about toothache. Further, talk about the satisfaction of
toothache-criteria is not ultimately distinguishable in any sense from
talk about toothache for it is the criteria which determine the meaning
of the term 'toothache' and fix what toothache is. This rather holistic,
non-reductionist position is by no means the only possible position but
is, I think, seen to be the most plausible when compared to alternative
accounts.
That is, if we separate the criteria and the phenomenon and argue
that facts pertaining to the phenomena settle the issue of truth or
falsity rather than facts about criteria, if we argue that, in some
sense, these are distinct, then it looks as if statements might be true
in virtue of the obtaining of a condition that outruns the criterion
which determines the very meaning of the term. Again, use in accordance
with meaning and saying something true are presumably inseparable.
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Otherwise, it looks as if there might be a further question as to whether
a criterially warranted assertion is in fact a true statement. What is
now needed in this particular case is an account which allows for a
conceptual difference between criteria obtaining and truth-conditions,
strictly speaking, obtaining; but an account which yet explains how the
notion of truth here is nonetheless constrained by that of criterial
assertability. Any criterialist who wanted to pursue that particular line
must make fully explicit the precise way in which:
"..the truth of a statement may be connected importantly
with the truth of another without it being the case that
the one entails the other in the sole sort of sense
preferred by obsessional logicians."
[J.L. Austin, 1955, "How To Do Things With Words",
p. 54. Austin's remark, of course, concerns presupposition
and not criteria.]
Part of any such successful account must involve driving a wedge
between 'use in accordance with meaning' and 'making true statements';
at least as far as criterially-based language goes. But there is clearly
a grave problem with that very idea, for how can the criteria determine
the meaning without fixing the referent of the term in question ? There
is clearly a grave danger of cutting adrift the psychological phenomena
to some ghostly realm and attendant upon that scepticism about other
minds. It could be argued, for instance, that it is perfectly possible
both to use language correctly and meaningfully and yet to say something
false in the process. But that fact is surely contingent upon the meaning
of the term establishing its referent in such a way that we already have
a basis for knowing when the term is used truly and therefore when it is
used falsely. Rather, I argue, in the case of criterially-based
language, the criteria give the meaning of the term and it is only via
that established meaning that the very nature of the referent is
established. Of course, that conclusion must cast doubt on the view that
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it is really possible to give any account of the content of criterially-
based assertions about mental states from outside that very type of
language. Further, because the problems with a non-monotonic account of
truth remain unsolved the core notion in the semantics of psychological
language must be illustrated and explained by the interaction of criteria
and defeaters. This at least allows us to map reasoning patterns via
something more like assertability and non-assertability rather than
truth.
It is important to note that the view which I am advocating here
does not necessarily imply that we had no pre-linguistic psychological
phenomena. These will have existed as, unconceptualized, "blind
intuitions" in Kant's terms. The criteria give us ways of carving up,
discriminating, classifying and conceptualizing our experience.
Similarily, it is vital to note that criteria cannot be . considered
evidence in the ordinary sense. For if criteria were evidence in the
ordinary sense then we ought to be able to provide a characterisation of
the referent which is ultimately independant of its criteria. But that is
precisley what is not possible. No independant characterisation is
possible, for it is only by means of the criteria for X that we can
understand what X is. This point in turn undermines the degree of depth
claimed for the first person / third person asymmetry in these contexts.
To understand what an X is for the psychological case presupposes
understanding of the criteria for X and this holds regardless of
perspective. Of course, once this much is understood one can identify X
in one's own case without explicit appeal to criteria, but it is only in
virtue of the criteria that one can conceptualize from the feeling to the
feeling as an X. It will also be noted that on my view avowals, sincere
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or not, cannot be construed as criteria. This, of course, stands in stark
contrast to the view usually attributed to Wittgenstein that such avowals
could form part of a criterion for the ascription of mental states to
others. I do not however wish to attribute my view to that author.
Correct use presupposes knowledge of the criteria in terms of which the
correct use was taught, while incorrect use simply exemplifies lack of
understanding. The desire to treat the product of having learned
criteria, correct use, as itself a criterion is an effect of the desire
to see criteria, fundamentally, as evidence in the usual sense.
These conclusions, I argue, must give the lie to the type of view
which Paul Churchland [1986] has recently put forward in the Philosophy
of Mind. I have already critically examined the presuppositions of that
author [above, Chapter 4] now I will consider his conclusions. As is
well known Churchland heralds a great enhancement in our 'introspective
vision':
"Glucose consumption in the forebrain, dopamine levels in
the thalamus, the spiking frequencies in specific neural
pathways, resonanaces in the nth layer of the peristriatal
cortex, and countless other neurophysiological and
neurofunctional niceties could be moved into the objective
focus of our introspective discrimination and conceptual
recognition..We shall of course have to learn the conceptual
framework of the projected neuroscience in order to pull this
off. And we shall have to practice to gain skill in applying
those concepts in our noninferential judgements. But that
seems a small price to pay, given the projected return."
( 1 984, p.160)
But how much of an advancement would our using the vocabulary of a
completed neuroscience about emotions and mental states really represent
? I would argue that Churchland is simply advocating a change in the way
we talk based on our original emotion or mental state vocabulary whose
meanings are criterially given. If the taxonomy of folk psychology is to
be replaced, it must, as Churchland realizes, map onto the taxonomy of
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the completed neuroscience. But that is precisely because our ordinary
ways of talking and our common-sense explanations fix the meanings of
the terms, defining what each state is, and therefore the science must
be associated with that if we are to understand the new science-talk as
talk about emotions. In that sense, the new way of talking is parasitic
upon the old, inescapaply tied to the carving up, the discriminating and
classifying already done. While it might represent a new way of talking,
it can be no more than a new way of talking about the same old thing. It
is very difficult to see how a change based inescapably on what has gone
before and only comprehensible on that basis can really amount to the
great revelation Churchland foresees.
With this brief statement of my view, in contrast to the context in
which Wright [1984] embeds the concept, I return to the issues raised in
Wright's article. One passage which brings into relief the contrast
between what I take to be the correct conception of a criterion and the
conception discussed by Professor Wright is found on p.390:
"The crucial consideration is again the consequential
character of assertion..when someone asserts P, even on
inconclusive grounds, he sets himself against the
subsequent defeat of those grounds. Nevertheless, defeat
always is a possibility where criteria are concerned. And
it will be in the lap of the gods whether it occurs in any
particular case and how often it happens..It is to be
expected no doubt - if only for evolutionary reasons- that
we will in general have selected criteria so as to minimize
the possibility of defeat. But that is not to say that we have
been'successful in any particular case, or that success will
last. So..it has to be a possibility that a type of criterion
for a particular assertion be defeated often enough to shake
our confidence in the propriety of that assertion when made
solely on that ground."
The same point is stressed on p.398:
"For anyone who understands both that a certain type of state
of affairs conventionally supports P and that this support is
defeasible by developments which, again, he understands..must
understand how experience could lead one to the conclusion
that occurences of that type of state of affairs did not after
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all provide an adequate reason for believing P. The possibility
involved is, once again, that of the world turning awkward...
worldly awkwardness may precisely take the form of an erosion
of those conditions."
The general worry here stems, firstly, from the fact that criteria
are still construed as primarily evidential and, secondly, from too
broad, too global, a conception of criteria. If we narrow the focus to
psychological terms, I argue, the anxiety about the erosion of criterial
connexions looks much less well-founded.
What has to be borne in mind, I argue, is that unless the criteria
for pain were as they are then there would not be pain. If there were no
such criteria there would be no pain. That is not to deny the pre-
linguistic existence of psychological phenomena but to point out that,
these phenomena would, ex hypothesi, remain unconceptualized, again in
Kant's terms the intuitions would be hopelessly blind. Further, if there
is no independent means of characterising the psychological phenomena
other than via the criteria in virtue of which the terms referring to the
phenomena can be understood at all, then if the criteria for pain goes,
so does the pain. And that is exactly what we would expect from the type
of relation which a criterion is supposed to provide. Therefore, in
general, recognition of the satisfaction of criteria for pain must be the
basis of correct use of the term pain. That is why, although any
criterially-based knowledge claim about pain might be defeasible, that is
no cause for anxiety that one particularly awkward day the criterial
circumstances of pain might no longer have any relevant connection with
pain. Without the criteria for pain there would, literally, be no pain.
Again, it is not that the agent has no reason to doubt the criterial
connexion in general but that he could have no reason to reject the
criterion per se unless his purpose was simply to alter those conventions
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which determine the meaning of the relevant term.
In "Criteria. Defeasibility and Knowledge" [1982], mentioned briefly
above, John McDowell outlines an alternative approach to the whole
concept of a criterion. In that paper McDowell opposes the orthodox
interpretation of Wittgenstein's later work as featuring a notion of
criteria as intrinsically defeasible. Further, McDowell sketches a
solution to the epistemological problem which I have discussed in the
present chapter. In the first instance McDowell [1982] replaces
defeasibility with a disjunctive thesis in the philosophy of perception
to the effect that, either one perceives a mere appearance, or experience
discloses a fact in perception. If the judgement on the basis of a (mere)
appearance falls short of the fact then that judgement simply was no-t a
genuinely criterial judgement. In allowing as genuinely criterial only
judgements about acts of perception in which experience actually
discloses a fact McDowell ensures that his criteria fix reference and
that correct use on the basis of criteria is identical with the making of
true statements. However, as indicated earlier, the price to be paid is
the loss of defeasibility. McDowell, in effect, replaces defeasibility
with the claim that ascriptions of mental states are decidable
perceptual statements and therefore bivalent. It is doubtful however
whether this really solves any of the deeper problems raised by
criteria, and indeed doubtful whether McDowell's view can really stand
on its own legs at all. That is, in making mental state ascriptions
simply decidable, it could be argued that McDowell, far from addressing
the problem, merely circumvents the problem by shifting the borderlines
between the decidable and the undecidable. For Dummett, for example,
nothing is gained as regards the problem of the notion of truth relevant
to undecidable propositions. McDowell has avoided, rather than
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answered, the question. The disjunctive thesis, it is claimed, is
however of genuinely Wittgensteinean pedigree unlike that of
defeasibility. McDowell motivates the latter claim by appeal to remarks
377 and 354/5 of Wittgenstein's "Philosophical Investigations". The
upshot of remark 354, McDowell argues, is not that the criteria for rain
are satisfied even though it is in fact not raining but rather that the
criteria never were satisfied, they only appeared to be so. The same
reasoning is applied to the idea that the possibility of pretence implies
that criteria must be defeasible:
"Here is a possible alternative; in pretending one causes
it to appear that criteria for something 'internal' are
satisfied..but the criteria are not really satisfied."
(p.466)
Remark 354 is an unfortunate choice upon which to ground an
interpretation of Wittgenstein for it is far from uncontroversial. In
his "Wittgenstein's Private Language Arguments" [1986], for example,
Bernard Gert argues that the remark is both confused and mistaken in
suggesting that private sensations could function as public criteria.
But I do not accept that this is the point of 354. Rather, remark 354
suggests the more interesting thesis that sense- impressions are
contained inside language and do not provide a neutral ground or
justification for language. Remark 377 does however provide better
support for McDowell's alternative. This remark, I believe, points up
another consequence of the distinction between psychological language and
physical-object language, namely that in language-acquisition objective
language is logically prior to the language of experience. In remark 377
Wittgenstein contends that the distinction between "being red" and
"seeming red" can only be taught at all if the concept "red" has already
been understood. The objective is the 'first' language-game. Notably,
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this reverses the logical priorities of Cartesian epistemology for what
is indubitable is not, by that fact alone, foundational. The language of
experience emerges on this account as parasitic upon an objective
language-game which has logical primacy. This is a better ground for
McDowell's alternative reading of "criteria" though it cannot be a
conclusive one. Despite that fact the onus is on the supporter of
defeasible criteria to produce textual evidence of Wittgenstein's
commmitment to defeasibility; a difficult task given the scarcity of such
evidence.
Finally, McDowell [1982] is at pains to cast doubt upon the view
which compares criteria to "highest common factors" ie. features which
are present both in actual cases of criteria and in cases which only
seem criterial. It is in virtue of just these shared features that we
can take an instance of the latter as being of the former. Now, although
we are warned against this view it may have more plausibility than
McDowell allows. Further, an examination of the plausibility of that
view may cast doubt upon the viability of McDowell's position.
In the first section of his paper McDowell [1982] outlines an
alternative to the criterial position; an alternative which is labelled
"M-realism" by Crispin Wright [1980]. In order to articulate M-realism
McDowell quotes from his earlier paper "On 'The Reality Of The Past'"
[1978] as follows:
"..we should not jib at, or interpret away, the commonsense
thought that, on those occasions which are paradigmatically
suitable for training in the assertoric use of the relevant
part of a language, one can literally perceive, in another
person's facial expression or his behaviour, that he is
[for instance] in pain, and not just infer that he is in
pain from what one perceives."
(p.456)
If we take this basic account of M-realism together with the
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disjunctive thesis then we must also accept that 'paradigmatic
suitability for training" is determined by it being a fact that another
person is in pain. Otherwise, by the disjunctive thesis, the judgement
would be based on mere appearance, could not be criterial in McDowell's
[1982] sense and therefore could not be paradigmatically suitable for
training. But this implication conflicts with the commonsense idea that
one can illustrate and explain the criteria for a psychological term in
the absence of the psychological phenomenon itself. That is, it
conflicts with the intuition that it is at least unnecessary and probably
counter-productive to become sad in order to teach the meaning of
sadness,, or to be in pain to teach the meaning of the word "pain". But
once that is conceded the criteria as determinants of meaning must be
considered apart from the referent of the term whose meaning is so
determined. In other words the "highest common factor' conception (and
indeed defeasibility) come back into the picture unless we deny the very
commonsense intuition about training in the use of psychological
vocabulary.
IV CONVENTION AND CONTINGENCY
Prof. Wright's [1984] paper closes with an appeal for clarity and
precision in the form of a challenge: if ( D1 Dn ) criterially
support P when are the substitutions on D necessary and when contingent ?
Any serious theory must attempt to meet this challenge though, I
think, the terminology will not prove useful here. If 01....Dn is to
represent criteria as those situational and behavioural circumstances in
virtue of which we learn when to assert P, when to say that P, and
determine what we mean by P then the schema is best understood as
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representing a rule. In so far as that is the case the schema represents
a grammatical rather than a simply empirical fact. If this is a necessary
connexion it is necessary in that the connexion is semantic and the
relation content-fixing with respect to P, but in a sense which is not
expressible in terms of formal logical notions. In Wittgenstein's terms,
it is a necessity of our form of life that certain kinds of behaviour in
certain contexts are criterially related to pain in that it reflects a
basic fact of the human condition. This is, perhaps, not even to say that
it could not have been otherwise; but the fact that it is so represents a
universally-shared feature of human life. While alternatives might be
imaginable or conceivable this does not imply that we could ever actually
live by them. We plainly could not legislate away pain-behaviour and
enforce a new way of acting. This fact, I argue, must cast some doubt
upon the idea that the putative alternatives are completely and
coherently conceivable. If we take seriously for a moment the sceptical
doubts and worldly awkwardnesses outlined in Wright's [1984] second
objection and try to concieve the resultant world in which none of our
psychological phenomena were defined in terms of their ordinary criteria,
where the recognition of the satisfaction of pain-criteria no longer
provided a basis for the correct use of the term "pain", we will find it
a remarkably difficult feat of conception. Is it, for instance, to remain
the case that psychological terms be teachable only via criteria or not ?
Would it be that our usual psychological phenomena were replaced by
phenomena of an unfamiliar sort ? This is hardly traditional logical
necessity but it does cast doubt upon the very conceivability of the kind
of worldly awkwardness mentioned.
Any world with different connexions of this basic sort would be a
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very different world from ours indeed. It is not any more useful to
consider the schema as a convention either; for it is only a convention
in the sense that a whole language is conventional. While grammar could
be described as a convention many things which are called conventions
have no bearing at all upon grammar. There is no useful analogy here to
a congress of Physicists deciding to adopt an international symbol for
force or mass. Facts of grammar do not always admit of this kind of free
choice and blatant arbitrariness. The whole game of the avowal, assertion
and attribution of pain and the use of the criteria for that term to
explain, justify, learn and teach the appropriate performance of the acts
in question is more like an inheritance; a taught linguistic heritage to
which human beings have a basic susceptibility and markedly similar
responses. The relation between the criteria for*the term and the use
of the term is not an inductive relation but an internal, semantic and
content-fixing relation. In short, our particular criterial rules are
contingent to the extent that we could have used language in another way;
but they are necessary given the way we do speak. As stated above, it is
not obvious that we could after all alter our language-game
significantly. At least, I argue, we cannot fully conceive of what that
would be like.
In certain contexts, I argue, facts of the human condition limit
and determine the degree of change which is possible. Obviously,
neurophysiological facts about human beings, pain and pain-reactions have
a role as regards the language-game with the term "pain", and it is facts
of this type which in a sense precede our form of language (or which are
structure-independant, if I may misuse a Chomskian term), which criterial
relations exploit and reflect at the linguistic level. The very
fundamental character of these facts about our nature does clearly point
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up a constraint which, I argue, must mitigate the sceptical concern that
the changing world might ultimately undermine the nexus of criterial
connexions in important ways. Any degree of change sufficient to wholly
undermine the criteria for pain actually being a basis for the correct
use of the term "pain", if that possibility is a coherent one at all,
would clearly require very fundamental alterations in the physiological
fabric of human life and would be tantamount to a serious change in the
nature of the human condition. The existence of a working logic of
criteria in everyday explanation and the success of criterial inference
testifies to the unlikeliness of change to the hyperbolic extent imagined
by the sceptic. If criteria are unreliable how is learning and teaching
via examples even possible ? Again, these facts testify to stable
connections between language and the world.
The schema also represents a pattern of explanation. The sceptic is
correct in a sense when he asserts that it is possible that -P. But to
fail to see that when D1 Dn obtain, "P" is appropriate is to fail to
see that 01...On fix what "P" means. It is just to fail to understand P. At
the meta-level the sceptic argues that it is always possible that -P.
Given grounds the sceptic can doubt any particular assertion, but nothing
could constitute a ground for doubting the mode of explanation. What
could count as a falsification of recognition of the satisfaction of pain-
criteria being the basis of correct use of the term "pain" ? Could
everyone always be pretending ? To pretend to be in pain one must first
learn what it is to be in pain, that is the semantic priority. There also
exist criteria for pretending and while pretence certainly defeats the
assertion of pain it never undermines the criterial connexion, rather it
exploits is, or gets off on the back of the criterial connexion.
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PRETENDING to be in pain is nonetheless pretending to be in PAIN. To
refuse to accept criteria as explanations of correct use is to reject a
standard model of explanation in the language we use. What is the
alternative model of explanation which the sceptic has ? At least the
onus is again on the sceptic, for by rejecting the rules he is refusing
to play the game.
Although to some extent we may inhabit a world of Heraclitean flux
we can talk about rivers and know what feet are. If the world changed or
was in any danger of changing so much that criterial connexions could no
longer be successfully maintained, if everyone in the dentist's was
always and only missing games, then I think we might well not know what
to say regardless of the theory we held. I have tried to show that what
the sceptic invites us to imagine and to worry about, the coming to be of
alternatives, may not even be coherently conceivable. The natural ebb and
flow in language is I think in no danger of drowning us. Finally, perhaps
the best way to characterise the schema is as a reminder of the rules of
the game, a perspicuous representation, or in the dialogical sense a
point of order. This is where justification endswhich, I argue, is an
appropriately Wittgensteinean response to a paper which in many ways




In the following chapter I attempt to represent the salient features
of criterial reasoning formally. The formal system presented is intended
as a clarification of the account developed in preceding chapters. The
possibility of formalization will underpin the view that the notion of a
criterion is not an incoherent one. Further, if the notion of a
criterion can be made sense of, then, to some extent, the traditional
views which oppose it will be undercut. Consistency itself is not proved
here, although I hope to have transferred the burden of proof to the
sceptic. The strategy itself is therefore one which coheres with the
conception of criteria outlined in earlier chapters; especially chapter
six.
I THE DIALOGUE SYSTEM
Criterial reasoning is represented within a context in a formal
dialogue system. The system is designed to be a formal analogue of actual
language-use so as to emphasise the salient features of the logic of
criteria against a realistic background, which will permit the fullest
examination of the use speakers make of criteria. A number of speakers
are featured, two in the simplest case. The speakers are embedded in a
context composed of behavioural and situational circumstances, which they
can report to one another and exploit as evidence and as premises in
arguments. In the type of theory to be considered criteria are taken to
be those situational and behavioural circumstances of a linguistic act
which make appropriate the performance of that act.
The motivation for the claim that descriptions of the satisfaction
of criteria for P do not entail that P resides in the defeasible
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character of assertions made on that basis. Criterial assertions must be
defeasible if it is to be possible to account for acting, pretence,
deceit and the like. Where Q, R and S are criteria relative to P it will
always be possible that while Q, R and S hold, P does not. The criterial
relation must therefore be a non-deductive relation distinct from
entailment. Clearly, this defining characteristic of the criterial
relation must be represented in any adequate formalization. In the
present case an attempt to represent that feature is made by
incorporating defeaters into a context and making them available to
speakers. Here it is vital to note one advantage which flows from the
dialogical framework and the notion of a context, which was not available
on the Baker/Klein model: while it may not be possible to say in advance
of a given context which defeaters might hold, that does not imply that
in any given context the list of defeaters is always infinite, or that
the question of whether or not a defeater holds is not decidable. I have
argued above that the notion of 'defeasible knowledge" is one which
should be replaced by that of a mechanism effecting the transfer of the
burden of proof from the criterialist to the sceptic as the sceptic
challenges a criterially-warranted assertion. The onus on the sceptic is
to demonstrate in which respect this situation differs from the norm,
that is, from those "paradigmatically suitable" cases on the basis of
which his understanding of the assertion was given. I have also urged
that the distinction between the imaginability of the negation of P and
the existence of a concrete ground to doubt that P must be accepted on
pain of simply rejecting the concept of negation. These two features at
least must be captured in the dialogic.
The purpose of the dialogue is to correctly subsume the evidence
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under a concept. By using the evidence and the criterial relations
speakers conjecture, reason, falsify and seek to correctly interpret
their environment. The range of linguistic acts available to speakers is
limited to five: assertion, doubt, challenge, withdrawal and exhibition
of evidence. Each speaker has a commitment store, initially a tabula
rasa. The following sets are accessible to speakers:
1. A completely specified set ip of sentences. In purely criterial
contexts these will all be criterially-based, ie."X is in pain", "X is
pretending". Asserted sentences of this form are, of course, understood
to be defeasible, dependent upon the assignment of truth- values to the
members of 2 below. That is, it is intended that the truth-values of
these sentences be computable on the basis of assignments of truth-values
in 2 below.
2. A completely specified set 4i of sentences intuitively understood
to be criteria and defeaters. That is, these sentences make explicit the
defeaters for the relevant criterial assertions in 1 .
In general, the union of <p and 4> defines the context in which the
speakers are taken to be embedded. The formal names of key terms and acts
are as follows:
Speaker = anything which asserts, challenges, doubts etc. in a dialogue
with appropriate commitment effects.
Context = the union of the contents of ip and i|).
A -assertion operator, any formula constructed from statement




E -exhibition operator; technically, this is a move rather than an
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act; a point to which I return below.
II RULES AND ACTS
The dialogue is composed of a language L, understood as the union of
the contents of tp and i|), and a set of rules. An atomic sentence in L is a
sentence letter from the appropriate set of sentences. Complex sentences
are formed from atomic sentences by combination with connectives.
For any point in a dialogue I give the general description:
(n) i : Op. (Sentence)
ie. Number of move (consecutive). Speaker (alternating). Operator.
Sentence.
Commitment is a function from the natural numbers and speakers to
the power set of sentences: C : N x (A,B) -> P (L). Individual commitment
at the nth move is a subset of the set of wff's of L, ie. a set of
sentences. C (n,i) is a subset of the set of wff's of L.
The rules for speech acts are as follows:
Assertion."A".
1 (Vn) (Vi) If (n) i A(S) then S E {L>.
This particular rule, that speakers can only assert sentences in the
language, is not peculiar to assertion but holds for every operator. For
that reason I omit to repeat it in each case, assuming that it is
implicit in the characterisation of each operator. This allows
concentration on the commitment effects pertaining to the use of each
operator.
2 If (n) i : A(S) then (Vi) C(n.i) = C(n-1,i) U {S}.
Acts are performed not asserted by speakers in a dialogue. Assertion
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applies to sentences. In order to ensure that the dialogue will get off
the ground I take assertion to commit all asserted statements to the
commitment-stores of each speaker. These commitments can be removed by
the speaker who has not himself asserted it, as I will make clear, but,
in the first instance we assume everyone to be committed, pending a
claim to the contrary. I do not believe that this is the only way to
construe the commitment effects of assertion but it does force speakers
to act against that commitment if they do not accept it and therefore
facilitates an active dialogue and, hopefully, minimises the possibility
of dialogues in which speakers assert sentences which just have no
bearing on the commitments or acts of their opponents. Rule 2 ensures a
certain common focus of argument and forces response on pain of the
asserter's sentence being accepted by both, in the sense that both will
actually be committed to that sentence. Any well-formed sentence may be
asserted. Any act may follow an assertion.
Implied Commitment: if an assertion is made and followed by a
challenge that must be followed in turn by an assertion. The second
assertion is then understood to have been given as a reason for the
first ie.
(1) A : A(X)
(2) 8 : ?(X)
(3) A : A(Y)
Three step arguments of this form will result in the following
pattern of commitment effects:
C(1,A) = {X}, C(1,B) = {X}
C(2.A ) = {X}, C ( 2,B) = {X}
C (3 . A) = {X, Y, Y 4 X}, C (3 , B ) = {X, Y, Y 4 X}
Intuitively, 8 has asked at (2) why A thinks that X is the case. A
replies that Y, giving Y as his reason for thinking that X. Other rules
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allow B to attempt to demonstrate the poverty of Y as a reason for X if
he does not wish to accept A's argument. As most of the work done by
criteria is in terms of their capacity to warrant an assertion, to
justify or to provide a reason to assert, it is vital to give speakers
mechanisms to make explicit the grounds of their opponent's assertions.
Of course, we do guess, conjecture and make unwarranted assertions in
ordinary discourse. It would be absurd to deny that. It would, however,
be equally absurd to assert that we never have reasons for assertion. As
the dialogic is to represent the sub class of grounds for assertion
which are criterial in character it seems reasonable to endorse some
such mechanism. Though there might well be a dialogic of Popperian
conjecture that is not the primary purpose of my own dialogic. Further
to the formal argument in three steps above however it is important to
note that just "if Y then X' will not do because A is not just saying 'if
Y then X' but 'X is the case because Y is actually the case". This
feature of the formal dialogue points up the reason-based nature of
assertion which, I have argued above, is integral to the logic of
criterion. In the case outlined 'Y -> X' is an implied commitment. So,.
Ass. A(T) after B?(S) adds T -> S to the commitment-stores of each
speaker.
Implied commitments will also be generated when an assertion is
given in response to a challenge as a reason for doubting a prior
assertion ie.
(1) A : A(X)
(2) B : D(X)
(3) A : ?(0(X))
(4) B : A(Y)
The pattern of commitment effects generated by the four step
argument will be as follows:
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C(1 . A) = {X} ,
C(2,A) = {X},
C(3 , A ) = {X},
C( 1 . B ) = (X>
C(2,B) = the empty set
C(3,8 ) = the empty set
C ( 4 . B ) = {Y, Y -> -X}C(4.A) = {X, Y, Y 4 -X},
Here speaker's commitments are not identical because the act of
doubting an assertion removes the doubter's commitment to what is
doubted. This, then, is one method whereby a speaker can himself
withdraw his commitment from a sentence which he has not actually
asserted, should he want to. Thus the rule (2) of assertion which
commits everyone to an assertion can be seen to be only temporary and by
no means permanently binding in its effects. As stated, it does however
force the speaker to act in a way relevant to that commitment and thus
to engage in argument. In the case of the four step formal argument
'
Y 4 -X' is an implied commitment.
1 If WIS) then (3t)(S = Alt)) or IS = 0(t)).
2 If (Vn)IBi)((n),i Alt)) or IVn)(3i)I(n),i DIt)) and If (n+1)
W (Alt)) or W 1011)) then (Vi) t is not a member of C(n+1,i).
Withdrawal applies only to assertions and doubts. S may be withdrawn
only if S occurs earlier in the dialogue and has not already been
withdrawn. Intuitively, it makes no sense to withdraw commitment to
something which you were not actually commited to in the first place.
Further, challenges can only be met, they cannot be withdrawn. In
addition, it ought, I think, to be possible to argue someone out of a
position of doubt, something along these lines has characteristically
been claimed on behalf of criteria in various versions of varying
strengths and it therefore seems legitimate to include a mechanism which
Withdrawal. "W".
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at least allows for that possibility. The act of withdrawal removes only
the act withdrawn from the commitment-store of the speaker of the act,
ie. it does not automatically remove implied commitments featuring the
subject of the withdrawn act as antecedent. This prevents the automatic
withdrawal of commitments which might have got in as implied commitments
but which might also be commitments for some other reason. I leave
implied commitments featuring withdrawns as antecedents for possible
later challenges. The point of withdrawal is reflexive, ie. it allows a
speaker to remove his commitment to one of his own acts.
Doubt. "D".
1 (Vn)(Vi) If ((n),i D(S) then (3t)(t E L and S = A(t)).
This states the condition of well-formedness for expressions
involving the doubt operator. The commitment effect is basically one of
deletion from the doubter's own store and is formally stated as
follows:
2 (Vn)(Vi) If ((n) ,i D(A(t)) then t is not a member of C(n+1,i).
Doubt applies only to sentences in assertions and implied
commitments. The only way a doubt can be opened is after an assertion.
The primary role of doubt is in the defence of claims and in strategies
to that end. A speaker can doubt t only if some speaker is commited to
t. The act of doubting an assertion removes the doubter's commitment only
to that which is doubted. I do not allow doubt to also remove commitment
to conditionals featuring t as antecedent. It is surely reasonable to
accept a conditional while denying that its antecedent is actually the
case. Classically, of course, -P |- P -> Q.
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Challenge.
1 (VnMVi) If (n) i : ?(S) then (3t)(S = (A(t)) or S = (D(t)).
2 (VnMVi) If (n) i : ?(S) then C(n,i) = C (n-1 . i) .
Without Parameters:
1 Assertions: (Vn)(Vi) If (n) i : ?(S) Then (n+1) i either:W(S) or:A(S").
2 Ooubts: (VnMVi) If (n) i : ?(D(S ) ) Then (n+1) i either:W(D(S)) or:A(S').
With Parameters:
1 (Vn)(Vi) If (n) i : ?(A(S))/ (Sk Sn) then (Vi) C(n , i) = C(n-1 . i ).
2 (Vn ) (Vi) If (n) i : ?(D(S))/ (Sk Sn) then (Vi) C(n,i) = C(n-1 . i ) .
In general, challenge applies to assertion, doubt and implied
commitment and has no effect upon either speaker's commitment-store.
Intuitively, a challenge does not actually commit one to asserting or
denying anything, especially given its use as a basic "why (?)"-type
question. Something may be challenged only if some speaker is commited to
what is being challenged. Again, it seems counterintuitive to allow
speakers to ask for a reason for asserting something which no one has
actually asserted.
Challenges are of two types: with parameters and without parameters.
Without parameters a challenged doubt must be followed either by a ground
for that doubt, in the form of an assertion, or by withdrawal of that
doubt if it cannot be grounded. This is a vital feature of the dialogue
in so far as it contributes to reflecting in the dialogue my account of
the logic of criteria as involving a distinction between the
imaginability of the negation of P and the existence of a ground to doubt
that P. Clearly, if in a given discourse someone will not assert that P
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just because of the imaginability of the negation of P he will fail to
assert under just those circumstances which provided the basis of his
education in the use of the word. In other words, to doubt where one
cannot ground one's doubt in anything in the context is not itself a new
strategy in the game, rather it is simply a refusal to play the game at
all. The point of a criterion as a basis for warranted assertion is that
if the criterion is satisfied then there exists a (defeasible) ground to
make that criterial assertion. If, in these circumstances, one still does
not want to so assert then unless one is simply rejecting one's training
in the use of the assertion one must have some account of how this
situation differs from those "paradigmatically suitable" cases which
formed the basis of one's original training. The logical advantage of a
criterion against the sceptic consists in this mechanism for transferring
the burden of proof back to the sceptic. Therefore this feature, the
dialectical transfer of the burden of proof, must have a dialogical
counterpart. Again, challenge without parameters to an assertion must be
followed either by an assertion as ground or by withdrawal of the
challenged assertion.
I have given above the two general forms of challenge with
parameters. In each case the challenge alleges a conditional ie.1 "I
challenge your commitment to S given your commitments to Sk..Sn". Here
the conditional Sk...Sn -> -S is implied by the act. 2 "I challenge your
doubt that S given your commitments to Sk...Sn". Here Sk...Sn -) S is
implied by the act. These conditionals need not be featured in the
challenger's commitment-store for, as far as possible, merely challenging
leaves commitments unaffected. In general, a speaker may challenge with
parmeters only if the assertion or doubt is an act of the hearer AND the
parameters and implied conditional are all commitments of the hearer.
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Therefore, challenge with parameters is an appeal to inconsistent
commitments.
I hope to offer some characterisation of the differences between
criterial and non-criterial conditionals by imposing restrictions on the
permissible responses to a challenge made with reference to parameters.
That is to say, I will contrast conditionals which reflect criterial
relations with what I shall call 'inductively-based" conditionals. These
non-criterial conditionals are not, strictly speaking, inductive
generalisations or law-like statements traditionally associated, for
better or worse, with scientific reasoning. Rather, I have in mind that
class of evidence-based assertions which are not properly criterial
assertions. For instance, 'the cockerel crowed therefore it must be
dawn'. The conclusion is plainly based on evidence and yet that evidence
is equally plainly not criterial evidence. The distinction I make is,
intuitively, that while in certain cases we are bound to accept certain
criterial assertions and cannot reasonably doubt those assertions, we are
not so compelled to accept the conclusions of evidence based arguments of
the type I have outlined. The -distinction must however be manifest in the
use of each type of assertion and must therefore flow from the rules of
the game. In the first place then, as regards my 'inductively-based'
assertions responses to a challenge with parameters must be either, 1
Withdraw the act challenged, 2 Ooubt that Sk...Sn obtain or 3 Ooubt the
implied conditional ie. argue that Sk...Sn may hold but S does not. If a
doubt of the form 2 or 3 cannot be grounded then 1 Withdrawal of the act
must follow. The criterial version of the rule differs only in the third
case. Where we are not compelled by sheer logic, or anything else, to
accept the inductively-based conclusion that "it must be dawn" we are
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entitled to doubt the conditional. But this cannot be the case as regards
criteria. It is not the case that one doubts that the criterial relation
holds. For to refuse to accept those relations is just to reject the
language. Even in cases of pretence the pretending does not undermine the
criterial relation, rather it exploits it. Therefore, I do not allow
speakers to doubt conditionals reflecting criterial conditionals. The
proper response will be to exhibit a defeater for the assertion made in
the present context. Thus the first two options are identical but in the
third the inductive argument may be doubted such that one cannot be
compelled to accept it, while in the criterial case, that X and Y are
criterial relative to Z, cannot be doubted, even though it might be
defeated in any context.
For challenge with parameters to assertions I give the following
formal rule:
1 (Vn)(Vi) If (n) i : ?(A(S) ) / (Sk...Sn) then (n+1) i either : D(Sk) or :
D ( Sk. .Sn) ■) -S or : W(A(S) ) .
Because, on my account, there are no negative criteria this use of
challenge with parameters will be common to both cases. Further, I note
that substituting -S for S and S for Sk....Sn the implied conditional
would be S -> --S. There is nothing to prevent logical rules occuring as
implied conditionals in this way and even entailments might be so
included. Here it should be quite possible for a challenge with
parameters to rest upon appeal to a logical proof of the conclusion from
the parameters as premises. If there were no proof or the proof could be
shown to be defective then it might be stipulated that the challenge be
ineffective and inconsequential. I discuss the issue of the introduction
of logic to the dialogue system in more detail below but it can already
be seen that there is nothing to prevent logical rules occurring as
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implied conditionals in this way. If the implied conditional was taken to
be an entailment its status could be reflected in the fact that as
entailment is not a defeasible relation there will never be a defeater
available for it. Hence, doubt of an entailment could never be grounded
just because nothing would be allowed to count as a defeater of it.
For challenge with parameters to doubts I give the following rule;
2 (Vnl(Vi) If (n) i : ?(D(S))/ (Sk...Sn) Then (n+1) i either : D(Sk) or :
D( (Sk. . .Sn) -> S) or : W(D(S)) .
Obviously, it is this version of the rule which governs the
inductively-based arguments I referred to earlier. To get the criterial
version I substitute an exhibition option for the second doubt option.
The rest remains unchanged. Again, logical rules may feature as implied
conditionals. While there could not be a defeasible instance of an
entailment every instance of a criterial logical rule will be defeasible.
That is just to say that while the former is not a defeasible relation
the latter is. However, it may be the case in a given context that a
criterial inference is actually undefeated in the sense that there is no
available ground among the set of evidences with which to make good a
doubt. 8ut the conclusion of that inference is still not entailed for
that is to say that nothing could defeat it while here the strongest
claim made is only that in this case it is actually undefeated. Certainly
it is defeasible and defeaters of it exist, but if none are present in a
specified context then it is undefeated in that context. In saying that a
relation is defeasible I am not contending that it is therefore
invariably defeated. Even if critics might hope that were the case.
Exhibition."E"
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The basic function of E is as a mechanism for deleting commitments
contradictory to any exhibited T, ie. if T can be exhibited then -T is
automatically deleted from commitment-stores. Only members of the set of
criteria and defeaters may be exhibited.
1 (Vn)(Vi) If (n) i : E (T) then T E t|).
2 (Vn) (Vi) If (n) i : E (T) then (VnMVi) -T is not a member of C(n+1,i).
Exhibition is always of members of the set of descriptions of
criteria and defeaters to which speakers are taken to be mutually agreed.
As a precondition of the dialogue speakers agree in the use of this
language, although it is by no means any sort of private language.
8asically, exhibition highlights a contradiction among the commitments of
any speaker commited to -T and automatically removes -T, replacing it
with T. Any speaker in the position of possessing contradictory
commitments, in effect, loses the dialogue. The act of exhibiting is
tantamount to a reminder of the rules of the game. In this it is not
dissimilar to that subset of the set of procedural rules which Hamblin
calls: 'points of order'. As such "E" cannot be doubted or challenged.
That is, I take it that both speakers are speaking the same language and
that they will at least agree to descriptions of obvious facts. It is
hoped that rule E, which presupposes mutual agreement to the evidence,
will overcome the problem of the defeater which is not cited. That is, it
may seem that speakers could conclude in favour of a criterial assertion
through simply failing to cite a relevant defeater present in that
context. However, I take all the evidence to be available to speakers and
take speakers to agree on what that evidence is together with the rules
for its exploitation. Part of the function of rule E is to ensure that
speakers can enforce that implicit agreement by making available to
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speakers the machinery to turn presupposed mutual agreements into
explicit commitments.
Two final distinctions must be made as regards criteria within the
dialogue system. Firstly, criteria will be distinguished from entailments
in that while no entailed consequent will be withdrawable at any point
in any dialogue it will always be possible to defeat a criterially
grounded assertion thus forcing withdrwal of that assertion. Secondly,
while both proper inductive generalisations or law-like assertions and
criterially grounded assertions can be withdrawn the former will be
falsified on production of a counter-instance while a defeater leaves
the status of the criterial rule untouched. Thus in the former case we
deny the truth of the assertion while in the latter the claim is only
withdrawn. Negations of criterial assertions will follow not merely from
the obtaining of a defeater but from the criterial assertion of a
contrary, where the contrary is established via conceptual
interconnections. That is, read purely criterially, A -> -B would not be a
wff in the object-language; though it might be treated as such in the
meta-language where criterial contraries might be defined and expressed
in such a manner (see above, Ch. 6, some remarks on negation following
Gabbay's formal representation of non-monotonicity).
These remarks can do no more than sketch a fully-fledged dialogic
and the production of any such comprehensive, interacting network of rule-
governed systems encapsulating criteria, entailment and induction remains
outwith the bounds of this thesis, though there seems no reason why such
a project should not be realisable. However, in any dialogical system the
admissible moves in the dialogic must define the relations involved.
Therefore, if the consequent is not withdrawable at all the relation
expressed is that of entailment. If the consequent can only be withdrawn
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then the relation is criterial. Finally, where the consequent can be
denied and its negation asserted the relation is inductive. For a given
conditional then, say, A -> B, if a further piece of evidence is cited
such that both A can be denied and A -> B can be denied then either the
conditional is a material implication or a generalized material
implication. I propose representing properly inductive law-like
conditionals as generalized material implications ie. (VxMAx -> Bx). The
distinctive feature of the criterial case would be that the conditional,
if criterial, could not be denied.
Of course, this is not the only way in which formal logic and
inductive inference can be represented in the dialogue. As opposed to
this rather integrated conception just outlined it might be possible to
demarcate distinct "language-games", as it were, of criterial
investigation, of Formal Logic etc. That is, it might be rewarding to see
the criterial dialogue as a game which is separate from but interacts
with the game of formal logic. To this end it seems natural to introduce
the turnstile into the formal language as an elementary predicate sign
in the spirit of Curry. To argue that logically, A is entailed by B,
that A is a theorem or a truth of logic would all become possible
options for speakers. Debate of the validity of suggested truths of
logic could be carried out according to separate rules defining the
distinct activity of Formal Logic. There might be a number of response
options to the assertion of a logical truth. For example, the hearer
might justifiably demand a proof of the theorem ie. he might challenge
the status of the truth within the system in which it is alleged to be a
theorem. Alternately, the hearer might challenge the idea that the
statement in the formal dialogue is actually of the form of that
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theorem. Thirdly, the hearer might challenge from the viewpoint that
being a theorem in a formal system has anything to do with what is the
case as regards the formal dialogue. Simple logical theorems might be
made available to speakers in the following way, as is illustrated
for P •» P:
(1) A: (A ( P ) ) Rule of Assertion
(2) B: ? (A ( P ) ) ? -parameters
(3) A: ( A ( P ) ) Rule of Assertion
(A) B: ? (P -> P) ? -parameters
(5) A: h P P f- introduction
Commitment-effects would be as follows:
C (1 .A) = {P> . C (1 , B ) = {P}
C ( 2 , A) = {P}. C ( 2 „ 8 ) = {P}
C ( 3 , A) = {P, P->P>, C ( 3 . B ) = {P, P->P>
C ( 4 , A ) = {P. P->P}, C ( 4 , B ) = {P. P->P}
C ( 5 , A ) = {P. P-*P>. C ( 5 , B ) = {P. P">P}
The debate might be concluded according to the rules perhaps by
invoking a schemata of which A has cited an instance.
It could be argued however that this particular theorem, f- P -> P,
far from illustrating the possibility of harmonious co-existence and
interaction between dialogic and classical formal logic in fact
illustrates a fundamental conflict. Jim Mackenzie, for example, in his
"No Logic Before Friday" [1985] maintains that, in the context of
dialogue, P, so P, is fallacious:
"All instances of P, so P are valid in any standard system
of logical inference; but anybody who used the premiss of
an argument of this form as a ground for its conclusion
would obviously fail to argue successfully. A valid
argument form every instance of which is intuitively
fallacious is an anomaly for logic. It is only when
logic is restored to its dialogical context, and seen
to be wider than merely the theory of inference, that
the fallacy can be understood as a .. part of a theory of
the nature of argument."
From a dialogical viewpoint the prohibition against 'P, so P" is an
obvious condition of non-circularity and uninformativeness preventing
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vicious regresses. In general, Mackenzie's [1985] argument is that:
"For the logician..consideration of dialogue cannot be
merely a specialised topic within the discipline like
the study of phobias in psychology. Rather the study of
dialogue should be the context within which we consider
any logical question."
But that is not the only alternative. If formal logic is made
available to speakers within a dialogue as a separate though interacting
activity and the challenge options are widened sufficiently to include
challenges about lack of relevance or inappropriateness, as I have been
suggesting, then we might move from the strong, revisionary stance of
Mackenzie [1985] to the idea of dialogic as a forum for logic as
'normative science'; in F.P. Ramsey's famous phrase [P.I., 81]. That is,
by allowing interaction between speaker's ordinary practices of, say,
criterial reasoning and their intuitions which provide relevant data (the
stuff of science) and the normative rules of formal logic prescribing the
ways in which speakers ought to reason.
Ill DOUBT AND GROUNDS: TWO CASES
The rules governing speech acts outlined above are intended to
exemplify the key feature of criterial theory that ungrounded doubt is
always inconsequential. The upshot of these constraints is that the onus
is always with the sceptic to ground his doubt. This ready transfer of
the burden of proof is itself a vital feature of criterial theory ( the
vital feature as regards scepticism, above Chapter 6) and is further
facilitated by the availability of challenge without parameters which
also demands grounding or retraction. The rules of the dialogue naturally
force agreement only after every opportunity to ground the doubt has been
made available. If the doubt cannot be grounded the inference must go
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through on pain of irrationality ie. on pain of consciously possessing
incoherent commitments. Failure to accept the inference then amounts to
rejecting the rules of the game. Again this is reflective of the type of
criterial theory for which I have been arguing. There are therefore at
least two cases here which merit closer attention: that in which doubt
cannot be grounded and that in which it can, and is, successfully
grounded. Below I present an example of a dialogue in which doubt is not
grounded. The section following that examines a case in which doubt has
been grounded.
In the case below it is assumed that in fact there is no piece of
evidence which could ground a doubt. This is for purposes of rule-















The pattern of commitment effects generated so far will be as follows:
C(1.A) = {P} C(1,B) = {P}
C(2 , A ) = {P} C(2.B) = {P}
C( 3 , A) = {P , Q, <HP} C( 3 . B ) = {P , Q, Q->P}
C ( 4 , A ) = {P . Q, Q->P} C ( 4 , B ) = {Q, Q-*P}
At step 4 B doubts P, which he has already challenged at 2, and the
Rule of Doubt removes B's commitment to P. The reflexive role of doubt as
regards commitment effects is therefore clearly illustrated. A's response
is now to challenge B's doubt, thus transferring the burden of proof to
B, the sceptic.
(5) A : ? ( D ( P ) ) / Q , Q -> P Rule Of ?+parameters
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C ( 5 . A ) = {P, Q, GHP} C ( 5 , B ) = {Q, GHP}
Although both sets of commitments are unaffected by A's challenge 8
now has only three options, by ?+parameters B must either:
(6) B : W(0(P)) Rule Of Withdrawal
That is, B withdraws his doubt that P and the dialogue terminates in
agreement to the conclusion of the criterial inference, P, with the
following coherent (rational) commitments,
C ( 6 , A) = {P, Q, (HP} C ( 6 . B ) = {P, Q, GHP}
or,
(6') B : D(Q) Rule of Doubt
(7") A : ?(0(Q)) Rule of ?-parameters
(8*) B : W(D(Q) ) Rule of Withdrawal
(9') A : ? ( D ( P) ) / Q , Q -> P ? + parameters
(10')B : W(D(P)) Rule of Withdrawal
The alternative strategy above generates the following commitments,
C { 6 ' , A ) = {P . Q, GHP} C ( 6 ' , B ) = {CHP}
C ( 7 ' , A ) = { P , Q, GHP} C ( 7 ' . B ) = {(HP}
C ( 8 ' , A ) = { P , Q, (HP} C ( 8 ' , B ) = {Q . (HP}
C ( 9 ' , A ) = { P , Q, (HP} C ( 9 ' , B ) = {Q, (HP}
C(10',A) = {P, Q, (HP} C(10',B) = {P, Q. (HP}
In other words, although 8 doubts Q, A again challenges, B can offer
no ground for the doubt and is forced to retract it. Consequently, A
reiterates his original challenge and the dialogue again terminates in
agreement to the conclusion of the criterial inference, P, with coherent
(rational) commitments. Given that the context is a purely criterial one
the last option open to B is to exhibit a defeater. First, B must exhibit
a piece of evidence to which A will reiterate his challenge by
parameters to establish the relevance of that evidence. If it is a piece
of defeating evidence it will feature in an override rule. If B cannot
produce such a rule he must withdraw his original doubt. We have assumed
that there is no such defeater and so B's strategy is a bluff which runs
as follows,
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(6") B : E(T)
(7" ) A : ? ( D ( P ) ) / Q . Q -> P




This strategy generates the commitment pattern below,
C ( 6" , A) = {P, Q, (HP, T}
C (7" , A) = {P , Q, GHP, T }
C ( 8" , A) = {P . Q, (HP , T}
C ( 6" , B ) = {Q. (HP, T}
C (7" , B ) = {Q, (HP , T}
C ( 8" , B ) = {P, Q, (HP, T}
Again, 8 cannot ground his doubt in the face of A's challenge, again
A restates his earlier challenge forcing B's agreement until the dialogue
terminates in agreement to the conclusion of the criterial inference, P,
with coherent (rational) commitments.
As the case above makes clear the dialogue is structurally a tree
with three branches from node (5). In the case above each branch of the
tree terminates in agreement and coherent commitments because 8 has
failed in every attempt to prevent the inference going through by
grounding a doubt of the inference, its antecedent or its consequent
which, finally, he is forced to accept. It is worth emphasising here that
once the sceptic has doubted an assertion the onus becomes his to
demonstrate the ground for that doubt. This feature of the dialogue is
intented to represent the transfer of the onus of proof in the case of
criterially-based assertions.
The dialogue below illustrates a standard method for successfully
grounding doubt:
Suppose C(E -> P) and T // E -> P. That is, suppose that E provides a
criterial basis for the assertion that P and that T is a named defeater




(1) A : A(P)
(2) B : ?(P)
(3) A : E(E)





(5) A : ? ( D ( P) ) / E , E -» P
The five step argument produces the following commitments,
C(1 . A) = {P},
C(2.A) = tP},
C(1 . B ) = {P}
C ( 2 , 8j = {P}
C (3 , B) = {P. E, E ■) P)
C ( 4 , B ) = { E . E -> P}
C(5 . B ) = f E, E 4 P}
C ( 3 , A ) = { P . E. E -> P},
C ( 4 . A) = {P, E , E P},
C ( 5 , A ) = { P . E, E -> P},
In essence, A has backed up his claim that P by pointing to some
piece of evidence. B cannot doubt or challenge the evidence just because
they are taken to be agreed, at least, to what the evidence is.
Therefore, B doubts that P and is subsequently challenged by parameters.
B's options are now limited by the responses available from a challenge
by parameters. That is, ('6") B: D (E1) by Rule Of Doubt is not a
permissible move. 8 cannot doubt or challenge exhibition of evidence to
which he agrees. Further, we have presupposed that the present context is
purely criterial, or that only the criterial aspect is of relevance.
Therefore, the criterial version of challenge by parameters is in force
here. Hence, B cannot doubt A's conditional. That is, 8 cannot doubt a
criterial relation; he can only exhibit a defeater in a context. In other
words, he cannot deny a criterial relation he can only say 'look, it is
defeated in this context'. It looks as if B must now agree with A, or try
another option by ?+par's. So far 8 has failed to ground his doubt. It is
quite possible therefore that this dialogue terminates in agreement. That
is, at node (6 ) ,
(6) B : W(D(P ) ) Rule of Withdrawal
The act of withdrawal would make B's commitments coherent and secure
his agreement with A. Doubt would fail to be grounded and the dialogue
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would terminate in agreement at node (7). However, B does have a decisive
alternative strategy,
(6") B : E(T) Rule of Exhibition
(7") A : ?(D)(P))/E, E 4 P ?+parameters
(8') B : E(T//E -> P) Rule of Exhibition
In response to A's challenge by parameters B exhibits another piece
of evidence which is intended to counter one of A's parameters. A repeats
his challenge to determine which parameter B has countered. Exhibition
of a defeater of the criterially-based assertion that P, made by A,
grounds the doubt alleged by B. The rule of exhibition will replace
anything contrary to it in each commitment store, and will therefore
override the criterial rule cited by A", showing that the criterial
assertion is in fact defeated in this context. The commitment effects are
as follows,
C(6',A) = {P, E, E 4 P}, C(6',B) = {E. E 4 P}
C ( 7 ' , A) = {P, E, E 4 P}, C(7' ,B) = {E. E 4 P}
C ( 8 ' , A) = {E. T, T//E1 4 P}, C(8' ,B) = {E, T, T//E 4 P}
In the above example doubt is readily and quickly grounded. But this
is only for purposes of illustration. In fact dialogues terminate when
no legitimate move is left open to speakers and chains of more complex
reasonings are perfectly permissible, though these are, in the case of
criteria, ultimately terminable in unchallengeable evidence-reports or
exhibitions. Below I give an example of a longer terminable chain in a
context which is assumed to be purely criterial ie. where each
constructed conditional is supposedley criterial
(1)A : A(P) Rule of Assertion
(2)B : ?(P) ?-parameters
( 3)A : A(Q) Rule of Assertion
(4)B : ?(Q) ?-parameters
{5)A : A(R) Rule of Assertion
( 6)B : ?(R) ?-parameters
(7)A : A(S) Rule of Assertion
( 8)B : D(P) Rule of Doubt
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( 1 3 ) A
? ( 0 ( P ) ) / Q , Q -> P
0 (Q)








The pattern of corresponding commitment effects runs as
follows;
C (1 . A) = {P}, C (1 , B) = {P}
C ( 2 , A ) = {P>, C ( 2 , 8 ) = {P}
C ( 3 , A ) = { P , Q , Q->P } , C ( 3 , B ) = {P , Q , Q->P}
C ( 4 . A ) = { P , Q , Q->P} , C ( 4 , B ) = {P,Q,Q->P}
C ( 5 , A) = { P , Q , R , R->Q , Q-)P } , C ( 5 . B ) = { P , Q , R , R->Q , Q-)P}
C ( 6 . A) = { P , Q , R , R->Q , Q->P } , C ( 6 . B ) = { P , Q , R , R->Q , Q-)P }
C ( 7 , A) = { P , Q , R , S , S )R , R->Q , Q-)P } , C ( 7 , B ) = {P,Q,R,S,S->R,R->Q,Q->P}
C ( 8 , A ) = {P,Q,R,S,S->R,R->Q,Q->P}, C ( 8 , B ) = {Q,R,S,S->R,R->Q,Q^P}
C ( 9 , A) = {P, Q, R, S , S->R , R4Q, Q->P} , C ( 9 , B ) = {Q,R,S,S-*R,R-»Q,Q->P}
C(10,A) = {P,Q,R,S,S-»R,R->Q,Q->P}, C (1 0 , B ) = { R , S , S")R , R-)Q , Q")P }
C ( 11 . A) = {P,Q,R,S,S->R,R->Q,Q->P}, C (11 , B ) = { R , S , S-)R , R-)Q , Q-)P}
C(12.A) = {P,Q,R,S,S->R,R->Q,Q->P}, C (1 2 , B ) = { S , S-^R , R")Q , Q^P }
C(13,A) = {P,Q,R,S,S->R,R->Q,Q->P}, C(13,B) = { S , S-)R , R->Q , Q-^P }
In the section of dialogue so far examined it is clear that as B
stops challenging and starts doubting A's assertions the burden of proof
moves from A to B: as would be expected in any reasonable model of the
theory of criteria. The reflexive role of the use of the doubt operator
is clearly visible in the eliminating effects on commitments which each
use of the rule has for the user, namely B, at each point of use,
namely, nodes 8, 10 -and 12. Therefore, while 8 can continue to doubt in
response to A's challenges he cannot pursue such a strategy indefinitely
without being forced to actually ground one of his doubts or withdraw
that doubt. Let us suppose that B does continue to doubt.
(14)8 : D(S) Rule of Doubt
(15)A : ?(D(S) ?-parameters
Commitment effects are:
C (1 4 , A ) = {P,Q,R,S,S->R,R-»Q,<HP}, C(14,B) = { S^R , R-»Q , Q*>P }
C ( 1 5 , A ) = {P,Q,R,S,S->R,R->Q,(HP}, C { 1 5 , B ) = { S">R , R->Q . (HP }
8 must now try to ground his doubt that (S) in accordance with the
rule for challenge without parameters. That is, he must ground his doubt
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by appeal to some X such that [if X then -S] or simply withdraw that
doubt. A ?-pars cannot be immediately followed by a doubt. In addition B
retains his commitment to the conditionals whose antecedents he has been
doubting. Intuitively, this is because it is quite possible that the
conditional be true while the antecedent is false and because we have
assumed a purely criterial context in which the arguments constructed
reflect criterial relations to which neither speaker can become
uncomitted. Suppose that B cannot ground his doubt that S. This need not
yet imply that A hs won.
(16)B : W(D(S) ) Rule of Withdrawal
(17 ) A : ?(D(R))/S,S R ? + parameters
( 1 8 ) B : E(E1) Rule Of Exhibition
(19 ) A : ? ( D ( R ) ) / S , S -> R ? + parameters
Commitment effects are:
In response to 8 withdrawing his doubt that (S) A repeats his
challenge by parameters forcing B to either withdraw his doubt that R or
exhibit some piece of defeating evidence which overrides A's conditional
(S 4 R), ie. a defeater of R in this context. B chooses to exhibit a
piece of evidence. A repeats his challenge forcing B either to withdraw
his doubt that R or to exhibit (E1//S->R) from the set of criteria and
defeaters. If we suppose that B can so exhibit, that is, that such a
piece of defeating evidence is a member of the relevant set, then this
branch of the tree will die at node (20) and by the Rule Of Exhibition
both commitment-sets will contain the cited defeater and B's commitment
to (R), the defeated assertion, will be removed. In other words 8 will,
ultimately, have grounded his doubt that R at node 12.
C ( 1 6 , A ) = {P,Q,R,S,S->R,R->Q,Q->P},
C ( 1 7 , A ) = {P,Q,R,S,S->R,R-)Q,<HP},
C ( 1 8 . A ) = {P,Q,R,S,S->R,R->Q,Q-)P,E1},
C ( 1 9 , A) = {P,Q,R,S,S->R,R->Q,(HP,E1},
C (1 6 , B ) = {S,S->R,R->Q,Q->P}
C ( 1 7 , B ) = { S , S-)R , R-)Q , Q^P }
C ( 1 8 , B ) = {S,S->R,R->Q,Q->P,E1}
C ( 1 9 , B ) = {S,S->R,R-»Q,(HP,E1}
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(20)8 : E ( E1 / / S-)R ) Rule of Exhibition
However, if no such defeater exists B's move at node 18 will amount
to no more than a bluff of the type outlined in the first dialogue. In
that case, 8's move at the, alternative, node 20 would simply be,
This move would, in effect, put R back into B's commitment-set.
Consequently, it would allow A to challenge again B's doubt that Q,
given his commitment to R and R->Q, as is illustrated below,
In a sense this would just be to return to an earlier node, namely,
node 11, where A initially challenged B's doubt in this way, except
that, of course, B could not proceed by doubting R, as he did at node
12, for that doubt cannot be grounded. B must therefore attempt to
exhibit a defeater of Cl, on pain of having to withdraw his doubt that Q.
If we again assume that there is in fact no defeater of Q, then B's move
must be,
(22")B : W(D(Q) Rule of Withdrawal
At this stage commitments will be as follows,
C ( 22 ' , A) = {P,Q,R,S,S->R,R-»Q.<HP,E1} C ( 22 ' , B ) ={Q , R , S , S*>R , R->Q , (HP , E1 }
In other words, commitments will differ only in so far as B does not
accept that P. Again, A can now reiterate his challenge with parameters
made originally at node (9),
(23*)A : ?(D(P))/Q, (HP ? + parameters
If 8 cannot exhibit a defeater of P from the set of criteria and
defeaters then given that he has failed to ground his doubt that Q he
must withdraw his doubt that P,
(24')B : W(D(P)) Rule of Withdrawal
The dialogue would thus terminate in agreement with identical
(20')B : W(D(R) Rule of Withdrawal
(21' )A : ?(D(Q)/R,R-»Q ?+parameters
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commitments, as below,
C (24' . A8.B ) = {P, Q, R, S, S->R, R->Q, (HP, E1}
I hope that the dialogue can be seen to be very much a matter of
exploring lines of reasoning ie. the developing branches from a given
node and frequently returning to that node to reason along other lines in
the light of subsequent discoveries. In fact the idea here is a very
schematic one. The basic dialogic format allows for constructions which
halt easily, which never halt and for a multiplicity in between. Thus
formal dialogue has an essential flexibility which is vital to its role
as an analogue of actual discourse and its use in modelling the vast
range of possible situations.
The ideal system of dialogic, as stated, would be one which
represented and contrasted inductive, deductive and criterial arguments
and displayed how those methods might interact within a dialogical
framework. In addition, it should clearly be the case that the logical
character of each class of inference-ticket is exemplified in the rules
of the game. But this is plainly an enormous task and while it might make
an interesting research programme I can do no more than hint at the way
ahead in the present context. However, one issue which I will address
here is the problem of distinguishing a criterial basis for assertions
from other types of evidential bases. I have suggested earlier that
arguments such as 'the cockerel is crowing, therefore it is dawn', or 'he
wore a black armband, so someone must have died' might be distinguished
from criterially-based assertions in that while there are contexts in
which we are forced to accept criterially-based assertions, on pain of
rejecting the language we use, this is plainly not so as regards those
other, symptomatic, arguments. Again, I have suggested that we cannot be
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forced to accept the conclusion of any such argument and have suggested
allowing speakers, via challenge with parameters, to doubt the inference-
ticket involved in such arguments. Of course, this would make any such
purely symptomatic dialogue hopelessly inconclusive, as it perhaps ought
to be, but my purpose remains the illustration of criterial reasoning in
the first instance and the symptomatic arguments are only of any interest
by way of contrast with that type of reasoning. I would suggest that
dialogues conta.ining both types of argument are of most interest when
construed as exemplifying different ways of getting to the same
conclusion. For that purpose I include a certain amount of symptomatic
evidence along with the criteria and defeaters and mark it so as to
distinguish criterial conditionals from symptomatic conditionals.
Suppose then that we have evidence T which is criterial relative to
the assertion that P. Further, suppose that the set \|> of evidence is
widened to include evidence 's' which is symptomatic relative to P and
that the sentence S in ip reports 's'. Again, suppose we also have the
defeater E, such that E//IHP. Consider the following dialogue;
(1)A : A(P) Rule of Assertion
(2)B : ?(P) , ?-parameters
(3)A : A(S) Rule of Assertion
The commitment effects will be,
C(1,A) = {P}, C(1.B) = {P}
C(2 , A ) = {P}, C(2,B) = {P}
C ( 3 , A ) = {P,S,S->P}, C ( 3 , B ) = {P,S,S->P}
Both speakers are now commited to the symptomatic argument
presented by A. But suppose,
(4)B : 0(P) Rule of Doubt
( 5) A : ? ( D ( P ) ) / S , S->P ? + parameters
8 has doubted that P, removing his commitment to it and in so doing
has been challenged by parameters. It is quite open to B now to doubt
- 233 -
that S. I suppose he does as below,
( 6 ) B : D ( S )
( 7 ) A : E ( s )
Rule of Doubt
Rule of Exhibition
A has responded however by exhibiting 's'. B cannot challenge or
doubt the exhibition of evidence. Unlike the criterial case however B
may doubt the alleged conditional,
8 is now commited only to ' s" and A cannot force 8 to accept his
conclusion. Therefore, this branch from node (1) has died in stalemate.
It is perfectly possible to include properly inductive generalisations,
represented as (Vx)(Ax Bx), in a similar manner. In these cases
however we might choose to include a counter instance among the
evidence. Exhibition of the counter instance could then result in a
denial, an assertion of the negation, of that conditional. Although the
conclusions would always be negative this would at least allow for more
productive dialogues featuring inductive arguments. In contexts in which
no counter instance is featured however stalemate would again be the
result. This fact reflects the point that while, under certain
circumstances, we might be compelled to accept a criterially-based
assertion, speakers cannot, I argue, be forced to accept the conclusions
of symptomatic or inductive arguments.
Having outlined the formal system I will now discuss some conditions
which might be imposed upon it to ensure its coherence and consistency.
In any given dialogue mechanisms for dealing with any contradictions
which might arise or come to be commitments of a speaker do, of course,
already exist. Firstly, contradictory commitments can be challenged,
with or without parameters. Secondly, rule 'E' automatically deletes
( 8 ) B : (S->P) Rule of Doubt
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those commitments in either store which contradict that which has been
exhibited. Finally, speakers might easily be allowed to appeal to a
theorem, perhaps an Intuitionistic one, to demonstrate the falsity of
contradictions. I think it is clear then that while a speaker may become
commited to a contradiction the means will exist to prevent that speaker
maintaining a contradiction. This fits quite well with the intuition
that while any speaker may unwittingly hold a contradiction he must be
prepared, as a rational agent, to retract and resolve the contradiction
once it is highlighted to him. An obvious candidate to provide
consistency of the rules, in a very weak sense, would be the condition
that it never be the case that one and the same act is both prohibited
and permitted. However, the dialogue is intended to be an analogue of
proof and, just as it is part of what a proof is, or part of what "proof"
means, that the rules do not prohibit and permit the same move, so that
feature should flow from what a dialogue is.
It is important here to say something about consistency over a
number of dialogues rather than within any given dialogue. I would argue
in this case that it should never be possible to get contradictory
conclusions as outputs from two dialogues with the same original inputs.
That is, given the same input for any two dialogues, it should never be
possible at the last line, as it were, to have one and the same speaker
committed to A at the end of one and -A at the end of the other.
Although I do not have a proof that this is so I think that the
condition can be seen to have been met once it is spelled out more
fully. Where the members of vp are identical in any two criterial
dialogues it ought not to be possible that at the conclusion of the
dialogues one and the same speaker could be committed to an atomic
member of ip in one dialogue and the negation of that atomic member of ip
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in the other dialogue. Intuitively, there seem to be three possibilities
as regards criterial dialogues. Firstly, where there are no defeaters,
the criterially based assertion A will end up in the commitment store of
each speaker. Secondly, where there are defeaters present, A will not
end up in the commitment store of each speaker. Now, there would appear
to be a third possibility, namely, where we just can't say whether or not
a defeater obtains. This case appears to be undecidable. However, in
practice, if a speaker cannot tell wheteher or not a defeater obtains he
will not be able to locate that defeater (if there is one) and therefore
will not be able to exhibit a defeater. If no defeater can be exhibited
then no doubt of any criterially-based assertion can be grounded. If no
doubt can be grounded then the criterially-based assertion must be
endorsed by both. This is not to claim that the assertion is thereby true
or is known but simply that the logical possibility of defeat is not
itself a ground to doubt an assertion. Therefore the third option is
neither undecidable, nor, I argue, is my account of it unreasonable. For
any two dialogues then with identical sets of criteria and defeaters i|) it
must be the case that at the conclusion of the dialogues speakers are
committed eitVier to A in both or are not so commited in both according
to whether or not there is a defeater, but not to something different in
each case. My claim then is that, for two dialogues with identical sets
t|), that input will ensure that either A is or is not a member of the
commitment store of each speaker, consistently in both dialogues.
Therefore, if, at the conclusion of one dialogue, A is a member of the
commitment store of a speaker then, at the conclusion of the other, A is
a member of that commitment store.
It is clear that in so far as the rules might be considered purely
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as formal rules for manipulating symbols so far can the suggested
condition of consistency be considered a purely syntactical one.
However, the entire system is very nearly an interpreted one and in
reality it is very difficult not to give the dialogues a reading and to
appeal to considerations about this following that due to the truth or
the meaning of one or the other. This consideration points therefore to
the condition being in fact a semantic one and, I hope, an intuitively
plausible one. Further, I hope that this is not the only point at which
the system in general coincides with our intuitions, In fact, the
dialogues also give rise to a highly plausible account of how
conditionals are formed in natural dialogue. That is, within the formal
dialogue we can easily see how conditionals come to be. If, for example,
an initial assertion by A, say, "X is in pain", formally, "P" is
subsequently doubted by B:
(n) A : P
(n+1) B : DIP)
(In fact ?P would do as well at n+1).
It will be obvious that A's next move is to invoke a piece of
evidence, let us say "X is screaming", formally, "Q", thus:
(n+2) A : Q
It is very natural to take A's moves as conjointly implying the
claim that Q -> P, "if X is screaming then X is in pain" just because the
second assertion is clearly being given as a reason for the first. Hence,
A becomes committed to Q -> P in asserting Q in response to ?(P).
It is also important to note that <p and could, in principle, be
construed as infinite sets which would generate infinite dialogues. It
might be argued that any such dialogue must be undecidable in that we
just could not say whether or not a given criterially-based assertion
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would end up in the commitment store of both speakers. Again, however if
no defeater could be located in a very finite number of moves doubt
could not be grounded and assertion would be forced. Therefore, on the
basis of the rules, a good case can be made for the dialogues being
finite. Here it seems that what is really required to ensure the
impossibility of infinite dialogical regress is a rigorous and strict set
of rules although a prohibitive rule to prevent looping in dialogues, in
the sense of repeating patterns of discourse, might be made explicit. The
most plausible condition, I suggest, would be that no assertion already
withdrawn may be re-asserted. Therefore, I argue, the dialogue offers a
basic account of how conditionals are formed, namely, as commitments
produced by responses to challenges to provide grounds for assertion,
they are consequences arising from reasons and justifiers. Formal
dialogue illuminates the pattern of their construction perspicuously and
it is hardly one which stretches our intuitions at all uncomfortably.
At this point it is worth reflecting upon how much of the character
of the criterial relation has been captured by the model. In fact a great
deal of the nature and status of the relation is represented.
Firstly, the relations themselves are defined in the rule-language
as rules of grammar, precisely as they ought to function in natural
discourse. The defeasibility essential to criterial inference is
represented in a concrete way by explicitly featuring instances of
defeaters in the left hand side of the relevant criterial conditionals.
Thus, unlike approaches of the type hinted at in Baker [1974] speakers
do not have to contend with problematic infinite lists generated by
'unless' clauses. The notion of defeasibility involved in actual practice
and the characterisation of the role and limits of scepticism as regards
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criterial assertion is also further underpinned by the scope of the doubt
operator. Full criterial support forces the assertion and in the absence
of countervailing data the assertion will be fully warranted and
"certain" in the sense that because no ground to doubt is available any
doubt raised must be groundless and therefore inconsequential. This is
not to say however that the assertion is guaranteed to be true, only that
in the absence of contravention and with full support it is, by the rules
of the game, just what we say. These stipulations then must go some way
towards reflecting the distinction between the imaginability of the
negation of P and the availability of grounds for doubting that P, which
I have held to be fundamental to the logic of criteria. Further, as all
moves in the game are linguistic acts, and all properties of linguistic
acts are dialogical in character, it will be the role and function of the
criterial relation in the dialogue which gives it its status and
character. Summarizing then, it is clear that the triumvirate of
epistemic role, semantic role and the crucial defeasibility, as I
perceive these notions to be of relevance to criteria, are all reflected,
to some extent, in the formal analogue.
Despite the fact that the task is plainly an enormous one and that a
full and proper explication of the logic of criteria presupposes some
solution, ultimately, to the problem of non-monotonicity. I would argue
that Formal dialogic can offer a fundamentally appropriate framework for
a formalization and mathematization which will illuminate and do justice
to the practice of criterial reasoning.
Finally, while it may well be possible to doubt anything it cannot
be possible to doubt everything ie. the meaning of every term we use. The
game of doubting must be taught and learned too. Psychologically, at
least, we cannot continually doubt whether we are right in applying words
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as we do, if doubt is to be a linguistic phenomenon at all, indeed, if
language is to be a phenomenon at all. It seems undeniable to me that
there exists a practice of basing assertions on criteria, especially as
regards psychological attributions. While that practice may be,
philosophically, perplexing and problematic it seems nothing but
dogmatic to simply reject that practice as wholly wrong. For better or
worse such reasoning cannot be simply dismissed. If the logic of
criteria is to remain of interest to philosophy however its proponents
would do well, I argue, to choose a dialogical context in which to argue
their case.
In the last analysis, if scepticism is applicable it may just be
that nothing is in fact sceptic-proof or even that a degree of
susceptibility to scepticism is in fact an acid-test of good theorizing.
Against this however it is worth pointing out that the dialogic bears to
some extent upon the Theory of Rationality. If it is allowed that
language precedes any concept of rationality in the sense that learning
a language involves learning procedures of argument and criticism,
allowed, that is, that rationality is a concept acquired when language is
acquired, then in learning a language we must learn what is reasonable in
argument and criticism. Now, if in learning a language we come to
understand the meanings of certain words and sentences via criteria and
understand and use criterial rules of inference then criteria spell out
what it is rational to infer.
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